An Essay

On Words and Determinism

How Geworfen Throws the World

1. Words have power.

2. Words orientate, and relative to that orientation, create/realize the world/future (of a speaker).

2.1 A person’s world is what a person experiences. What one says determines what and how one experiences the world. Therefore, words orientate the world.

2.2 Words determine what and how humans experience the world. The present moment (‘now’) slips into the future every second, so to speak ‘now’ influences how one experiences (the very next moment of) the world. Therefore, what you say determines what you do, what those around you experience, and, therefore, what world comes unto you.

2.21 If you say something depressing, you will be primed to experience a world in which you are depressed; if you say something joyful, you will be primed to experience a world in which you are joyful. Likewise, if you say something self-deprecating, you will be primed to experience a world in which you are self-loathed; if you say something self-affirming, you will primed to experience a world in which you are affirmed.

2.22 When asked ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, a person is given a choice as to what future/world he or she will experience. If the person says ‘yes’, he or she will experience a world in which the person is sitting and watching a movie; if ‘no’, the person will experience a world in which he or she is worried about whether or not the friend is offended by the decision and/or a world in which the person stays at home and reads a book.

2.23 If I ask someone ‘how are you doing?’, I will create a future/world in which we are talking about how that person is doing. If I hadn’t said anything, that world would have never come about. If I say ‘toothpick’ to a person, I force that individual to talk or think about — be ‘toward’ — a toothpick. In a way, I invade that individual’s freedom. If I were to merely think about a toothpick, that individual’s freedom and will wouldn’t be so infringed. Thoughts, in this sense, don’t have has much power as words.

2.24 The moment I say ‘toothpick’, a world in which the person I’m speaking to doesn’t engage with ‘toothpick’ is impossible. Once I speak, an alternative world is gone forever. Yet had I said something else, a world in which the person I’m talking to engages with ‘toothpicks’ (now) would likewise be impossible. With every word, I determine what is possible and what is impossible, what is concrete and what is abstract.

2.25 If a person asks a girl ‘will you marry me?’ and the girl says ‘yes’, because of a three-letter word, the girl will experience an entirely different set of experiences than she would had she had said ‘no’: she creates the world she will experience by what she says. Note that this girl enters this world the very instant she answers; instantaneously, her entire mode of being and ‘toward-ness’ are changed. Words are powerful enough to create a new world the very moment they are spoken.

2.3 Life is a movement of x to X, of (a) ‘now’ moving into the presently-not-in-time. ‘Now’ is a world and the future is a world dependent on the world of ‘now’ to ‘be’ (experienced).

X = ‘outside-of-time’-ness.

x = a given moment of spacetime.

What I say ‘now’ orientates and creates the world of the future that I experience (momentarily). Words link x1 and x2 and present x1 with various options of what x2 could be. The words of x1 ‘now’ determine which options (worlds/futures) x1 is presented (or which x1 is orientated ‘toward’), and these words influence which x1 experiences while x1 moves forward in time toward X. Words orientate causality and ‘link’ (moments of) spacetime(s).

2.4 Moments of silence are moments in which previous words (perhaps from years ago) can continue organizing the world.

3. Words wouldn’t exist without humans. Without words, the world would be on a set course of time and space. Words, and so humans, add uncertainty to the deterministic.

3.1 Words have the power to transform how the world unfolds: they keep ‘what could be’ in constant flux and the future indeterminable. Without words, the world would be locked into a certain set of causality (which couldn’t even be experienced as ‘causality’).

3.11 If as President I declare ‘war’, the future of the world is dramatically changed. If there were no humans to declare ‘war’, the future of the world would be very different and couldn’t change (so quickly and randomly). Likewise, one word — ‘cease’ — could change history. Without humans, whatever series of events that things would lead to (and that the world would undergo) couldn’t be changed: spacetime would be set. Words though make it so that the road is always moving.

3.2 Words never speak: people speak. Words never generate words (though words may stimulate a person to generate them). If there were no people, there would be no words, and in a sense, there would be no worlds (just a world).

3.21 An animal can make or repeat sounds, but a human can speak. No bird can willfully create the future: a bird can only cause events to happen insomuch as they happen. If there was no humanity, what those events would be would be set from the beginning of time. If a paper cup was on a table and there were no humans, it would be ‘fated’ (five years ahead of time) to rest there for five years before falling to the floor due to a gust of wind through a window. However, with humans present, there is no set course: the cup could be picked up tomorrow when requested, forgotten, destroyed in a nuclear explosion, etc. — the possibilities are endless. The same logic applies when it comes to speaking. If it weren’t possible to say ‘please weed that garden’, it wouldn’t be possible for a human to ask another to bring about a world in which he or she was beautifying the property. Because a given individual can speak at any moment, every instant contains the potential for countless courses of causality, though only one can be actualized.

3.211 Without words, humans would undergo determinism, as do animals. Animals are incapable of altering causality because they cannot conceptualize causality and add words to experiences. Since a bird cannot ask ‘would you like to go to the movies?’, a bird cannot present or be presented with the option of either going to the movies or staying home. Rather, a bird can only be presented with options in regard to what the world ‘throws’ at the bird. If the world presents the bird with a storm, the bird can either stay in the rain or perch under the cover of a tree, but the bird cannot ‘throw’ a storm unto itself, per se, by asking ‘what will I do if a storm comes?’. Humans, on the other hand, from within the world into which they have been ‘thrown’ (in the Heideggeran sense), can ‘throw’ a world ahead of themselves into which they will journey. Though humans cannot decide into what they are ‘thrown’, they can ‘throw’ themselves into a future/world of their own choosing (from their given starting point), as orientated by their words.

4. Words are ‘in the world’, but not of it.

4.1 ‘The world’ is where causality is all encompassing and determinism true. Words are ‘not of it’ for words are not deterministic, and by extension, neither are humans entirely.

4.2 Words are fundamentally human, and humans, with words, are fundamentally ‘indeterminable’. Something totally ‘in the world’ or ‘in causality/determinism’ must follow the world’s course, but humans, with their words, can steer it. It is with words that human define themselves (through worlds) (with)in being and time.

4.21 Because of words, how the world unfolds (through time) is constantly changing and indeterminable (relative to an alternative dimension absent of humans). Without words, the way the world unfolded would be unchangeable. Only a human can willfully cause the course of history to change (to be ‘unset’), for only a human can speak and create new worlds and new modes of experience.

4.22 Since words orientate phenomena in time and people choose when they speak, determinism, as a whole truth, is false; yet, in part, it is true. People are free in deciding which experiences-under-causality/determinism they undergo, and they exercise this freedom through speaking.

4.221 When an entity does (or undergoes) something that isn’t a result of speaking, determinism is true. When a person speaks, freedom and determinism coexist. When an entity does (or undergoes) something as a result of speaking, determinism is false.

4.2211 In the act of speaking (which includes sign language), the difference between determinism and freedom can be defined. Though they are distinct, outside the act of speaking, freedom and determinism cannot be (meaningfully) separated. As speaking divides the object cup from the word ‘cup’, speaking divides agency from circumstance. As with an object and the word which signifies it, agency and circumstance are hard to conceptualize apart. In other words, once the object cup is called ‘cup’, it’s hard to talk and think about the object cup independent of the word ‘cup’.

4.2212 When speaking and action cross, though one acts freely, the difference between determinism and freedom cannot be determined, though they are distinct — like two rivers that merge.

4.222 When a human isn’t engaged in, or influenced by, speaking, the person lets his or her self be carried by the river of determinism; when the person speaks, the person swims the other way. When a person speaks to others, in that moment, the speaker is free, though the speaker may be submitting others to further determinism by forcing them to exist in a world in which they experience what is said.

4.223 Determinism and freedom are like two rivers that cross here and there yet remain distinct. Each deposits water into the other, so any point of each river can be composed of different amounts of the other. In places that the rivers cross, the rivers cannot be defined apart. And the rivers need one another: a world that doesn’t have both freedom and determinism lacks what the other needs for definition.

4.224 As one speaks, one moves in and out of determinism freely. And yet it is only from X that this can be empirically observed. A finite being (x) can only believe.

4.23 When a person speaks, the laws of causality are activated in the direction of the speaker’s choosing, like a bullet fired from a gun.

4.231 Speaking is like throwing people into a machine that doesn’t stop just because they’re in it. Once I say ‘you’re an idiot’, the feelings, implications, causality, etc. that results are inescapable for the person to whom I’m speaking. I have now forced that person to feel sad, to undergo an identity crisis, etc. The person wasn’t free to stop me from speaking, and the person isn’t free to choose whether or not he or she goes through the experiences created by my words.

4.2311 Everyone’s world is constantly at risk before the mouths of others: mouths consume worlds.

4.232 If you have a surprise present for your mother that your brother knows about, you are at his mercy. You cannot keep him from speaking and ‘pressing down’ upon you a world in which your hard work of keeping the surprise a secret doesn’t pay off. Before your brother, you are not free, and yet in such a case, you verify the freedom of your brother, who is free to ruin your surprise. Such an experience shows how freedom and determinism are two sides of the same coin. Of course, you are free in deciding what you say to your brother, but you are not free to decide what he says and so to what you have to respond and/or adapt. In this example, your world is shaped and controlled by what information your brother chooses to share or withhold. Because you are at his mercy, you verify his liberty; yet, he is not free to have his freedom meaningfully defined without you. In this sense, as you are at his mercy, he is also at yours: the master and the slave are slaves of one another.

4.233 At any moment, someone around you can say something and ‘incept’ a thought into your mind (in line with “Inception, Dichotomies, and Freedom” by O.G. Rose). By telling you that you’re insane, I can force you to question the validity of everything around you and to face the thoughts such a claim causes. You are not free to not be in this possibility. In this sense, you aren’t free, yet because you (can) also put others in this situation, you are free.

4.24 Determinism can end where lips open.

5. Words are not a result of causality, though they are in causality (and temporality).

5.1 Causality never causes, as ‘the laws of nature’ never cause an event in nature. Causality isn’t a thing, but a kind of atmosphere things undergo. ‘Causality’ refers to a relationship between phenomena; it isn’t a phenomenon in itself. For causality to be a thing that determines what things do and that restricts freedom, causality would have to be a thing. This is another reason why determinism, as a whole truth, is false.

5.11 Causality occurs as one event leads to another, but causality does not determine what the events will entail. Though causality may determine that a cup falls off a table when there is an earthquake, causality does not cause the cup to be on the table or to exist in the first place. I put it there; I made it. One could say that I put the cup there because someone told me to, and that would be true (in this example), but only because I agreed to do what that person asked. Had I had not listened, causality would have never gotten the cup on the table. Granted, causality would have determined that the cup undergo some other series of events from where it was left once the earthquake hit, but causality couldn’t have made the cup fall off the table if the cup was left in a cabinet. I decided where the cup would undergo causality. To simply say the cup was determined to do ‘so and so’ when the earthquake hit would miss the fact that I decided where (and upon which spacetime course) the cup underwent such determination. Causality is only part of the story.

5.12 Causality can only operate upon phenomena within the parameters of a set, spacetime course, while humans can move phenomena between courses. Within and relative to a given course, phenomena undergo determinism: freedom emerges in the shifting between deterministic courses. Yet like two rivers that are merged and then split again, it is in the act of speaking that ‘freedom’ can be meaningfully defined from ‘determinism’, as it is in speaking that trust can be defined from ‘living’ (in line with “On Trust” and reminiscent of points made in “On Love” by O.G. Rose).

5.13 Please note that anytime this paper uses the terms ‘causality’ or ‘determinism’ in a manner that sounds as if they have agency, this paper does not mean to imply such. To say, for example, ‘causality occurs as one event leads to another’ is to say that causality is the atmosphere in and under which events transpire.

5.2 If there was no time, there would be no causality: if I dropped a ball, it wouldn’t fall. Of course, without time, I would never be able to drop a ball in the first place: the ball would either come into being in a state of falling or not (though, without time, the ball wouldn’t be so much ‘falling’ as it would be ‘suspended’). Without time, there is neither causality nor choice, determinism nor freedom. The two exist together (in time): there is no such thing as a world in which they exist apart. If there is time, both determinism and freedom will be present.

5.21 Keep in mind that if we existed in a world in which dropping a ball caused it to float, it would be a violation of ‘the laws of nature’ if the ball dropped to the floor. What constitutes such a violation is relative to what we are used to experiencing (the same can be said in regard to causality and non-contradiction). We decide what constitutes ‘the laws of nature’, because ‘the laws of nature’ don’t exist unto themselves: we define them. In deciding this, we exercise freedom, as in coming up with determinism, we act freely. To define ‘the laws of nature’ is to defy nature. This all being true, it becomes apparent that what we believe constitutes our deterministic world isn’t as concrete as the word ‘deterministic’ would lead us to believe.

5.22 If there was no time, there would be no space (for time is a result of, and relative to, space), and yet if there was no space, there would be no time. Like causality and choice, they cannot exist apart.

5.221 In a sense, causality is spatial; choice, temporal. Relative to space, determinism is true. Relative to time, freedom is true. Relative to spacetime, determinism/freedom is true (with spacetime being what actually exists, since space and time never exist apart).

5.23 Without words, there would be no experiential distinction between time and space, because the ‘rivers’ of space and time would never uncross. Every time one speaks, the rivers part, making it clear that they are distinct. Though the rivers would still be distinct even if they never separated, it would be impossible for anyone to identify this, nor would this distinction be meaningful or matter.

5.231 Time and space never exist apart: they are always one in ‘spacetime’. It is ‘toward’ what one speaks that time and space can be conceptually divided, though they are never apart in actuality. However, all around ‘toward’-what-one-speaks, time and space are indistinguishable. If I cup my hands, dip them into a river, and then pull them out, I can now define the water cupped in my hands from the river (though the water is still ‘river’, in a way). The same occurs when I speak in regard to space and time (though time is still ‘spacetime’, in a way).

5.232 A similar point can be made in regard to freedom and determinism. When I pick up a cup, I am exercising freedom ‘toward’ that cup; at the same time, I am not exercising freedom ‘toward’ the table it is on. Hence, I am free relative to the cup, but not relative to the table. In sum, I am partially free and partially not. If I thought that humans were either entirely free or not at all, I would conclude that I was a slave, but this would only be partially true.

5.2321 In this act, the table is outside my freedom, but not the cup. It can seem like we live in a deterministic world because our freedom can only be directed ‘toward’ one thing at one time. In a room full of fifty things, for example, I can only be free relative to one of those things and a slave relative to the other forty-nine. I counter the deterministic forces of whatever I direct my will ‘toward’, but in a room of fifty things, there are forty-nine pieces of evidence for determinism and one for freedom. Though humanity has freedom, its freedom is always far less than the forces humanity has no control over. Yet even with so little, humanity can do so much (which is evidence of freedom’s greatness).

5.2322 In any given instance, there are things a person is free ‘toward’ and things a person is a slave ‘toward’. This is what makes the debate about free will so difficult. We are free and we aren’t: we are ‘walking contradictions’.

5.3 ‘Causality’ is a term that describes the flipping of spacetime into another frame of spacetime (like a movie reel). The term refers to how moments in spacetime lead to other moments in spacetime.

5.31 If I hold my hand in front of my face (moment x1) and then lower it (moment x2), time links x1 and x2. Yet x1 and x2 are also in time. There’s technically an uncountable amount of x(s) (x1.1, 1.2…) between x1 and x2, and it’s not causality which links x1 and x2 (since causality isn’t a thing), but all the x(s) between x1 and x2, which function as a kind of bridge. It is because of the infinite x(s) that x1 becomes x2, not causality.

5.311 If I walk down a flight of stairs, causality doesn’t get me to the bottom. Rather, it is x1 (moment of me on step one), x2 (moment of me on step two), etc., all linked together, which gets me down the stairs.

5.312 To say I underwent causality is to say time works.

5.32 Since time is relative, determinism, ‘the laws of nature’, and causality are also relative. Since they are relative, there is no set path which entities must take through spacetime. Therefore, there is uncertainty; therefore, there is freedom.

5.4 ‘Causality’ is a term that refers more to how reality doesn’t contradict than to how reality works. To say ‘if I drop a ball, it falls’ is a testament to how reality doesn’t contradict more so than it is a testament that causality works: to say causality works is to say ‘contradictions aren’t natural’.

5.41 In this world, balls are ‘that-which-fall-when-dropped’. If a ball in this world doesn’t fall when dropped, it contradicts ‘the nature’ of this world and itself, not causality. In a different world, a ball could be ‘that-which-rises-when-dropped’. In that world, for the ball to fall when dropped would be to violate causality and the law of non-contradiction, for it would violate its ontology.

5.411 Since what constitutes ‘the laws of nature’, for example, is relative to what we are familiar to, it is ‘what a thing is’ that dictates how it ‘unfolds’ through time. To speak about ‘the laws of nature’ is to refer to ‘the laws of a thing’s ontology’ (or ‘the law of how things act relative to how things are’), which is to say things act a certain way because things are what they are. Yes, one could say that a person ages because of time, but a person is ‘a thing in time’, so to say this would be to say that a person ages because a person is a person. A person doesn’t age merely because of time, but because a person is ‘that-in-time’ (or at least one cannot meaningfully make a distinction between these perspectives).

5.4111 Gravity isn’t the same ‘law of nature’ on the moon. There, the term ‘gravity’ signifies the tendencies of objects to rise when released; there, suggesting objects fall when let go would be as absurd as suggesting here objects rise.

5.4112 The fact a ball rises on the moon but falls on earth is evidence that ‘gravity’ signifies not so much a ‘law of nature’ as a tendency of an object relative to an environment.

5.4113 If a civilization existed on the moon for thousands of years (which didn’t know about a world in which objects fell when released), the ‘David Hume’ of that civilization would work to deconstruct an entirely different set of ‘natural laws’ into ‘constant conjunctions’.

5.412 Ontology is relative. On earth, a ball is ‘that-which-falls’ when let go, while it is ‘that-which-rises’ on the moon. In a timeless dimension, a person wouldn’t be ‘that-in-time’ and so not ‘that-which-ages’. Ontology is relative to environment and dimensions, but that isn’t to say all of a thing’s ontology is relative. Which parts are which of a given thing takes contemplation to determine. Furthermore, all parts of one phenomenon may be relative, but not of another.

5.4121 A ball on earth is the same as a ball on the moon in ‘ball-ness’, but what constitutes ‘ball-ness’ seems difficult to say. On earth, a part of ‘ball-ness’ is ‘the quality of falling when released’; on the moon, ‘the quality of rising when let go’. This isn’t to say non-contingent ‘ball-ness’ cannot be defined, only that it’s difficult (if not impossible). The same goes for any phenomenon, let alone many.

5.41211 Ontology is effected by environment, as definition is effected by dictionaries (see “(Im)morality” by O.G. Rose).

5.41212 Laws and definitions shift from place to place.

5.41213 Whoever has the power to define ontology has the power to define nature, as those who write dictionaries have the power to define humanity.

5.4122 What a thing is cannot be separated from the context it is in: a person standing in a room is a (moment of) ‘person-standing-in-room’ (of ‘person/room’-ness).

5.413 On the moon, a moment of (a) ‘ball being let go’ leads into a moment of (a) ‘ball rising’; on earth, a moment of (a) ‘ball being let go’ leads into a moment of (a) ‘ball falling’. Time is relative.

5.42 A given x2 cannot contradict its corresponding x1. If x2 is of me standing on a cliff and x1 is of me standing at the bottom of it and there is a second of x(s) between x1 and x2, then x2 contradicts with x1 (assuming that I am ‘that-which-cannot-teleport’). Such a contradiction is ‘relative to time’ more so than ‘relative to space’ (though technically all contradictions ‘of space’ are also contradiction ‘of time’, since space and time are one in spacetime). A cup cannot occupy the same space as a different cup: this is a spatial contradiction. On the other hand, a temporal contradiction would be to say that a cup moves from one table to another when left on the first table for three minutes (given that a cup is ‘that-which-cannot-teleport’).

5.421 Consider the following:

Line x represents a dimension or world in which a cup is sitting on a table. Line y represents a dimension in which the same cup is sitting on a different table. Both dimensions cannot exist simultaneously, for that would be a spatial contradiction. Yet, neither can dimension x become y without a ‘bridge’ between the two dimensions, in the same way that x1 cannot become x3 without going through x2. Both of these would constitute a temporal contradiction.

Consider:

Once x2 becomes y3, y3 becomes x3, and never was/is y3 (relative to x). Furthermore, x3, as part of dimension x, never exists (and is never possible). Once x becomes y, y ceases to be y and, from that moment, was/is never y. It is always part of x (relative to x), and if x were the orientation of a being entering into y, y could have never been anything other than x: to talk of y to the being would be nonsense.

x1 of ‘cup-resting-on-table1’ never leads into y1 of ‘cup-resting-on-table2’ ; rather, x1 leads to x2 of ‘cup-(still)-resting-on-table1’: for x1 to turn into y1 would be a temporal contradiction. However, it isn’t a temporal contradiction for x2 to become y3 (and to make y3 become x3), given that a person moves the cup from the first table to the second. In other words, for x1 to become x3 or y1, 2 isn’t so much a violation of causality, but of temporality. ‘Causality’ refers to ‘a (temporal) law of non-contradiction’.

5.4211 To say ‘a ball falls when dropped’ is to say ‘the moment of a ball falling cannot occur simultaneous with the experience of a ball rising’, perhaps even more so than it is to say that ‘gravity works’.

5.422 Since we already have a Law of Non-Contradiction, the Law of Causality should perhaps be renamed ‘The Law of Temporal Non-Contradiction’ to avoid confusion. However, if when one says ‘causality’ one means ‘non-contradiction’, the term is valid.

5.423 Using the graphs above to expound upon the difference between animals and humans (though keep in mind that humans are animals in part), an animal is stuck on deterministic course x, per se, while a human can jump between course x and y.

5.4231 While a human can make another think about going to the movies, a dolphin can only tell another dolphin that they are at the movies, per se. Animals can communicate about what is, perhaps about what has been, and perhaps about what could be relative to what is, while humans can also communicate about what could be independent of what is. I can talk about going to the movies without any biological clocks telling me that I need to go the movies. An animal, on the hand, if it thinks about going to get food, does so because the animal senses food, is environmentally stimulated, reacts to an innate, biological programming, and/or because the animal is reacting to what another animal communicates (who is reacting to some instinct, sense, and/or communication). This being the case, an animal cannot transcendent causality and determinism, while a human can (but doesn’t always necessarily).

5.42311 Of course, I can want to go to the movies for biological reasons, but this doesn’t have to be the case. Not all human communication is necessarily definable from animal communication, as the ‘rivers’ of determinism and freedom aren’t always uncrossed. However, if even for just once in all of history a human ever said something that wasn’t animalistic/deterministic, humans would be definable from animals, as two rivers that only part for the shortest of spans must be said to be two instead of one.

5.423111 Keep in mind that if you find a river, you may have no idea that the river splits into two (perhaps just for an instant) at some point along it. To be sure that the river isn’t two, you’d have to have walked the entire thing. The same can be said in regard to humans and freedom through history.

5.423112 Relative to a spot where the river doesn’t split, the river isn’t two. If that was the only spot ever experienced, the river would never be two (relative to the observer). The same can be said of humans and determinism.

5.42312 It is understood that dolphins are known to do things not because they have an obvious, biological need for doing so, but for fun. Other animals have also been recorded as having ‘fun’ in various ways, yet such acts are still a result of biological needs, for ‘fun’ has many biological and neurological benefits (see Play by Stuart Brown). This being the case, such acts are still deterministic: an animal is reacting to internal drives. If, on the other hand, a dolphin were to kill a given animal because it was ‘that particular animal’ or for a reason, this would be a human act. While humans can kill for a principle (say Capitalism), and bring that principle into determinism, per se, animals cannot.

5.42313 No animal has written a War and Peace. No biological clock made Tolstoy do this, nor did anything he sensed make him give rise to that particular work. He of course observed ‘war and peace’ (in some form), but ‘war and peace’ did not make him write War and Peace. Perhaps they inspired or urged him to write a book, but not that book in particular. It is in particularities that humanness and freedom can be found (meaningfully).

5.4232 Humans can communicate particularities; animals, generalities. While an animal might be able to tell another that food is needed, a human can talk about a particular food that is needed. An animal can say ‘get food’, in a sense, while a human can say ‘I want a hamburger with mayo’.

5.4233 When a bear roars, the other bear knows that bear is angry because of tone. When a human screams ‘I hate you!’, the other knows it’s because she cheated on her boyfriend. The bear cannot tell the other bear why he is upset, only that he is upset. The emotion can be expressed generally but not particularly (and likewise reacted to). In this sense, the difference between humans and animals is that humans can talk ‘in particular’; animals, only ‘in general’.

5.42331 Of course, the other bear might be able to guess that it’s because he took the angry bear’s food, but the bear can never be completely sure (perhaps it’s actually because the other bear is on the bear’s property). At the same time, when a girl screams ‘I hate you’, maybe it isn’t because the other girl cheated on her boyfriend; rather, maybe she’s just cranky. Yet with humans, it is at least possible for a human to communicate (though often ineffectively) to the other ‘why’ he or she is angry, while animals can only guess via tone. There seems to be little or no degree of ‘why’ in animal communication; with humans, a given statement can be 10% ‘why’, 90% something else (to make a random ratio and example), etc.

5.42332 A human is capable of making another think about different, possible interpretations about what is being said. In saying ‘I hate you’, the girl makes the other think about all the possible implications and interpretations of this statement. When a bear roars, the other bear reacts to ‘anger’; the bear doesn’t react rather to ‘sadness-hidden-behind-anger’, ‘insecurity’, ‘joking’, etc. Also, while a human can hold in mind multiple possible meanings of a statement, an animal seems to only act.

5.4234 A bear can imply that it wants to fight another bear by its tonal inflexion, but it cannot say ‘I want to fight’ (in a way, a bear can only say ‘!’, while a human can say ‘I want to fight!’). A given tone signifies ‘I want to fight’, but it isn’t ‘I want to fight’ in of itself. Also, a human can say ‘I want to fight’ in any tone that the human wants and always mean the same thing; alternatively, a human can mean the opposite of what is being said, such as in instances of sarcasm.

The language of an animal is tones and sounds. While sounds are an animal’s language, to a human’s language, sounds are secondary and meanings/ideas primary. There is also no meaning independent of the sounds for animals: the sounds and meanings are the same thing. With humans, the sounds and meanings are often two rivers that are running together, but they are still distinct.

Animals don’t relay ideas: they relay sounds and tones which signify emotions or needs. Animals are incapable of saying ‘I’m mad’; animals can only communicate ‘I’m mad’ with noise. ‘Mad’ isn’t an idea to animals, only an expression; for humans, ‘mad’ is both an idea and an expression. In a way, the idea is meaningless without expression, but at the same time, the expression is meaningless without the idea.

5.42341 Theoretically, if an animal was taught that ‘madness’ is an idea, this would perhaps prove that humans can pass on their ‘human-ness’ to other creatures, not necessarily that animals can think, that animals can acquire ‘human-ness’ on their own, or that animals and humans are identical. Animals can be taught to react in a way that implies thinking, but until animals teach one another that ‘madness’ is an idea, animals cannot be meaningfully said to think like humans, only that animals can be taught.

5.423411 The capacity to react in a way that implies thinking doesn’t verify the capacity to think. Though animals have proven their capacity to learn, they haven’t proven their capacity to contemplate. To borrow from the thought of Walker Percy, there is a profound difference between the moment when Helen Keller did what she was taught and the moment she recognized that water was ‘water’ (an idea). It is this ‘epiphany’ that animals must be able to give one another to prove they can think.

5.423412 If one animal was to grant the other an ‘epiphany’ experience, this would prove only that these particular animals qualified as ‘human’, not that all animals are human or that all humans are (just) animals (see “On Thinking and Perceiving” by O.G. Rose).

5.423413 Domesticated animals seem to be ones transferred (some degree of) ‘human-ness’.

5.4235 Because humans can think, humans can jump between deterministic courses of spacetime, and because humans can speak, they can make others jump between courses (and meaningfully jump between deterministic courses themselves). In causal terms, the communications of animals are indistinguishable from rain falling from the sky or a billiard ball hitting another one (meaningfully). In lacking ideas, animals must follow causality (or at least cannot be meaningfully defined from it). Considering this, to the degree a given person is animalistic is to the degree a given person is deterministic.

5.42351 One could argue that, relative to timelessness or Eternity, humanity is Predestined and so under deterministic forces themselves. Whether or not humans are under some kind of ‘Divine Determinism’ isn’t the question of this paper, but whether humans are under determinism. It is not in the scope of philosophy to address issues like Predestination, though philosophy that earns the right to blend with theology can address such a topic (in transition and sum as philosophical-theology). Perhaps humanity is Predestined, but humanity’s life isn’t set by (just) causality (and so isn’t deterministic); rather, it’s set by freedom and causality, as can be meaningfully determined thanks to words. If humanity’s life is set by God, it is fortunate none of us have God’s Mind and know our destiny. This would keep one from ‘realizing’ it (meaningfully): destiny could then only be achieved by bored beasts.

5.43 Since causality is temporality, to say that humans direct causality with words is to say that humans direct time. If I never ask my friend ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, time can never make us go. If I never walk outside, neither time nor space can ever make me experience what is outside. What time and space ‘unveil’ is up to me. Determinism cannot be the whole picture, because time and space can never make me experience what I will experience on a walk I don’t choose to go on.

5.431 Though humans, in aging, are powerless before time, time is powerless before humans.

5.4311 In the world, I am forced to experience my circumstances, yet I force the world to experience the circumstance of myself.

5.432 With words, a person can orientate the time and space of others, though a person cannot force others to go down a presented path. If I ask a girl ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, I offer that girl a possible world in which she attends a film, though I cannot make her go to that film. If she goes, in part, I created that world, though only because she agreed to go. Such acts of creation are always communal.

5.4321 Perhaps I can drag her kicking and screaming if she turns my offer down, but then I cannot possibly make her experience a world in which she willingly enjoys the film (as I originally hoped). I am not entirely free to live in a world in which she has a great night with me: I am only free to make the offer (and orientate her ‘toward’ the possibility). Ultimately, the future is always in the hands of those to whom I speak, though at any moment I can force upon them, to at least some degree, a future of my choosing. By speaking to the girl, I force her into a world/future in which she is speaking to me. By replying, she forces me into a world in which I listen to her say whatever it is she chooses to say. One moment I am free; the next, determined. I am free when I speak to her, but I am not free to choose how and if she replies. She is vulnerable to my words as I am vulnerable to hers.

5.4322 No matter how much the girl doesn’t want to be asked to a movie, she cannot make me refrain from inviting her (though she could put duct-tape over my mouth if she knew I was going to), and once I ask, she can never exist in a world in which she isn’t asked. Likewise, she could ask me not to invite her to a movie before I do so, and once she does this, I can never exist in a world in which I am not asked to refrain from asking her out. There is no escape from ‘no escape’.

5.4323 If people didn’t have freedom, whenever I asked ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, they would go. Though they are not free to decide whether or not they are asked the question, they are free in deciding how they respond. It is in this moment during which a person is forced into (contemplation of) a certain future that they are given a chance to exercise freedom. Since it is in the middle of an act that restricts freedom, this isn’t easily noticed. Freedom appears in prisons, places where it’s unnatural to look.

5.43231 I can will to verify the freedom of others, but only they can will to verify mine. Defining freedom is communal.

5.4324 I am free to will that the girl goes to the movies with me, but I am not free to make her go. If she says ‘no’, though she verifies my lack of freedom, she verifies her liberty. In other words, she proves her freedom by violating mine. Considering this, if people didn’t have freedom, their freedom couldn’t be violated. Crimes would be (meaningfully) impossible, because if a person found themselves being mugged, they couldn’t will the crime to stop.

5.4325 It is much easier to identify the existence of freedom relative to people than to inanimate objects. When a person acts freely toward something inanimate (which is an object entirely under deterministic forces), the ‘river’ of freedom and the ‘river’ of determinism cannot be separated. As determinism is verifiable between two inanimate objects, so freedom is verifiable between people. The reason it is hard to tell if I am free ‘toward the world’ is because inanimate objects cannot violate my freedom. In letting my freedom flow uninterrupted, I don’t notice it, as I don’t notice a doorknob until it doesn’t work (to allude to Heidegger). Because freedom isn’t noticed until it is broken, I naturally never recognize my freedom.

To what I will, inanimate objects agree. If I want to pick up a cup, it is picked up. If I want to pick up a hot iron, even if it is hot, I can still carry out this act. The hot iron cannot will for me not to touch it, only ‘be’ (hot), which may make me decide to throw it away. Yet, when I ask a girl ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, she can will against me. A person can ‘will’ against my will, while a mountain can only ‘be’ against my will, per se.

If I want to touch a hot iron but because of how the iron is I decide not to, my will runs uninterrupted and unnoticed. If I wish for the hot iron not to be hot, eventually, it won’t be. Though no matter how long I will for a girl to go to the movies with me, she never has to agree.

If I will for a mountain to be shorter so that I can climb it, the mountain will never change. However, this isn’t because the mountain doesn’t want to help me, but because the mountain in ‘being’ itself, cannot become shorter. Consequently, the mountain doesn’t will again me; rather, I choose to will for ‘something-that-cannot-be’. I, in choosing this, will against myself: I will to violate my will (probably subconsciously). Consequently, my will goes uninterrupted and unnoticed. It is only ‘toward’ people that my will can be violated when I don’t will for it to be violated, so it is only ‘toward’ people that my will can be broken and noticed (like Heidegger’s doorknob).

5.4326 On the other hand, if the girl I asked to the movies agreed to go, it would be hard to tell if I was free, even though I would be getting what I wanted; in such an instance, she would ‘practically’ be like an inanimate object. My will would flow uninterrupted, going unnoticed like a doorknob that worked. Paradoxically, liberty is easier to find in ‘no’ than in ‘yes’.

5.43261 Likewise, speaking is hard to define from sound until speaking fails (which is a moment when the ‘two rivers’ part). Speaking is an act that can violate the liberty of another, as described earlier (and that dichotomizes, as expanded upon in “Inception, Dichotomies, and Freedom” by O.G. Rose), while sounds don’t. Of course, when one speaks, one speaks freely (as has been described), but it is when that freedom seems to fail that we can tell it exists. Speaking entails sounds, but sounds do not entail speaking. Every time I speak in a way that exercises my freedom, my words are hard to define from sounds. Yet, every time I violate another’s freedom, sound and speaking are easier to tell apart, yet I likely don’t recognize this distinction until another violates my freedom. If I want a girl to go the movies and she says ‘no’, I will feel as if I failed in talking to her, yet such an instance is when I can safely say I spoke at all.

5.43262 Animals do not seem to (meaningfully) speak because animals don’t seem to violate liberty with their sounds (nor dichotomize). Animals also cannot seem to (meaningfully) make me think something that they want me to think about. However, a human can force another to think about going to the movies by asking someone ‘do you want to go to the movies?’, as the speaker so wills. A lion by roaring can make you think about finding an escape route, but a lion cannot by roaring make you think about something the lion is thinking about (except perhaps by the most extraordinary of coincidences, which if were to occur, none could know it).

5.43263 It should be noted that if we existed in a world without words, there would be no meaningful difference between humans and animals (though that isn’t to say there wouldn’t be any difference, as when two rivers become one, they don’t necessarily lose their ‘two-ness’). Evidence of this can perhaps be found in studying examples of children who were not brought up with language.

5.433 Time is powerless before humans as humans are powerless before time (just as the other is powerless before the ‘I’ and as the ‘I’ is powerless before the other). In-finite (‘not-determined’) power is restrained by in-finite power.

6. Words are created and creative, not caused or causal.

6.1 A creative act is a non-deterministic act, while a causal act is deterministic. However, all creative acts occur in causality (or temporality), and so are difficult to define from causal acts. Creativity and causality are like two rivers that cross here and there: at times they’re impossible to tell apart; at others, they’re clearly separate. Parts of creative acts flow in(to) and through causal acts, as causal acts flow in(to) and through creative acts.

6.2 Building a sand castle is a creative act. If when a wave hit the shore a sand castle appeared, sandcastles would signify causality. On the other hand, when a sandcastle is destroyed by a wave, this is a causal act. Since sandcastles are in causality, they are easy to ascribe to causality. In fact, since the world is under causation, all efforts to find a creative act that can be defined apart from causality will probably disappoint. In the world, causal and creative phenomena are seemingly one, like two joining rivers, and they appear the same as purely causal phenomena. Likewise, once something is created, it too appears causal. As in speaking it is easiest to define freedom from determinism, it is easiest in the creative act (itself) to define creativity from causation: to put it another way, it is easier to tell creativity apart from causality while watching someone paint versus studying their work in a gallery.

6.21 As freedom is always ‘dressed’ in or ‘behind’ determinism, so creativity is always ‘dressed’ in causality. As freedom looks like determinism, so creativity resembles causality.

6.211 Determinism and causality are masks of freedom and creativity. It is in rare, quick instances that the line between the mask and the face can be glimpsed.

6.22 To use a different image, causality and determinism are a river and creation and freedom bends in the river. We are in the river, and relative to us, the river always runs straight.

6.3 A creative act is any act that directs spacetime toward an end it wouldn’t have realized if left to itself: all acts that redirect determinism are creative. Of course, once redirected, it will seem as if this new direction was always part of what was pre-determined (as depicted in 5.421). Freedom can only be truly seen by entities that can stand outside of time and watch a given being jump between possible spacetime ‘paths’ (an impossibility). Every time a being jumps, the being is free.

6.31 A person is creative every time one thinks and/or speaks and acts as a result of, or under the influence of, speaking or thinking, for such acts counter the direction causality would have gone if left to its own devices. Likewise, one’s experience is ‘created’ every time one acts a result of, or influenced by, thinking or speaking.

6.311 Every time a person acts as a result of thinking, one speaks, even if the person doesn’t say anything: the person uses the language of his or her body to articulate his or her thoughts. Yet this kind of language isn’t a clear or precise language: verbal speaking is far clearer (though not perfect). Speaking ‘do you want to go to the movies?’ quickly and instantly forces another into a decision, while simply raising my eyebrows and trying to get the girl to ‘read me’ doesn’t work so well. Thoughtful acts are ‘dark speech’ (they are talking to some extent, but very unclear). Indeed, all speaking is unclear to some degree, for no one can perfectly read the mind of another: action is simply very low on the ‘scale of language’; telepathy, at the very top.

6.3111 Thought-provoked acts (‘dark speech’) are also free acts, though in being ‘dark’, it is hard to tell. As freedom is only noticed when broken against the freedom of another, the ‘dark speech’ of one’s body isn’t distinguishable as free until it fails.

6.312 Not all actions are a kind of speaking. Thoughtless acts are deterministic (or at least cannot meaningfully be defined from causality): if I hold a girl’s hand because I want her to know I love her, I speak; if I mechanically move a pot to the other side of a room, I act (like an animal).

6.3121 That said, without me, the world in which the pot is on one side of the room versus the other would have never come to be, so is it not the case that actions create/realize the world/future as do words? Absolutely; however, only words can orientate beings toward (the) world/future(s) and create/realize relative to that orientation. If I said ‘do you want to go the movies?’, I would make you think about a future in which we were at the movies, while if I grabbed your hand and took you to the movies without telling you where we were going, you couldn’t think about that possible world (beforehand) — it would simply ‘be’ (unto you).

6.31211 The difference between acting and speaking is that in moving the pot, I do not orientate toward a (possible) world/future: I simply bring that future about. No possibility was presented/considered beforehand: a state of being simply ‘appeared’. While words direct beings toward world/future(s), actions just realize them. Words (unto themselves) cannot realize a future (other than the future in which they are spoken), so action is a necessarily component. Though words can orientate (and so create/realize) the world/future, actions cannot orientate beings ‘toward’ a given future: actions can only make a certain world ‘be’.

When a squirrel moves an acorn, it doesn’t seem to really ‘realize’ a future in which the acorn is in one spot versus another, for the squirrel seems to have had no prior idea of that world before it came to be (or at least nothing beyond a very limited idea). It ‘wasn’t’, then it ‘was’. For a human, a world generally ‘isn’t’, then ‘might be’, then ‘is’ or ‘isn’t’. If I think about going to the movies and then do, I ‘realize’ that idea into reality. Since a squirrel doesn’t seem to think about moving an acorn (it just does), a squirrel doesn’t seem to ‘realize’ any idea into reality.

Even if a squirrel could ‘realize’ the future/world of an acorn in one spot versus another, being unable to speak, a squirrel doesn’t seems like it could make other squirrels ‘realize’ such a world. While a boy can ask a girl to the movies and thus force her to consider that possible future, a squirrel seems unable to force another squirrel into such a ‘toward-ness’. Since it is in these moments when the rivers of freedom and determinism part, even if squirrels were free, they could not be said to be so meaningfully: the difference between determined and liberated would be indeterminable.

6.3122 If I throw a ball at a girl, I force her into a world where a ball hits her head; if I ask a girl if I can throw a ball at her head, I give her the option of entering that world. If there was no such thing as language, it would be impossible to make the girl think about me hitting her in the head with a ball before I actually did so. She could ‘happen’ to think about that upon seeing me touch a ball, but she couldn’t think about it when I willed her to or in any manner that wasn’t ultimately ‘by chance’. Consequently, without language, whatever will be is whatever will be, and determinism, a world of pure causality, is ‘practically’ true.

6.31221 Is it not a matter of cause and effect to ask a girl if I can take her to the movies and so make her think about going? It is in a way (for the interaction occurs ‘in causality’), but not entirely, because the words in and of themselves are created. While two billiard balls hitting one another is a causal occurrence which is the result of another causal occurrence, speaking is a creative act which results in causality, which results in probably another creative act (her response): the ‘rivers’ run so close together that they are hard to define apart.

6.3123 Thinking orientates oneself as does language, however thinking cannot orientate others like language. Also, in thinking, I can never orientate myself toward a world/future that isn’t ‘already in mind’, while in speaking I can be presented with a possibility I ‘wasn’t thinking about’: a girl can say ‘let’s take a walk’ when I was thinking about going to the movies, orientating me toward a future/world I wasn’t considering. In this sense, language can surprise us in a way that thinking can’t (though that isn’t to say ‘daydreaming’ can’t surprise us). I can orientate my future/world and imagine people in different future/world(s) then what they are in by thinking, but I cannot so orientate the future/world(s) of others.

6.31231 Without language, thinking could not be meaningfully defined from perceiving (a distinction expounded upon in “On Thinking and Perceiving” by O.G. Rose): it couldn’t be said that humans could think without language, as determinism and freedom couldn’t be meaningfully distinguished without language. It is in the moments when a person orientates the future of another that freedom emerges distinct, as does thinking. When I think unto myself by my own will, I of course think, but the act can only be understood in terms of the actions I do as a result of that thinking. However, those actions will always be indistinguishable from instincts, reflexes, etc. It is in the space between others that I can say for sure that thinking has occurred. It of course occurs elsewhere, but like a functioning doorknob, it’s unnatural to notice.

6.3124 Without thinking, I could only react to things in the world as they were presented, not before they ‘were’ (presented) — I could only be ‘caused’ toward the future. Thoughtless, I would be in the river of spacetime, not swimming, a silent, determined part.

6.31241 Silent actions influenced by words are still actions influenced by words and so un-deterministic to some indeterminable degree.

6.31242 Everyone is a mixture of determinism and liberty, causation and creation.

6.3125 Without thinking, I couldn’t help others learn how to swim.

6.4 It is in what is commonly referred to as art (painting, dance, writing, etc.) that creativity is most easily defined from causality, for it is obvious a painting or book would have never come into being had determinism not been redirected. Yet if an acorn is on a spot of earth that it wouldn’t have been on had there been no humans, some degree of creativity is also responsible for that acorn’s placement. That said, it is impossible for any human to determine to what degree a given entity and its state is a result of creativity versus causality: the point is simply to recognize that the world is a mixture of these two ‘rivers’.

6.5 Creative acts direct/combine causal entities into a new synthesis in spacetime (causality).

6.6 Only humans seem able to direct spacetime toward an end it wouldn’t have realized on its own, and so only humans seem creative. Perhaps animals can be taught by humans how to be creative, but this very act of training animals to do such is a creative one that spacetime, on its own, couldn’t have given rise to.

6.7 All purely human acts are creative acts. Humans are capable of purely animal acts, human and animal acts, and purely human acts. When a human is redirecting cause and effect, a human is most distinguishable from an animal, but it isn’t always apparent when a human is being creative. The rivers are always mixing.

6.8 Words are always creative, for words always redirect causality. On the other hand, the sea never transcends mathematics.

6.9 Words are always created, for words are always humans. No matter how much the ocean hits the shore, it only makes a sound.

6.91 Usually words are created in response to and with causality, but they aren’t caused in themselves. What is created exists independent and alongside what is caused.

6.92 Nothing causes a human to speak; humans create words when they want. A human is never forced to talk. Even when at gunpoint or tortured, a person can remain silent. People cannot always choose what is caused unto them, but people can always decide what they say in response (if anything).

7. Words are in humans, and so a part of humans isn’t a result of causality: a part of humans is created.

7.1 The created part of humans is a result of and influenced by words. This part cannot be defined from the part that is caused: the ‘rivers’ never part until death. In death, as a doorknob is noticed when broken, the caused is definable from the created (though the created part can’t, naturally, be put into words, being gone). Of course, a doorknob can be noticed when it works, but one has to act unnaturally to do so and make a point to observe it, which would require a person to function abnormally. Something has to break. Likewise, for one to define the part of his or her self which is created versus caused, the person would have to act like he or she was dead (which would be absurd and probably suicidal), but how exactly a person would do this is hard to say.

8. Words are created by humans, so humans create a (created and creative) part of themselves. This part of humans is ‘in the world’, but not of it, and this is the part that is free.

8.1 What a given person chooses to do with their freedom is up to the given person and cannot be universalized. Therefore, what exactly this part is cannot be defined, for each person must define it for his or her self. If it could be defined, it wouldn’t be free. It could be called a ‘self’, but the term would lack meaning.

8.11 A self is that which each person has but no one else can know. A given self doesn’t notice his or her self until it ‘breaks’, which is when the self doesn’t seem to exist. Yet by vanishing, what hides proves it was present.

8.12 By speaking and robbing another’s freedom, I give that other an opportunity to prove the existence of his or her self. The only person of whom I can never give such an opportunity is myself. Others are what I need to ‘know thyself’.

8.2 It’s hard for a human to create his or her self, for all a human observes is caused. Therefore, it seems like belief in freedom is a denial of reality, as it seems that determinism is ‘proven’ and ‘verified’. This is why you cannot always believe what you see, for when you look at a river made of two, you only see one.

9. ‘You’ are free because ‘you’ are a unifier of wor(l)ds.

9.1 Words orientate the course of one’s experiences and the world one lives in. All humans are influenced by words, for a human that doesn’t understand words or that doesn’t speak is an animal (or at least cannot be meaningfully distinguished from an animal). There is no such thing as a human of whom words have not affected, and therefore there is no such thing as a world/future which hasn’t been created to some degree: there is no such thing as a world that hasn’t, to some degree, been spoken into being.

9.2 All experiences of a given person are unified within that person: a person unifies the worlds and experiences his or her words cause.

9.21 Though there may seem to be no relationship between how a person talks to their neighbor and what he or she did at work today, there is a relationship through that person, because the individuals experiences both. If at work a coworker calls a person ‘dumb’, that person may feel depressed when talking with his or her neighbor later that day. The experiences are hence connected. Though the neighbor never encounters the person’s coworker, they have a relationship in and through the person.

9.22. If one can overcome, for example, their habit of putting down their coworker, this will actually help one gain ground against all other negative areas in his or her life. This may sound far-fetched, but all experiences of a given individual are one within that individual. If negativity is perpetuated in one area of a person’s life, it will darken his or her world and thereby darken the other worlds and experiences the person brings unto his or her self. To grow or decline in one area causes all areas to grow or decline (for all is one in ‘you’).

9.23 It may not seem as if cheating on one’s taxes could impact how a person maintains a friendship, but since the ‘you’ of that person unifies the experience of doing taxes with meeting a friend for coffee, the experiences do affect one another (directly). If I cheat on my taxes, when I talk to my friend, I talk to my friend as a ‘person-who-cheated-on-his-taxes’ versus a ‘person-who-didn’t-cheat-on-his-taxes’. Hence, the choice of how I did my taxes decided the ‘mode of being’ through which I would interact with my friend later on. As a result, by cheating on my taxes, I created a world in which I ‘met with my friend as a person-who-cheated-on-his-taxes’ rather than a world of ‘meeting with my friend as a person-who-didn’t-cheat-on-his-taxes’. Consequently, I may become more likely to become a ‘person-who-cheats-on-his-friends’ because of cheating done in another area of life.

9.3 A self is a unification of worlds/futures experienced by/into (a) ‘you’. Since all worlds are infused with ‘rivers’ (however small or faint) of words, a self is also a unification of words.

9.4 To the degree the ‘you’ is infused with worlds/futures that are a result of his or her words is to the degree that ‘you’ is free.

10. ‘You’ are ‘your’ wor(1)ds, for the part of you that isn’t free, isn’t ‘you’.

10.1 You are what is caused; ‘you’ are what is created (which is always founded in/by wor(l)ds). A given person is a ‘you’/you, as a given entity is causal/creative, deterministic/free.

10.11 This isn’t dualism, for there is no such thing as you or ‘you’, just ‘you’/you. When one mentions ‘you’, one refers to ‘you’/you, and vice-versa. Separating you and ‘you’ is purely an exercise in abstraction for the sake of clarifying what they are apart to understand better what they are together. If by ‘dualism’ one means something more like ‘amalgamism’ (like has been described), Cartesianism loses much of its absurdity.

10.2 To the degree a ‘you’ is infused with worlds/futures that are a result of his or her words is to the degree that ‘you’ is free, and so the degree that ‘you’ is definable from you (which is the degree to which that ‘you’ is definable from ‘your’ body and other, deterministic dimensions).

10.3 ‘You’ formulate ‘you’ in you(/‘you’). ‘You’ are not formulated by what others say, though others provide you with opportunities to verify the existence of ‘you’ (as ‘you’ provide opportunities for ‘them’). ‘You’ are not the questions someone asks: ‘you’ are more so the answers. When someone asks a question that violates freedom, ‘you’, though restricted, are given an opportunity of definition (from you). The prison becomes a place of discovery.

10.4 All experiences are linked in ‘you’, and the degree freedom constitutes those experiences is determined by what ‘you’ say. What fundamentally constitutes ‘you’ is decided by what ‘you’ choose to say (into world-ness).

10.5 Though not signified elsewhere in this paper, note that the distinction between ‘you’ and you runs throughout. Simply take ‘you’ to mean ‘you’/you, and vice-versa.

11. You have power, for you have ‘you’, and ‘you’, with words, creates the world.

11.1 ‘You’ power words as words power ‘you’. ‘You’ are the power of words (for ‘you’ can create the world), and words are ‘your’ power (for words are with what ‘you’ create). ‘You’ also have the power to stop yourself/‘yourself’.

12. ‘You’ have freedom.

12.1 ‘You’ speak ‘you’.

12.11 If ‘you’ don’t speak, ‘you’ aren’t.

13. ‘You’ speak.

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Iowa. Broken Pencil. Allegory. Write Launch. Ponder. Pidgeonholes. W&M. Poydras. Toho. ellipsis. O:JA&L. West Trade. UNO. Pushcart Nominee. linktr.ee/ogros