A Nonfiction Book
What is “discovered meaning” versus “created meaning,” and is “discovered/created meaning” possible?
As discussed brilliantly in the article “Is Meaning a Meaningless Pursuit?” by RJS (which this section is heavily indebted to), through Making Sense of God, Timothy Keller discussed the importance of meaning in life, and argued that “created meanings” aren’t robust enough to sustain people through life: they will prove psychologically, emotionally, and spiritually disappointing. He acknowledged that ‘subjective, created meanings do serve human life well,’ and warned Christians not to tell their nonreligious friends that their lives are meaningless.¹ Keller noted though that without “discovered meaning” (meaning grounded in X versus x), meaning can be ‘fragile, weakening quickly under too much thinking or adversity,’ while for those whose meaning is grounded in X, ‘sustained thought and even suffering only drive[s] them deeper into [their meaning]’.²
Some have viewed the loss of Meaning (X or “discovered meaning”) as liberating, for it has meant that we now are free to create whatever meaning (x or “created meaning”) we want. As Hunter described during his talk with David Brooks at the 2016 Faith Angle Forum:
‘To make a long story short, under the conditions of modernity and late modernity, the background of stable institutional patterns is receding, and the foreground of choice is growing.’³
As institutional forces, “givens,” and the like have collapsed, we have in a sense become increasingly free, but this means we are also likely more existentially and psychologically anxious (and in this state, totalitarianism can become appealing). Keller wrote:
‘If you decide that the meaning of your life is to be a good parent, or to serve a crucial political cause, or to tutor underprivileged youth, or to enjoy and promote great literature — then you have, by definition, a meaning in life. Plenty of secular people live like this without being tortured and gloomy in the manner of Camus. It is quite possible to find great purpose in the ordinary tasks of life, apart from knowing answers to the Big Questions About Existence.’⁴
Keller pointed out that these meanings are “created,” while belief in God ‘was the basis for discovered, objective meaning — meaning that [was] there apart from your inner feelings or interpretations.’⁵ Keller continued:
‘The meanings that secular people have are not discovered but rather created. They are not objectively ‘there.’ They are subjective and wholly dependent on our feelings. You may determine to live for political change or the establishment of a happy family, and these can definitely serve as energizing goals. However, I want to argue that such created meanings are much more fragile and thin than discovered meaning. Specifically, discovered meaning is more rational, communal, and durable than created meaning.’⁶
As what Hunter called “the foreground” has grown, “the background” has become increasingly fragile, which means that what “holds up” and “supports” the foreground is increasingly likely to break, bringing “the foreground” down with it. In other words, the society that makes possible our freedoms as we know them — to speak, assemble, marry, and the like — is increasingly likely to fall apart. The more appealing authoritarianism becomes, the more likely our foreground will be lost: the expansion of freedom can ultimately become what breaks it.
Considering this point in light of Keller’s argument, as “created meaning” has replaced “discovered meaning” (versus happen “in” the context of a Meaning or “be an image of” X) — as x has replaced X — so too has increased the likelihood that all meaning is lost (that meaning becomes meaningless), though this doesn’t mean a given person who only lives by “created meaning” will feel nihilistic. I believe the same could be said about CCE, and how without “discovered X” versus “created x,” the likelihood CCE doesn’t devolve into mere “values” is slim.
For Keller, it is hard to imagine Martin Luther King Jr.’s program for social justice starting and sustaining itself based on a x versus a X, as Keller doesn’t seem to think x is likely to stand against suffering nearly as well as X. I don’t think Keller would say it’s impossible, but highly unlikely and will only be possible for a minority. Likewise, I don’t think community is utterly impossible without X (my critique of Hunter isn’t total), just highly unlikely, especially for the majority. For the majority to have the possibility of character, “discovered CCE/X” seems needed as opposed to “created CCE/x.” Yes, I believe CCE is possible without X — the question is if it is possible and sustainable over the long run for most (as debt can sustain an economy in the short term, and even for the long run if the debt results in investment that finances itself, but that’s hard to guess or tell). Without X, Keller suggests it is probable for the majority that character, meaning, and the like inevitably collapse before personal will, pleasure, and happiness. Without X, there is no standard robust enough to “stand against” our want; without X, it seems inevitable “the therapeutic will triumph.”⁷ Ultimately, all this approaches the question of if the majority can be Nietzschean Children, living according to a “discovered/created meaning” — our strange, paradoxical, and seemingly necessary challenge.
If self-denial is based on x, which is ultimately created by the self/will, why would a person deny doing something they want to do because according to x they should? What the person wants to do has just as much authority over the person as does the person’s (created) x. Considering this, without X, it seems unlikely the majority would participate in self-denial and character development in any sustainable and distinct sense: “created meaning/CCE” (x) lacks power, reason, authority, and robustness. This is because the self-denial which attempts to locate its source in self-affirmation blurs the line between “self-affirmation” and “self-denial,” and when that affirmation feels like it’s being weakened, then we will strangely also likely conclude that we are losing the benefits of self-denial, and conclude what we are experiencing is “wrong” and not something we should be experiencing. As a result, in the name of strengthening the self, we may withdraw as “the right thing to do” precisely that which could strengthen the self — a strange situation.
In a “created meaning/CCE,” the line between self-affirmation and self-denial becomes difficult if not impossible to draw. When a personally “created CCE” comes in conflict with what is personally wanted, it would seem probable and even logical that the personally “created CCE” be (temporarily) abandoned until the experience has passed (precisely when it practically matters) (and keep in mind we often don’t want what is ultimately good for us, which we at the same time want when asked directly — confusingly). I don’t deny that a logic and rationality could exist to avoid a person throwing out a “created CCE” when it comes in conflict with personal want — my concern is what is practically likely for the majority. For the majority, character could always be something “about to be developed” — “always about.”
Without X, x is naturally experienced as self-imposed, and if the self wants something that stands against what is self-imposed, it seems unlikely for the self to stop imposing on itself. A minority of people may, but likely not the majority. Yes, if we believe in the X of Christianity, for example, there is a real sense in which we choose that X and impose it on ourselves; however, Christians believe what they choose is actually not “self-created” but rather “realized.” For the Christian and others who believe in God, what is self-imposed isn’t identical with what’s self-created, while for those who don’t ascribe to an X, the self-imposed and self-created are one and the same (as it is for the Christian in the eyes of those who don’t believe in Christianity, do note, which suggests the possibility of “Absolute Knowers” and Children). Indeed, the Atheist would argue that the X of Christians is in truth “self-created/imposed,” seeing as the Atheist doesn’t believe in God, but the key point is that the Christian believes that his or her X is Transcendent of his or her self. Whether or not the Christian’s X is ultimately an “x in disguise,” the practical impacts which belief in X has on the Christian are significant. Perhaps these benefits are thanks to self-deception and delusion, but if so, considering their potential benefits, perhaps some “self-deception” isn’t so bad?
The religious ascribe to an X that they believe isn’t ultimately an x, though Atheists think any given X is ultimately an X and actually always was an X — to think otherwise is self-deception. And perhaps Atheists are correct, but that wouldn’t change the point that an x or “self-created/self-imposed X” is one that will ultimately fail to sustain CCE.8 Perhaps though all we need is an X that’s actually an x but never realized as an x (perhaps like a God who doesn’t exist but who we always have reason to believe exists)?⁹ Perhaps indeed, but regardless it should be noted that whether a given X actually is an X would not impact how it practically impacts people and sustains CCE, given that the X is always maintained plausibly as an X by those who ascribe to it. Considering this, the question of whether God actually exists is a question that proves secondary to the concerns of this paper (which is most focused on “psychotechnologies”), especially considering that religious practices could still be committed to even if God didn’t exist. It’s an extremely important question, yes, but one that must be pursued elsewhere.
Perhaps “human rights” could function like an “Atheist God” (X/x), per se, an X that has authority and that ultimately won’t devolve into an x (especially in the times when self-will comes in conflict with self-imposed self-denial, which is when it counts)? Indeed, perhaps “human rights” could (it’s hard to say), and it is indeed possible there exists some x which is “as practically robust as X.” Still, it seems difficult to see how “human rights” or any ethical code could maintain authority and power over those who don’t want to follow them at a given time, in a given experience, without those rights being nested in a plausible X (especially a conscious X like God). No, human rights and CCE don’t need to be backed by a God/X when times are good, but for when self-will comes in conflict with them — those are the times when it seems either X or law are needed. And if laws are why people don’t do what they want to do, then people will struggle to define character or even meaningful ethics, a grave sign that freedom is in trouble (as argued in “Kafka, Law, and Character” by O.G. Rose); furthermore, as argued in “Equality and Its Immoral Limits” by O.G. Rose, where there are laws, there is “existential anxiety,” which is what makes totalitarianism appealing and can cause social instability (though “fear of God” can also cause “existential anxiety,” as noted by thinkers like Christopher Hitchens, who has compared God with Orwell’s Big Brother). And lastly, if the laws aren’t backed by some sense of X, it seems likely that many will see laws as expressions of authoritarianism and/or that laws could suffer a “legitimization crisis,” to use Habermas’ phrase.¹⁰
If it is the case that God doesn’t exist and that ultimately all religions and ascriptions to an X will be unveiled as based on an x, for sustaining CCE, finding some “Atheist God” (which is “practically” the product of a Nietzschean Child, arguably) is of the utmost importance for the possibility of maintaining CCE and hence better avoiding the problems discussed in this paper. Do not mistake me as saying that Atheists cannot give themselves meaning in life or that the religious are necessarily better off: believing this life is all one has could motivate a person to do everything in their power to make this life better, while the religious may not care at all what happens to this life, so focused on escaping it to heaven. Not all action that happens in the name of X is necessarily good, as not all action that happens in the name of x is necessarily bad. Furthermore, the Atheist can be spiritual, as argued by Sam Harris in his book Waking Up.
Overall, my point is that when a person’s self-will comes in conflict with that person’s moral order, it is much more likely a given person will suspend his or her “moral views” until the conflict passes then if the person believes in the divinity of Christ and/or if his or her Kantianism is backed by a belief in God. Kant worked hard to prove that it was rational to be ethical, but in response, Kierkegaard asked, “Why be rational?” When one’s ethical life comes in conflict with his or her will, it would seem to me that it would become irrational of the person to be “rational/ethical.” Perhaps not for everyone, but for many.
No, Atheists don’t need God to be good people and certainly lack of belief in God often makes no practical difference in their lives. However, the concern here is what happens when times are bad for the majority, when self-will comes in conflict with a person’s self-imposed moral order, and/or when self-will comes in conflict with what a person wants to do? Without X, it seems a person’s moral order will lack authority, making meaningful character unlikely for the majority (which if required for freedom, as argued in “Kafka, Law, and Character” by O.G. Rose, would make freedom improbable). Without an Atheistic X, even if all religions are false, it would seem to me only Theists would ascribe to a moral order that has authority (particularly when “self-will” comes in conflict with a “self-imposed order”) to back its claims that “the poor need to be provided for,” “diversity matters,” “free speech should be protected,” “discrimination is wrong,” “humans have dignity,” “don’t cause unnecessary pain,” and so on. So this suggests the question: Assuming Theistic X(s) are false and/or at least no longer plausible (“given”), is an Atheist X possible (that can be a “given”)? This, of course, is the question of it’s possible for the majority to be the Children of Nietzsche, those who create an X/x that is experienced phenomenologically not as merely chosen and created, but powerful, meaningful, and more authoritative than arbitrary wants.
To close this section, please note that when the “discovered meaning” people have involves suicide bombing and blowing up abortion clinics, it would be preferable if those people instead only lived according to a “created meaning,” for it would be far easier to convince them to change their views. Likewise, we cannot say that character is always good, and it is possible for “having character” to be worse than “being ethical”: the Nazi who “has character” and denies his desire to not serve in the Nazi party for the sake of greater Germany would have been better off to have done what we believed was ethical and avoid killing. Considering this, we shouldn’t assume that “discovered meaning” is always good — again, the loss of “givens” reduces the probability of “the banality of evil.” Rather, we are investigating the role of religion as a “psychotechnology,” which is to say as a way to shape and influence how people act and behave collectively, making possible “shared intelligibility.” Without this, we suffer an “existential anxiety” which makes totalitarianism appealing and nihilism hard to avoid.
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Notes
¹Keller, Timothy. Making Sense of God. New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016: 74.
²Keller, Timothy. Making Sense of God. New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016: 74.
³Allusion to “Dr. James Davison Hunter and David Brooks at the March 2016 Faith Angle Forum” by Michael Cromartie, as can be found here:
https://eppc.org/publications/dr-james-davison-hunter-and-david-brooks-at-the-march-2016-faith-angle-forum/
⁴Keller, Timothy. Making Sense of God. New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016: 65.
⁵Keller, Timothy. Making Sense of God. New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016: 65.
⁶Keller, Timothy. Making Sense of God. New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016: 65.
⁷Without X, it seems difficult for people to maintain a unified view of the world — something holistic that avoids fragmentation — and without that, character seems difficult to maintain as distinct from values.
⁸Furthermore, as discussed in The True Isn’t the Rational by O.G. Rose, if “the map is indestructible,” then a given X, even if it’s ultimately an x, can always be maintained plausibly and rationally as an X, making it function in a manner that sustains CCE.
⁹We could also discuss the role of “beauty” as potentially being something the majority could “plausibly” experience as suggesting an X (regardless if the X actually exists), as discussed in “Beauty Saves” by O.G. Rose.
¹⁰But again, it should be noted that much of the authority and sway of X is often grounded in a fear of Hell and hope of reward in Heaven — is this really so different from law? It would seem so: it would seem it strikes people as much less arbitrary and consequential.
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