An Essay on “Hume to Hegel,” Featured in The Absolute Choice
Are not Hegel and Hume opposite responses to our Philosophical Age?
I think more needs to be said on why I have transitioned from Hume to Hegel, and here I will attempt to further explain myself. I believe Eric Steinberg is correct in his Introduction to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that ‘much of post-Kantian philosophy was content with Kant’s ‘answer’ to Hume [and that] many studied the latter […] simply to critique and refute him.’¹ This tendency is perhaps starting to change in our time, which is to say it is more so ‘recognized that the judgment of Hume by his contemporaries was, on the whole, unjustified,’ but what does it mean to “return to Hume” in a way similar to Žižek’s call for us to “return to Hegel?”² To start, it is to recognize that a severe problem of philosophy is philosophy itself, which suggests something was missed (something perhaps noted by Hegel, to look ahead). In my view, Dr. Donald Livingston has done invaluable work to help revive Hume scholarship, and certainly Dr. Livingston’s interpretation helped awaken me from a “dogmatic slumber” — I doubt I would have ever made it much beyond Neo-Pragmaticism without him, and certainly I would have not been ready to reconsider Hegel or the Modern Counter-Enlightenment.
I
Hume’s incredible Treatise on Human Nature failed miserably, and much of Hume’s later writings rework the Treatise into more digestible forms. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding revisits Book 1 of the Treatise, and at the start of the Enquiry we are told something important that provides a framing for considering all of Hume, a framing we have reason to believe was with Hume from the start. In the Introduction of the Treatise, Hume writes:
‘Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.’³
We see here already a Hume who believes philosophy tends to direct itself in favor of itself at the expense of everything else (“autonomous reason”), a theme emphasized throughout his career. Similarly, Hume suggests the centrality of “common life” in his thinking:
‘[…] the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.’⁴ [emphasis added]
By “the science of man,” Hume does not mean biology but “common life,” which is much more phenomenological. This seems like ‘the commonsense school of Thomas Reid,’ but critically that is not what Hume means, for ‘[p]articipation in custom does not provide one with an epistemology privileged access to truth; nor can it serve as a foundation for knowledge.’⁵ This would privilege the “non-philosophical” in ways that Hume wants to avoid, for ultimately the “dialectical incompleteness of philosophy” is a philosophical thought we must reach through philosophy (privileging “commonsense” would suggest this journey is not needed) (and please note here we can see something similar to Hegel’s “Phenomenological Journey” and it’s negation/sublation, as Cadel Last discusses). And what exactly is the character of “the philosophical thought” which constitutes a negation/sublation of philosophy (into what Hume calls ‘true philosoph[y]’)?⁶ To quote Dr. Livingston:
‘Anyone, then, who philosophizes engages in an act of reflection guided by the principles of ultimacy, autonomy, and dominion. But what Hume discovered is that these principles do not cohere with other principles of our nature and that, consequently, philosophy so understood is inconsistent with human nature. And since philosophy is supposed to yield human self-understanding, it is inconsistent with its own nature. If philosophy is to continue, it must take account of this discovery and reform itself.’⁷
Our “Doctrine of Being” must marry a “Doctrine of Essence,” per se, a marriage which must be maintained in the “Doctrine of Concept” (to consider Hegel). Dr. Livingston continues:
‘This discovery that philosophy is inconsistent with itself and with the critical thinking which achieves the reform that renders philosophy self-coherent is expressed by Hume in a dialectical circle of thought. Philosophers who have passed through this disturbing circle [emphasis added] of philosophical self-understanding Hume calls ‘true philosophers.’ Those who have not reached the level of self-awareness in which philosophical reflection itself is seen as a problem and so have not themselves instantiated the dialectical circle are ‘false philosophers.’ Their ‘falsity’ consists not in asserting propositions that do not correspond to a world of objects, but in a failure of philosophical self-knowledge […] The dialectical circle, first exhibited in the Treatise, is in the background of all Hume’s philosophical writings, shaping his reflections and giving them their special character.’⁸
The terms “dialectical” and “disturbing” stand out as overlays with Hegel, as does this overall depiction of philosophy as ironic, contradictory, and paradoxical. Why does Hume so describe and situate philosophy? Hume wants to defend “a science of man” as foundational, which will entail Hume deconstructing any possible alternative foundation (such as science, “autonomous rationality,” philosophy — anything “bestowing,” to allude to Nietzsche) — but why? I believe the reason is captured well at the start of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (which again is a reworking of Book I of the Treatise):
‘Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or security of his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: […] Man is also an active being […] It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race [emphasis added] […] Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human […] , and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound research I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.’⁹
Take special note of how Hume wants us to be punished if we engage in “bad” or “false” philosophy. If we cannot “stay a man” while philosophizing, then Hume has no sympathy for what befalls us, for Hume actually believes we are a grave threat and danger (as Philosophy Kings, Dictators, Suffering Servants, etc.). This suggests overlap between Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence” and Hume’s “common life,” and for both “abstract reasoning” which fails to become “concrete” as such is a problem.
Along with the Conclusion (Section VII) of Book I of his Treatise, “Of the Different Species of Philosophy,” Section I of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, is excellent for grasping the overarching concern of Hume’s thinking (and even “anti-philosophy,” paradoxically, to allude to Lacan). Hume wants us to be human, and he believes it is only by maintaining a “science of man” as foundational that we will accomplish this goal (similar to how Nietzsche seems to believe that we must deconstruct “Bestow Centrism” if we are be Overmen and Children, as I discuss in “The Overman and the Allegory of the Cave”). We cannot receive or use a foundation that is external to the human life, but that begs the question of what exactly constitutes such? Indeed, Hume will have to outline his defense and case for “common life” well and clearly.
In the above quotation, what’s also interesting is how Hume suggests we will be rightfully punished if we fail to bring our philosophical reflection to the realm of “common life” (‘profound research I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce […]’), which similarly suggests how we undergo “effacement” in Hegel if we fail to undergo “negation/sublation.”¹⁰ If we fail to “negate abstraction into concreteness,” Hume suggests we will be punished and rightfully so. A good way to avoid this punishment is to not engage in philosophy at all, and indeed for most of history, that seems to have worked well enough. Ah, but as discussed in “Hegel’s Justification of Hegel,” now “The State” has arisen to Philosophy, and so there is “reason to think” that we need Philosophy to negate/sublate. If this is the case, then we must risk Philosophy, which is to say we must risk the punishment Hume describes as awaiting those who fail to “stay a man,” per se. If “being a man” today requires being a Nietzschean Child and Overmen, that would suggest that we can only avoid the noted punishment by also rising to Nietzsche’s challenge — our surviving and thriving seems to be a tall order. We must become Children as subjects engaging in Absolute Knowing — only then can we “remain human” as Hume employes — and elaborating on all of this is the work of Belonging Again (Part II).
II
Hegel gives us a “(non)journey,” just as Hume does, and in this we see a “negation of abstraction into concreteness,” as necessary for us to “remain human.” Hume wants us to save our humanity (as does Nietzsche, who believes we can only save it by negating/sublating it into Children), which he believes we will lose unless we “rethink philosophy” and keep “a science of man” foundational. Otherwise, Hume tells us that ‘I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man’ — a statement which suggests Hume’s skepticism of philosophers as akin to Nietzsche’s, and where Hume discusses “a need for common life” we might think of Nietzsche’s “need for dancing.”¹¹
For Hume, the point of philosophy is to make us at home in our “common life” and to enable us to defend it, as logic for Hegel is in the business of “conceptually mediating the subject” and to avoid “effacement” through navigating the fitting “negation/sublations” rationality and thinking will inevitably bring us upon. Hegel seeks to keep humanity “human” just like Hume (as does Lacan, suggesting “staying human” requires “facing the subject”), but Hegel believes that we have reached a point in History where this requires “Absolute Knowing,” which ultimately means for us, after “the death of God,” that we must become Nietzsche’s Children (who can create values for ourselves), as hopefully is made clear in Belonging Again and The Absolute Choice. What is “Absolute Knowing?” Sounding similar to Žižek, I think Dr. Livingston describes it well, commenting first on overlaps between Hegel and Hume:
‘Both thinkers aim to give a complete account of experience […] Each form implicitly claims to be a complete, self-determining account of the whole of experience, and each, through dialectical criticism, is shown to fail at being the absolute coherent form of experience. Each fails because each takes a part of experience as the whole […] Temporary resolutions are reached as subverted worlds are gathered up into greater wholes, only to discover once more their partial character.’¹²
‘What Hegel calls ‘absolute knowledge’ is the philosophical insight that this is our condition: to seek an absolutely coherent and self-determining form of experience, and always fail [to find that ‘coherence’ can never confirm ‘correspondence,’ per se]. But in the process of this adventure in radical self-determination, numerous and varied spiritual forms emerge which constitute the rich tapestry of human culture […] Philosophy is […] the only form that knows what it is, namely the act of seeking an absolutely coherent, self-determining experience. But it is not superior in that it can replace the other forms or dictate their conduct. And it can understand the other forms only in a manner of the ‘owl of Minerva,’ when they have finished their work and are safely in the past.’¹³
“Absolute Knowing” is a state of knowing that we are structured as subjects by a negation/sublation, a constant encounter with limitation and failure which makes “us” even possible. I understand that not all Hegel scholars agree with this interpretation, and I would like to note such here to suggest readers of this essay explore those alternatives for themselves. However, I am partial to this interpretation, because I am partial to linking Hegel and Hume, and I believe this understanding of “Absolute Knowing” aligns with Hegel (though Dr. Livingston himself may not agree, as I’ll expand on). Why do I say that? Consider the following, which is from the Introduction of Hume’s Treatise, suggesting Hume’s commitment to something like “Absolute Knowing” his whole philosophical career:
‘When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; [though] we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.’¹⁴
The overlap between Hegel and Hume here feels blatant, and both seem to suggest that we should feel a satisfaction precisely when we accept “an essential incompleteness” as the end of philosophy. Philosophy “lacks” an ultimate grounding, and it is this realization which for Hume is how we do philosophy (as necessary) and “still be a person.” Personally, I find Hume a profoundly useful guide for understanding Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel, and I think we see in Hume basically the unfolding of Spirit according to failures and negations/sublations. Hume is not a “deconstructionist” leaving us with nothing but fragments, but a philosopher who, like Hegel, wants us to understand that what seeks to be “autonomous” will fail and either thus suffer “effacement” or undergo “negation/sublation.” But though Hume matches Hegel up to the Phenomenology of Spirt, it is at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (and possible start of Science of Logic) that Hegel continues onward (we all have roles to play, after all).
III
For Dr. Livingston, Hume and Hegel are ‘inverted mirror images of each other, and they generate alternative paths that can be taken in the adventure of the first philosophic age.’¹⁵ Both are ‘rare thinkers for whom philosophy itself is the fundamental problem of philosophy,’ but Dr. Livingston believes the key difference is that for Hegel ‘philosophy and experience are the same,’ while for Hume they are not.¹⁶ In fact, for Hume, what Hegel attempts could be seen as ‘a spectacular case of philosophical alchemy and hubris.’¹⁷ Hume sees ‘philosophy [as] one form of experience among others [and to] treat the philosophical act as the essence of experience is just another instance of the stock error of false philosophy: spiritualizing part of experience as the whole.’¹⁸ And so the line of disagreement is drawn, the roads diverge in the woods — but is this what Hegel is doing? Is Hegel incredibly similar to Hume, only to ultimately make one of the worst of all possible mistakes?
For Hume, ‘[t]he philosophical act seeks radical self-determination independent of the dictators of any common life, and necessarily fails.’¹⁹ Hegel completely agrees, and he describes philosophy as coming to choose Determinations as Necessities in Elements of Philosophy of Right (as I describe in “Hegel’s Justification of Hegel”) so that we might avoid the temptation of “Abstract Freedom” to end up effaced, which is ‘the despair of absolute skepticism […] the fate that always awaits the philosophical act purged of every aspect of common life’ and/or Determination.²⁰ This is the despair experienced at “Absolute Knowing,” which for Hegel can suddenly become a joy precisely in the same way Hume thinks of it: ‘Out of this despair the authoritative character of common life is noticed for the first time and is embraced by an act of philosophical deference and submission.’²¹ Similarly, when in Lacan we accept “lack as fundamental,” we suddenly see it as an ontological feature and stop experiencing “lack” as a source of despair but perhaps as a source of creative possibility (as discussed in “The Impossibility of Fulfilling Desire Is the Possibility of Intrinsic Motivation” by O.G. Rose, for example). “Absolute Knowing” is something akin to “The Passion of Christ”: God’s death is God’s Salvation.
Alright, so they agree? On much, but the better question might be if Hegel and Hume can be “bridged,” and Dr. Livingston does not seem to think so since for Hegel ‘the philosophical act is the telos of experience.’²² Yes, this seems to be suggested by the Phenomenology of Spirit, but is that what we find in Science of Logic, Hegel’s main work? That seems to be the critical question, which would suggest Science of Logic is where we must look if we are to ultimately find resources to avoid Global Totalitarianism or Duginism (as described in the first “Hegel to Hume”). For Dr. Livingston, the difference between Hume and Hegel can be described as:
‘There is an ‘absolute moment’ in Hume as in Hegel where the thinker’s relation to the whole of experience is grasped. For Hegel it occurs at the moment of ‘absolute knowledge,’ where the philosopher grasps the whole of experience as a hierarchy animated by the philosophical act. For Hume it occurs at the moment of ‘absolute skepticism,’ where the emptiness of the project of radical self-determination becomes manifest and the primordial authority of common life is revealed.’²³
In my view, “Absolute Knowing” is a state of realizing something that is “always already” (a “(non)journey” for Hegel), and each stage of “The Phenomenological Journey” requires all the others. Furthermore, for Hegel, the philosophical act itself is ultimately the recognition that it cannot ground itself and thus cannot be “autonomous” as we think it is, but rather must be “dialectical.” And if so, why? (Is it because Notion and Nature are isomorphic, connected, etc.?) Hence Hegel moves from “dialectical thinking” into “speculative reasoning,” which is a move Hume perhaps sees no need for at all, and in fact the move risks our connection to “common life.” It is true that in Hegel it would seem that ‘[t]here is and can be nothing outside the philosophical act,’ which for Hume risks us “being people,” but this only follows if what constitutes “the philosophical act” itself isn’t negated/sublated at the end of Phenomenology of Spirit, which indeed it is, and arguably a reason Hegel wrote the Phenomenology of Spirit is precisely to be sure he doesn’t make the mistake Hume is admonishing against before Hegel enters Science of Logic.²⁴ (Philosophy becomes philosophy, per se, at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and so Science of Logic elaborates on a logic for the sake of exploring Nature/Notion.)
“The telos of experience” for Hegel is a particular philosophy which realizes philosophy cannot be “autonomous” as cannot be (nonrational) experience, which is to say Notion and Nature require one another. If philosophy must devour itself, Hegel wants us to speculate why that is, while Hume suggests there is no reason to take that next step. And for most of history, Hume was “practically right,” I think, but then Globalization and Pluralism occurred, and now things have changed (which suggests that though Hume’s notion of history was “practically right,” using it now instead of Hegel’s would be “overfitting,” just as would be using Aristotle’s logic). And with that I think we have framed why we must consider moving from Hume to Hegel — the only response we can find in Hume to Globalization is ultimately Duginism (which perhaps is ultimately all we can hope for), but we’ll see.
‘In dramatically transubstantiating the whole of experience into the philosophical act, Hegel stands as emblematic of the first philosophical age,’ a point I agree with Dr. Lovingston on, but with a different sense of what constitutes “the philosophical act” (as informed by Science of Logic).²⁵ ‘Nature is that which saves us from the absolute skepticism and nihilism to which autonomous reason inevitable leads’ for Hume, and Hegel agrees, which is to say Notion realizes at the end of Phenomenology of Spirit it requires Nature (something outside itself, Gödel-esq).²⁶ And yet here is the problem for Hegel: Nature itself is known through Notion. Following Kant after Hume, Hegel acknowledges that we can never reach the ontic through the ontological, and so how can we assume that “Notion and Nature” are not actually “Notion/Nature?” Is there not a presupposition, assumed in Hume? Indeed, there is, but one which was “practically fine” for most of history. But now, faced with Globalization and Pluralism, the assumption cannot be accepted without also, in my estimation, accepting Global Totalitarianism or Duginism.²⁷
The division between what I call “perceiving” and “thinking” is basically all we need in Hume (as discussed in (Re)constructing “A Is A” by O.G. Rose), and if there was no Globalization and Pluralism, it would also be “practically” all we needed to live well. And for most of history, indeed, Hume was “fitting,” as was Aristotle, but things have changed, and clinging to them now would cause “overfitting” and “effacement” in an age with nukes and a “Meta-Crisis,” where the consequences for failure could be more dire. Hume and Aristotle as “complete concepts” themselves have reached a point of failure, precisely in line with Hume’s and Hegel’s thinking, and it is today, 200 years after his death, that we need to negate/sublate Hume into Hegel (fortunately Hegel gave us 200 years to prepare). Also, to suggest further stakes, please note that a reason I think we missed what I call “The Modern Counter-Enlightenment” is because we failed to match Hume and Hegel, which would create a strong line of thought from Vico to Hume to Hegel to us, and I believe we need that strong line to find an alternative to Postmodernity and Neo-Pragmaticism, which is inadequate to protect us from totalitarianism and nihilism. Though Hume does not give us all that can be found in Hegel, it is still important that Hume and Hegel not prove impossible to fit together, hence why I think it is important to clarify what constitutes “the philosophical act” for Hegel, doing which can help us see how both Hegel and Hume agree that Notion requires Nature. But here we can trace out the real difference.
Nature and Notion for Hegel are locked in a feedback loop, while for Hume Notion only represents Nature or relates to it through and/or as abstraction. Hegel suggests Nature and Notion could be Nature/Notion, while in Hume it is always “Nature and Notion,” per se. This difference is massive, and we will cover it more substantially in “Hegel’s Question,” which basically asks, “How do Nature and Notion relate?” Hegel’s answer seems different from Hume’s and more like Owen Barfield’s, which means to me that we might have a way to avoid Duginism, but we’ll see.
For Hume, Hegel might erroneously mistake a part as the whole; for Hegel, Hume might erroneously treat parts and wholes as separate. Merold Westphal writes that for Hegel ‘[t]he truth is the whole […] and it follows that the part is the false so far as it is merely part […] the part is also true in the degree that it expresses in its own limited way the whole.’²⁸ For Hegel, parts connected into wholes are not the same if those parts are left alone in isolation (suggesting the “layered cake”-example which Dr. Conant brings up in “Why Kant Is Not a Kantian”), while in Hume the parts which are part of a “whole” seems to function the same as the parts separate from any whole. There is more “emergence” in Hegel than in Hume, I think, and that changes everything, for then we can ask, “What is the nature of reality so that emergence might be possible?” And once we ask that, we cannot easily assume a “representational” relationship between Nature and Notion: we have lost the “plausible deniability” we need to remain in Hume and maintain “epistemic responsible” (considering W.K. Clifford), which is what we require to not be overwhelmed by “existential anxiety.” And so Hume now “overfits.”
For Hegel, ‘a totality is not merely an aggregate, being part of a whole means more than being one of a bunch,’ and that means the emergence of Philosophy in History changes the “whole” into which Philosophy emerges.²⁹ For thousands of years though, the role of Philosophy in History has ideally been precisely to do what Hume has taught us, which is to use Philosophy to honor and defend “common life” — where Philosophy failed in this, Philosophy has caused disaster. But History continues to advance, and so “human nature” is changing precisely as Hume and Hegel understood; now, melancholy and delirium is something everyone can feel, not just those who engage in “bad philosophy.” This is “The Mental Health Crisis” or what some call “The Meaning Crisis,” and this means everyone requires “good philosophy.” Indeed, but that means we need a “common life,” and that is what Dugin offers (we can stay in Hume and ignore the ontological implications of “emergence”), unless that is in Hegel we might find a way to substantively situate “the one and the many” (A/B). Otherwise, our only option might be a multitude of Daesins (different ontoepistemologies, A/A, B/B, C/C…), either communally (Dugin) or individually (Deleuze), versus a Trinity. (a “harmonious” ontoepistemology). And these are the stakes: if Hegel is “practically impossible,” we likely will not overcome “The Meta-Crisis,” except perhaps through unifying the planet against a greater foe.
More could be said, such as how in Hume we are dealing with “concept, percept, and subject,” while in Hegel we could be dealing with “concept/percept/subject,” which seems necessary if we are to avoid Totalitarianism and Duginism in favor of Harmony — but for now we should bring this opening piece to a close. “Hegel’s Question” is where we will return to the question of Hume and Hegel, the relation of Notion and Nature; here, I only want to suggest the trajectory of this book. I will end with a quote which I believe sets the terms of the debate:
‘The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny […] But such is the fragility of human reason […] while we ourselves […] happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of [good] philosophy.’³⁰
And so David Hume ends his philosophy at “Absolute Knowing,” at the end of Phenomenology of Spirit, which is where Hegel starts his philosophy, a beautiful baton pass, with Science of Logic, asking, “What must the nature of reality be so that ‘the whole is a riddle?’ ” Does this mean that Notion changes with Nature so that Nature is always changing and thus not totally known, or does it mean that Notion can never fully represent Nature? In other words, is Hume right because we are dealing with a “true infinity” between Notion and Nature, or because Notion can only ever hope to be a “spurious infinity,” only ever moving from one thing of Nature to the next, never reaching an end of its effort to represent it? Hegel believes Hume is right, but Hegel asks, “How is Hume right?” And such a simple question leads to Science of Logic, where we find that ‘[t]he truth is the whole,’ which changes the parts, and so a Notion which represents Nature is not the same as a Notion which “Natures,” per se, as a Nature which contains Notion is not the same as a Nature absent of Notion.³¹ Or so Hegel notes we cannot be so quick to assume, and if we do assume it, we forgo the chance at a Harmony and perhaps set ourselves up to be replaced with Artificial Intelligence (which will always best us at Notionally representing Nature). Is that the choice we want to make?
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Notes
¹Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Company, 1993: vii.
²Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Company, 1993: vii.
³Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2005: xxiii.
⁴Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2005: xxv.
⁵Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 37.
⁶Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 19.
⁷Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 19.
⁸Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 19.
⁹Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Company, 1993: 3–4.
¹⁰Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Company, 1993: 3–4.
¹¹Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2005: xxvi.
¹²2Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 387–388.
¹³Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 388.
¹⁴Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2005: xxvi.
¹⁵Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 387.
¹⁶Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 388.
¹⁷Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 389.
¹⁸Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 389.
¹⁹Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 389.
²⁰Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 389.
²¹Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 389.
²²Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 395.
²³Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 395.
²⁴Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 396.
²⁵Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 396.
²⁶Livingston, Donald. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998: 397.
²⁷There is a sense in which Hegel is Kant/Hume and opposes both in them.
²⁸Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Atlantic Highlands, N.J. Humanities Press Inc., 1978: 84.
²⁹Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Atlantic Highlands, N.J. Humanities Press Inc., 1978: 141.
³⁰Hume, David. Dialogues and Natural History of Religion. New York, NY: Oxford World’s Classics, 1998: 185.
³¹Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Atlantic Highlands, N.J. Humanities Press Inc., 1978: 84.
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