Inspired by “The Net (103)”
From the Introduction (Section 5) of II.2
Before closing our Introduction and moving into the main body of II.2, there is a significant and problematic paradox that emerges in the relation between virtue and power (especially regarding political, institutional, etc. leadership) that expanding on could help us further understand the stakes of why we must “spread Childhood.” We have already discussed in II.1 the need for this “new address” so that we can generate Rhetoric (McCloskey, Rauch), incubate mentidivergence to avoid Nash Equilibria (Weil, Lorenzo), “create demand” (Keynes), regain enablement (Illich), prove capable of handling forgiveness (Callard), and so on, but another consideration could further suggest the stakes of the topic. The problem involves what I will call “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” as elaborated on in “The Net (103),” thanks to an initial framing by Alex Ebert, father of “Fre(Q) Theory,” which also connects with Thomas Jockin’s work on the relationship between virtue and beauty.
If I want to become President of the United States, should I become President of the United States? No absolute or universal judgment is possible, but there’s an argument to be had that a person who wants power, leadership, influence, etc. is exactly the person we don’t want to lead us, precisely because there is something potentially problematic about ambition. Many of the great leaders and heroes of history are often thought of as “reluctant leaders,” compelled by duty or some Higher Power (suggesting another Game Theory Problem that religion might have helped address, as discussed in Thoughts, perhaps also like “The Population Problem”). People who want power are often depicted as immoral and “in it for the wrong reasons,” as similarly it often seems the best novels and ideas are generated not by people who want to be writers, philosophers, etc., but those who felt compelled by something “beyond them,” whether a Vision, God, or Something More. In this way, we might say that generally ambition and vice correlate, while attraction and virtue correlate (though people can use words in different ways), but this could mean we have a problem: “If the virtuous don’t seek power, how can those in power be virtuous?”
Alex Ebert described the feeling of being complete and satisfied in life, which is when our ambition to say create new works or sell more books or achieve more goes away. And there is something fulfilling and wonderful-full about this, and I personally would associate this state with virtue and beauty. Now, we could go into here how there is a difference between some “earned satisfaction” and “given rootedness,” between the feeling of “not needing anything” in a “common life” that doesn’t go on “the philosophical journey” (which can be problematic), versus the “satisfaction” that might be arrived at after a “(re)turn” that is gained through difficult, anxiety, etc., but we have already covered that through David Hume and Hegel elsewhere (say in “Deconstructing Common Life”). For our purposes, we need only note that a(n) (earned) virtuous state is one in which we don’t so much need to do anything. We’re satisfied. We’ve learned to see some beauty in what we find ourselves in and before. Though there is no final or noncontingent “Ultimate Completeness” in this life, we’ve learned to find Harmony in the change and shift of life in a manner that we’ve made the contingent a source of “(in)completeness” (A/B). We’ve learned to Dance. We’ve gained what Ebert might call “a total saturation.” We’re “good.”
Is this Enlightenment? That’s a risky term, but perhaps we might associate this state with it, but here we begin to frame our serious problem. It is suggested there is a correlation between virtue and a loss of ambition, which means those who are less virtuous will have ambition, and so won’t the more immoral end up in power? This is what I mean when I describe “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” and so is not society doomed? Well, wait — is there not virtue in ambition? Also, if nobody had ambition, surely “The Great Enrichment” that Deirdre McCloskey discusses wouldn’t have occurred. These are great counters, and it’s true that though ambition can be a vice, it doesn’t follow that a lack of ambition is a virtue. Some negation/sublation seems needed here, and also context seems to play a role, as does “the historic episode.”
Generally, a virtue of Capitalism can be rewarding hard-work and ambition, and this was partially thanks to “the value-form of Capital” which helped make the earth and finitude valuable (as we’ll explain). It is clear that ambition is a necessary stage of development, but what’s odd is that there seems to be some kind of “virtuous saturation of ambition” on the other side of it, which is not laziness even if it might look that way (“the monk or drunk problem,” as Ebert discusses). For the lazy, work is a virtue, but for the power-hungry, work can be a vice. “Working hard” can also be used as an ethic by corporations to manipulate the working class, as the working class can use this ethic on itself to manipulate itself into “capture.” It really matters the details of “the situation,” and yet risking error seems necessary, because it seems necessary that we at least have ambition to “work through it” (a (re)turn in a Hegelian and Humean sense). We need ambition, as we need fire…Hence, a question: “Are we saying that we need to get rid of ambition?” No, we need to negate/sublate it into “attraction” (of the beautiful, the virtuous, Childlike…), which is to say we make our ambitions for beauty, goodness, and truth. This means ambition serves “encounter” and “attraction” versus be served by or replace them, which suggests Encounterology (discussed in “The Net (95)”). To put this another way, we need ambition in and with attraction, not to replace attraction, which also suggests why we needed to go through a historic period more focused on “the good of ambition”; otherwise, no “(re)turn to attraction” would be possible (just a “staying in attraction,” which is problematic like “staying in common life”).
The virtue or vice of ambition radically shifts depending on the context, and the ambition for making a living to provide for one’s family (for example) seems very different from the ambition to run a country. Could an ambition to “run a country” be virtuous? Sure, but it could also be self-deception, and then also that (initially) genuine virtue could easily be composed in the process of becoming president (for example, as perhaps described in a novel like All the King’s Men by Robert Penn Warren). Without going too much into these critical distinctions, it would seem that the probability of ambition being and staying good when it involves power is significantly less than when it involves “taking care of the family” or “solving a problem” (like how to get clean water, how to create a new communication technology, etc.). Not always, and the line between “good ambition” and “bad ambition” is easily gray (especially where we are “disabled,” say from being able to tell the difference), and it’s also perhaps more likely that ambition prove bad where there is no “Value-Form Competition” (as we’ll get into), say if we’re under a monopolistic value-form of Capital. But the point is that ambition in past ages of Capitalism, in perhaps Task-Based Societies (versus Voice-Based Societies, as we’ll also discuss), was perhaps more likely to honor and support the good than today. Furthermore, it seems especially the case that ambition involving management, rulership, leadership, governance, etc. is more likely to be vice-full, and why exactly is framed in “Why the Worst Get on Top” by Fredrich Hayek.
Hayek was written on in Thoughts, and though there is far more to the argument, we could just say here that good people don’t like telling other people how to live their lives, while bad people enjoy controlling others. Aligned with Hayek’s reflection (the valid application of which seems to increase the larger the system, as Kohr understood, making “the problem of scale” very difficult), Daniel Schmachtenberger discusses how the system might select and reward sociopathic behavior, and we noted a similar problem in II.1 in claiming that neurodiversity was needed to avoid Nash Equilibria problems, and yet right now that predominately might mean we end up with sociopaths and psychopaths in positions of power (for they are neurodiverse and can handle making decisions others cannot), until at least we learn to “spread mentidivergence,” which we associated with Simone Weil (suggesting further reason why “spreading Childhood” matters). Anyway, today at least, in a First World Nation and Voice-Based Society, it seems very likely that the ambition to have political, corporate, etc. power is more often than not a sign of vice (“power” here is very different from what Nietzsche means, please note, for “managerial power” is a power to be a Bestower, problematically), and that being the case it is probable (and “practically inevitable” over time) that those who have power will be more vice-full than virtue-full (especially those who keep it). And all the while those who are more virtuous and perhaps better leaders will likely be satisfied and happy. What then? (Is this a reason why civilizations might need catastrophes to change, to compel the virtuous to act, suggesting Žižek has a point with his “Catastrophe Politics?”)
“The Ambitious Virtue Paradox” can be summed up by saying that virtue limits ambition, so how is an “ambitious virtue” possible, as seems needed for the virtuous to (want and choose to) lead societies? “How do we get good rulers if good people don’t want to rule?” (especially in “free societies”). Was this why Plato and Socrates disliked Democracy? For Democracy would create the conditions where, in most cases and more so with greater scale, “the vice-full/ambitious” would rule? If we take this problem seriously, we might start to sympathize with why Plato and Socrates force Philosopher Kings to “return to the Cave,” which we can associate with politics and rulership. Once people indeed experience “The Beautiful” and “realm of forms,” they will prove able to be satisfied with life and won’t need aspirations and ambitions for power or fame (exactly as Ebert described): they will find happiness simply on meditating on “the forms” and beauty of everything around them. And yet it is precisely these people who often have no desire to rule, who precisely need to rule, and so Plato and Socrates use force, a move which seems justified and not immoral in their eyes because people in the cave were “dragged out” — hence why “the drag narrative” is so important to the overall project of The Republic (as we discussed in II.1). What about if we deconstruct “Bestow Centrism” though and speak of people “leaving the Cave on their own?” We have spoken of that as a goal of our “new address,” but if that were accomplished, wouldn’t we doom ourselves in another way, mainly that we will then have no “just-ification” to force Children to rule? And thus “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox” might be the end of us (at least not without committing an injustice that seems oppressive and even like slavery). What then? Give up the effort to “spread Childhood,” for it will prove self-defeating? Well, given what we have discussed throughout O.G. Rose, that doesn’t seem to be the best course (as doesn’t just hoping “the problem of scale” somehow takes care of itself, even if it (hopefully) does). Alright, but then when?
How do we motivate people who need nothing? If the most noble don’t seek power, how will the noble come into power? We could so force the noble, but is that not immoral and like slavery? Furthermore, if the noble don’t want to lead, even if they are put in positions of power, they might not put their heart into it (defeating the purpose). Are we trapped between Plato “forcing philosophers back into the cave” and Friedrich Hayek’s “worst rising to the top” — “no exit?”
A few options:
1. The Virtuous and Childlike are forced into power, either in the way described by Plato and Socrates or perhaps through “a royal line” where someone is forced into rulership via birth.
2. The Childlike see something in power that “attracts” them because it is beautiful and/or virtuous.
3. Everyone is a Child, and thus those in power are Children.
I am using the terms “Virtue” and “Childlike” rather interchangeably here, for even though not necessarily similes, if a Child can “choose his or her own values,” there is something about a Child that is necessarily “virtuous” in the sense that the Child “chooses values” (I am also overlapping “virtues” and “values” a bit). At the very least, the Child can deal with “facing virtue” (the anxiety), and there is arguably a virtue in that very courage. Also, we are suggesting here that the probability someone is virtuous is higher if they are a Child, and so if we can “spread Childhood” we will likely also “spread virtue.”
Anyway, if we’re not going to follow Plato’s model, then the virtuous or Child (again, not that these necessarily align, even if a given Child might have a higher chance at virtue beyond dogmatism) must for some reason “nonrationally choose” power even though Children don’t want power, and that would seem to require beauty (which is to say “a new value-form,” pointing to Marx and Temple). How could that be possible? Perhaps if the function of power changed to something that was easier to see as noble? Perhaps if what was expected of those with power was creating incubators of creative unfolding (for example), versus “telling people what to do,” then perhaps the virtuous and Childlike would be more attracted into power and leadership, while right now these positions seem reserved for the ambitious (problematically). Again, politicians and leaders in our age seem often tied to dealing and wielding power, figuring out how to build coalitions, seeking victory in elections — these are not activities likely to “attract” Children, especially if Children are “satisfied” and content in their current lives (as they seemingly must be, precisely in being Children). What can the virtuous gain in politics today other than the loss of their virtue? Stress. Egotism. Vices. It’s simply irrational for Children to seek power, yes? Does that suggest virtue might benefit corrupt power, for virtue keeps people satisfied and so from acting against corrupt power? Is this another chess-move of the Capital-Nation-State?
Again, if we lived in a world that stressed incubating “intrinsic motivation” and “spreading Childhood,” perhaps the virtuous would be “attracted” into power, while at the same time so appropriately changing the social infrastructure of the world to also increase the number of Children who can be found, hence increasing the probability that those in power are those who have virtue. Also, perhaps simply reading about “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox” will make it so that “The Virtuous” cannot readily be virtuous anymore without “nonrationally choosing power,” aware (now) that not doing so will likely fate institutions, systems, etc. to Nash Equilibria and autocannibalism. But isn’t it prideful and perhaps self-deceptive to think of oneself “as virtuous” and so what systems need? Perhaps the virtuous or Childlike have an out then, some space for “plausible deniability” so that “epistemic responsibility” cannot compel them into office and out of satisfaction. This suggests something important: to more reliably “attract” the virtuous into power, it must not be from a place where “the virtuous see themselves as virtuous” (possible exposition vs story, pride), but instead they see something “beyond them” (“The Beautiful”) which attracts them into power. Not because they want it or have ambition for power, but because there is some Value or Beauty or Something in the power that “strikes” their very virtue to “call them” in and forth. If they weren’t virtuous, they wouldn’t be so called, but if they are virtuous, it is precisely because of that virtue that they are “attracted” in. It’s not a choice, so much, but rather a realization and pull (or else we cannot move from exposition to Story and Theme, alluding to Alex and Andrew’s work, discussed in II.1). This seems to be the dynamic necessary to deal with our paradox, but how might this dynamic be generated? Not easily, but this generation is at least theoretically possible if there was “a beauty in power,” which again might be possible for the virtuous to see in power if power was primarily used to help “incubate intrinsic motivation,” “spread Childhood,” increase beauty, etc. But currently this is not ostensibly the role of power, which most today see as primarily exercising dominion and control over others, which repels the virtuous precisely because they are virtuous (not being repelled would suggest vice). But the point is that if “power was beautiful,” then the virtuous would not have to “see themselves as virtuous” to go into power, which would risk egotism and “exposition” (as Andrew and Alex discuss); instead, the virtuous would simply be “attracted in” by being themselves. Something outside of them would compel them (like a good story, generating a Thematic Command), and then in “self-forgetfulness” (a key phrase in O.G. Rose), the virtuous and Childlike could be “attracted in.” This would help address “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” but also increasing the number of Children would also help in raising probabilities favorably. This would also be the act of “creating the infrastructure to spread Childhood,” which would perhaps make power beautiful to the virtuous — but does that create a “chicken and egg problem?” It might generate “a true infinity,” in the Hegelian sense, but it might suggest that “social infrastructure” must change first (generating a new “medium condition” and “abstract social value,” as we’ll explain), perhaps thanks to the Children who already exist (for whatever reason) — or perhaps thanks to “the forcing function” of some historic disaster and catastrophe (alluding to Žižek). Hard to say.
In addition to somehow making “power beautiful,” a good bet for addressing “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox” seems to be in increasing the probability that the average person is Childlike and virtuous. Not that this is ever totally possible, but if everyone was Childlike, then those in power would be Childlike — it’s just a matter of probability (perhaps someone would likely see some beauty in it). If few are Childlike, then it is likely those in power will be “The Ambitious,” exactly as Hayek described (and perhaps even if a large enough minority were “The Ambitious,” suggesting a great challenge). This in mind, our concern of “spreading Childhood” is also a concern with overcoming “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” which if we don’t overcome the consequences could be dire. Thus, we have another reason to take seriously the possibility of “a new address”: our systems, nation-states, etc. may simply not avoid Nash Equilibria otherwise. There are of course no guarantees (especially if we’re not going to “force the best” to rule, perhaps believing ourselves incapable of discerning “the best,” Hayekian, or else moral?
If virtue lessens ambition in a good way (in favor of attraction), but everyone was virtuous, then those in power would be virtuous. Well, maybe not: nobody might run or seek power, meaning the positions would be vacant. Perhaps, but someone of virtue might at that point see “good reason” to move into power, precisely because otherwise the consequences could be dire. But there will likely be a valuable reluctance to do such, which actually might increase the probability that those in power are good rulers. Alternatively, if everyone was virtuous, then the probability someone saw some beauty in power (relative to their unique conditioning) that thus attracted them in would be high. Perhaps not, but regardless “spreading Childhood” greatly increases the probability that we have virtuous and mentidivergent leaders, and even if this effort failed, it is better to have more Childlikeness than not (as argued throughout O.G. Rose). So it goes with generating and spreading “the conditions of possibility” needed for “a value-form of beauty” (A/B) alternative to the dominate value-form of Capital (which would also increase the probability that power was beautiful) — but that must be expanded on.
The Childlike and virtuous are motivated more by “attraction” than they are “ambition” (not that these are always easy to tell apart), with the first incubating and strengthening capacities for “intrinsic motivation” (hence “creating demand”) while the second is more extrinsic (“stimulating demand”). There is indeed something “like” beauty and value which “drags” and “bestows” (as we discussed in II.1), but the nuanced difference is while bestowing is “force” and/or “externa-based,” the beautiful and “attractive” can only be experienced through individual and internal cultivation, which means “(be)coming.” We cannot be attracted unless we condition ourselves to be capable of that attraction, and so we internally “resonate” with something versus find ourselves externally “pulled.” The order is different: “intrinsic motivation” involves an internal work then “pull,” while “extrinsic motivation” is easily just “pull” (there is no conditioning). Order matters, and yet in irony “the right order” can be reversed in efforts to avoid “an oppressive rightness” (so much rides on slight differences). But how does someone get “intrinsic motivation?” Don’t they have to be “dragged” by some extrinsic force into “conditioning?” Ah, excellent — this is where we must think “Ontological Warfare” of Daniel Fraga again and “the medium condition,” which admittedly involves degrees of something like “bestowing” (which is not always bad), but not predominately, and that matters.
We have argued in II.1 that without Childlikeness there will likely be significant social, political, and economic consequences, generally due to a loss of creativity and “intrinsic motivation,” and here we suggest another reason is because we will have no address for “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” as seemingly we must address if we are going to also address “The Triplex of Belonging.” We are suggesting here that our best strategy entails “making power beautiful” and “making everyone a Child,” which at the very least we might be able to increase the probability of occurring (though there are no guarantees, as there never are in Hegel). Children can nonrationally or mentidivergently choose to enter power at any point, yes (there’s always hope, which we always need more of in a world that needs “preparing” versus “planning,” as Illich taught), and perhaps learning about “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox” could help with that, but we also increases our odds if we “spread the conditions of possibility for Childhood and beauty.” Yes, fine, but surely we are over-speaking: there must be good people in power, yes? Sure, but perhaps not on average, and it might also shift if we are discussing “business power” or “political power,” as it can if we are describing “the power of a small business owner” or “power of a parent” or “power of an entrepreneur” — there are again contextual issues here. Admittedly, my main concerns are (“mixed market”) corporate entities and political entities, and I am of the opinion that these tend to attract “the worst” kinds of people or to turn good people into less virtuous people with time (following Hayek). This doesn’t mean “every given person” under corporatism, the “professional managerial class,” government…are immoral, but it does mean on average they will be, which in a democracy and “free society” could be very problematic. But even if this is wrong, it is better to spread Childhood than not — hopefully Belonging Again has made that abundantly clear — my hope has only been to suggest that “spreading Childhood” could also help with our problem of corrupt government, bad leadership, etc. But what if there is no system, especially not a global system (as seems needed in some way under Global Pluralism), even theoretically, which doesn’t destroy virtue? Then hopefully Children will not be part of those systems, “showing” that instead some organic and decentralized Dance is all we can hope for, on the outskirt…or nothing. All the same, Childhood helps us live, so let us try our best before an open future. Anything might go.
“The Virtuous” seemingly must make “a nonrational rational choice” so that we address “The Ambitious Virtue Paradox,” and perhaps we could argue if they are unwilling to do this once they know this is needed to avoid Nash Equilibria, it is no longer virtuous not to make such a choice? So Spirit and Thought might develop, shifting “epistemic responsibility” (alluding to W.K. Clifford, as discussed in The Conflict of Mind), ever-fluxing and oscillating, as Ebert describes in “Fre(Q) Theory” (limits are limit(less)). Does this notion generate anxiety? If so, that might be a good thing, a new stage and movement of development. Wait, anxiety can be good? Absolutely: it is the spreading of a condition of realizing that “everything might not be what it seems,” which is a step toward A/B in being a step toward the (Apophatic? Graceful?) Void…Choose…
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