A Featured in Belonging Again (Part II)
Considering Marx, Leibniz, and Political-Economy More Geometrically
Forever indebted to Anthony Morley, who taught me everything I know on Leibniz in his incredible Geometry & the Interior, O.G. Rose will often consider Leibniz and his work on geometrical “situation” versus algebraic “points” (say in The Absolute Choice and (Re)constructing “A Is A”), which claims reality is more composed of “situations” than “things.” There is nowhere we can go in the universe where we don’t find “relations,” and though geometry is composed of algebra, it is not the case that geometry is “built up from algebra” (which would suggest “things” are more fundamental). Rather, “things” are necessarily part of “situations,” which means it must be possible for us to consider things “as if” they can be understood independent of “situation.” But this is an act of imagination (or “understanding” versus “reason,” to allude to Hegel), which we experience as an act of rationality and “getting to the things themselves.” But “getting to things themselves,” as if they can exist independently, is a mistake that can lead to problems.
Here, I would like to consider Karl Marx, whose Capital is a work of political-economy that I believe can align in parts with the thinking of Leibniz. I have been inspired by David McKerracher and Nance at Theory Underground in their close readings of Marx throughout 2023 and 2024, and I appreciate the attention they’ve given the debate between “Value-Form Theory” and “Labor Value Theory” Marxism. David and Nance are profound examples of people willing to put in the effort necessary to tackle the great books, benefiting us all. Also, I cannot promise my interpretations and incorporations of Marx are entirely accurate, for I am no Marx scholar. All the same, even if my interpretations are wrong, I hope the ideas described and explored are of value.
I
Capital is not merely a “form” but a principle of “formulation” (a distinction which helps me think through Plato), which is to say we find ourselves amongst Capital as “formulated” by it, not just using it (as if it doesn’t condition us as we condition it). Marx is well-aware that economies require certain kinds of societies to be possible, which is to say that Capitalism is only possible in a society where Capitalism is intelligible and hence “a way of thinking” that average people participate in and comprehend. Economics is always then a “situation,” which is to say we cannot meaningfully discuss “economics and politics,” as if they are things which don’t relate and condition one another. No, we are always dealing with “political-economy,” and so we can start our analysis by basically asking, “How is a Capitalistic thought even possible?” To help with the point, if I were to walk into the Amazon, find someone who had never been part of modern society, and told the person that, “My laptop is worth five weeks of food,” that isolated individual might think I was insane. For the person in the Amazon to understand me, that individual would have to be situated within a social order where such an equivalence could even be comprehendible (for though we under Capitalism may at this point just “get” such an equation, such an equation is not part of nature or the facticity around us — such is the power of Capitalism that we develop into habits where we cease realizing this and live as if equal signs between phenomena are part of nature). Capital is not just something we “use,” but an “enframent” that makes the “use” intelligible.
“Things don’t interpret themselves,” we could say, as books don’t read themselves (as McKerracher put it): I have to interpret them, which means I require a “horizon” of thought that makes interpretation possible — hence the necessity of gradually everything being turned into “commodities” so that I might relate things in terms of value and Capital more generally. ‘[T]he establishment of socially recognized standards of measurement” is required (which brings Mary Douglas to mind), which means we don’t just need “things to measure” but also “measuring sticks,” which means abstract ideas of what should constitute measurement.¹ Though to ask someone to count the number of forks in a drawer seems like we need nothing more than forks to determine (“things”), we actually require a whole situation and network of relations (between phenomena, abstracts, objects, subjects…): we need the word “fork,” the phenomena-of-forks, the abstract notion of numbers, a social order in which numbers are intelligible and socially acceptable — on and on. To count requires a horizon; basics require much.
‘The utility of a thing makes it a use-value’ (which is to say that a fork has use-value because I can use it to eat, and there is value in eating being easier), ‘[b]ut this utility is not a thing of air […] it has no existence apart from the commodity.’² “Utility” is not a property of things like “cold,” “hard,” “small,” etc., for while a thing can be cold by itself, a thing cannot be used except in relation and situation (‘[u]se-values become a reality only by use or consumption’).³ The moment we speak of “utility” then, we speak of “otherness,” but do we yet speak of a society?⁴ Maybe, but that becomes more so the case when we speak of “exchange” (versus “utility”), for how in the world is “exchange” even possible? What are the conditions of its possibility? “Exchange” is only possible where a situation is created in which people could relate to one another in a certain way by which “exchange” would be intelligible. In other words, if I am to say, “One apple equals one pear,” then I must live in a society where it is imaginable that an “equal sign” can be somehow placed between apples and pears. But how? Apples aren’t pears, so what in the world do I mean when I say, “one apple equals one pear?” What does that “equal sign” mean?
Paradoxically, as we learn in Leibniz, the act of bringing an apple together into the same situation as a pear is the act which necessarily unveils their difference (ultimately, “difference/similarity,” as we spoke about at Philosophy Portal during “The Logic for the Global Brain” conference); and so it goes with bringing together identical apples, for we might say that “these apples are all the same,” but that of course is impossible, for if the apples were all the same, there would only be one apple. To speak of things as “worth the same amount” or “being the same” then is to suggest an “equal sign” in a very paradoxical way, so paradoxical that it only seems like a subject could ascribe to it if there was a whole social order that acted as if this paradox was not only normal but rational. This point brings to mind the work of Peter Berger, who suggests that our beliefs are necessarily constituted by our societies, which is to say that if we didn’t live in a society where everyone acted like “equal signs” were possible, we’d likely not believe in “equal signs” ourselves (but once we do, the belief seems to be part of reality itself, which is why the belief is effective, grounds for social unification, but also possibly problematic).
Under Capitalism, an “equal sign” becomes intelligible to us, as it must if Capitalism is to prove possible. It becomes possible for me to think that “One apple is equal to one pear” (in terms of “exchange value”), and this notion not be downright crazy. On the face of it, this sentence should be nonsense, and yet it is not, which is evidence in of itself that we are socially conditioned to see “x as sensible” even if, in nature and facticity, x shouldn’t be sensible at all. There are no “equal signs” in nature, and yet society trains me to experience “equal signs” as intelligible (and even “(practically) concrete”). This basically requires something like a magic trick, and we might say that this is “the magic of society”: we can come to believe things, without much fuss, that arguably are absurd. And yet what is absurd can be valuable — odd.
An “equal sign” only makes sense if there are multiple qualities which are being compared together as equal, and ultimately any kind of “comparison” requires similarities. But Leibniz makes it very clear that “similarity” is a human judgment which is not found in nature, for if I say, “Apples and pears are similar as fruits,” where do I locate the category of “fruit” in facticity? I judge the category as valid (“into existence”), for various reasons according to usefulness, intelligibility, etc., but ultimately this “category” is an abstraction which humans add to reality. Furthermore, I perhaps judge apples and fruits as similar because they have x and y qualities, but why should I privilege those qualities over others? Why can’t “apple” and “cabinet” be categorized together as “similar” because they both have colors, are made of matter, etc.? Why do we judge that apples and pears are “more similar” than say apples and cabinets? There are reasons, yes, but the point is that these reasons are our reasons, which arise in relation to phenomena in the world. So the same applies when in Capitalism we say, “Five apples is worth two pears”: we are making a judgment which expresses our relation to the things, and the very possibility of this formulation requires that relations between things be possibly ‘expressed in terms of something common to them all.’⁵
“Similarity” is the “form(ulation)” of metaphysics for Leibniz, which is to say that Leibniz saw metaphysics as strongly tied questions like, “How is ‘similarity’ possible, what is it, where does it come from…?” (for if metaphysics has something to do with “a study of categories,” all categories require “similarity” and hence “difference” to consider). To speak of Plato’s “form” was for Leibniz to speak of (modes of) “similarity,” and to inquire into how things “changed” was to inquire into how things stayed the same while also not. More could be said, but the point is that “similarity” is for Leibnitz necessary for the possibility of metaphysics and judgment, and we could say that in Marx there is a realization that markets are only possible where a “similarity” and hence “relation” (which requires “similarity” to be possible) can be established between phenomena. If no similarity can be seen between things, they cannot be commoditized or incorporated into markets (which means they cannot be “captured,” please note, following Deleuze, but this also means they cannot “relate,” which might lead to problematic atomization and social breakdown).
To the degree things have something in common is to the degree they can be considered in relation to one another and possibly equivalent, and yet since “similarity” and “equal signs” don’t exist in nature, this “similarity” must be metaphysical, and what is metaphysical is that which we might feel crazy to believe in or alone in believing unless the metaphysics is socially-reinforced (to the point where we come to believe it is part of facticity itself). This is where Capitalism comes in, convincing us that everything indeed does have a common property by which relation and equivalence could be established. But what might that be? Color? Everything has a color. Yes, but a relation is not necessarily an exchange — that requires motivation and desire — and without exchange there won’t be much social activity, productivity, and the like. Could I really convince people to exchange goods on terms of colors? Maybe here and there, but the range of this kind of exchange proving effective is likely very limited, which means Capitalism would likely prove ineffective. Color won’t suffice, neither will shape, atoms…but what “common property” is left by which things might be brought into comparison and relation? Nothing in nature (that isn’t radically “bound” and “limited” in its application), and so “something else” has to be created (and then socially re-enforced), something that can be located in everything from fruits to parties to cars to factories — something necessarily “metaphysical” to make possible a “similarity” according to which any and everything can be “exchanged.” And so arises “exchange value” (which ultimately requires an “abstract value” based on the idea of human labor — but more on that later).
What in the world could be common to fruits, cabinets, airplanes, people, dirt — every possible phenomenon? Nothing, and so Marx’s point is that Capitalism creates something so that everything can be commoditized, mainly “exchange value.” “Use-value” will not suffice, for then my comparisons would be bound by my senses of utility, and how can I compare “the use of a car” with “the use of a hammer?” Both have use, but how could I go about comparing these “uses” together? Should I compare “one mile of driving” with “five hours of hammer use?” The means and metrics of the comparison seem impossible to establish, and even if I establish it somehow between “driving a car” and “hitting a nail with a hammer,” what about between hammers and tacos? Millions of possible combinations and “exchanges” arise, with no clear metric or measure by which to go about the comparison. I need a more common and universal measure, but what in the world might that be? Marx tells us that ‘the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterized by a total abstraction from use-value,’ precisely because it seems impossible to exchange commodities in terms of use (there is no clear metric or standard of measure).⁶ We need something ‘contained’ in things yet ‘distinguishable’ from them, but what in the world might that be?⁷ Capitalism needs basically everything to contain an exchangeable quality, but that means we need something which is contained in everything yet also distinguishable from everything. This doesn’t sound possible, and it isn’t in nature, but might there be something that society could convince us (“plausibly”) is in nature? Indeed, this would be “value” (which makes possible “exchange (value)”), which is based on an idea of (concrete) human labor (we see here how the abstract and concrete interpenetrate, as characteristic of the “Absolute Idealism” of Hegel).
For two things like ‘corn and iron’ to be brough into relation, ‘[t]he two things must […] be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the one nor the other’ (which is to say for “ten corn” and “one iron” to be considered together, they cannot be the “equal sign” between them); ‘[e]ach of them, so far as it is exchange value, must therefore by reducible to this third.’⁸ Leibniz spoke of how “a third” was required for two temples which seemed the “same” when apart (“in different situations”) to be judged as actually (only) “similar,” with that “third” being us ourselves as (judging) observers; likewise, Marx suggests that “a third” is needed beyond the corn and iron so that they can be considered together, with that “third” mainly being “the equal sign” itself, which we make possible and create. But how can we carry out this act of “adding a third” without feeling crazy, because isn’t it kind of odd to think that corn and iron (of some quantity) can have anything to do with one another at all? Ah, well that’s where social reinforcement comes in: as growing up in Christianity can make Christianity “given” (versus a “option”), say “part of is-ness itself,” so growing up under Capitalism can make things have an “exchange value” and “relation in terms of possible exchange” that just is “part of them.” We don’t think about it. It’s “given” (a “socially-reinforced notion” helped by money).⁹ But as this can lead to profound pathologies and trouble in Christianity, so the same can happen under Capitalism. Now, everything is exchangeable, which means everything can relate, which is arguably positive, but now we seem to have “overfit” Capitalism and made everything interchangeable, which is to say nearly irrelevant in their particularity. At this point, self-effacement can spread.
II
Society is only possible because of relation, but this presents a problem, because on what basis can we “relate?” If nothing is identical (or “equal”) in reality, then that means everything inherently exists “always already” in a kind of tension, precisely because that means everything is “always already” a testament to difference. And so we find ourselves with the problem which all societies find themselves in, which is the problem of having to create “a one out of a many,” which must to some degree ultimately abstract, totalize, and risk dehumanizing. There is no “sameness” in reality, only “similarity” (which always entails some degree of “difference” as “similarity/difference”), and what should be the basis of our “similarity” according to which we try to establish a society? Who gets to decide? By what standard? And so the danger begins…
There are no “equal signs’ in reality, and yet we need to make different people somehow equal with one another (at least in terms of “human dignity”), which must be an abstraction that anyone at any point could question, and so we must somehow make that abstraction plausible to believe (which brings to mind “givens” and Peter Berger), which is to say the “abstraction” which makes society possible is never questioned to such an extent that it fails (a problem which brings many Counter-Enlightenment thinkers to mind). But of course an “unquestioned abstraction” could control and oppress us when “overfit,” so goodness — we are always at risk. We need an abstraction that enables “universal relation,” which cannot exist in nature (Leibniz), and yet we have to “plausibly” treat it “as if” it is in (something like) nature, or otherwise it will lack authority. How odd, and yet such “oddness” seems appropriate for paradoxical beings like ourselves.
This is where “exchange value” comes in through Capitalism, which seems to be a very bare minimum to make space for the most possible relations between the most possible people. All cultures could be Capitalistic theoretically and so relate on those terms, which means Capitalism could make possible “Global Society” — which is also exactly the problem when we lose the capacity to relate outside “the logic of Capital.” It is arguably a benefit that Capital makes possible “universal relation on grounds of exchange value,” but it is also a great danger if we are trained out of the capacity to relate “non-reductionistic-ally,” as our brains with their “pleasure principle” seem naturally prone to do, enjoying the “understanding” prices can provide a little too much (as discussed in II.1). Might it be possible to live under Capital and not fall into these self-effacing habits? That does seem to be the question, the great hope of “spreading Childhood”…
Where there is something like an “equal sign,” there is the possibility of exchange, which is a form of “meaningful relation,” please note, suggesting we need exchange, at least in terms of exchanging ideas, emotions, language, etc. Exchange is not all bad, but “reductionistic and autonomous exchange” is indeed problematic we lose the capacity to think beyond. On this point, where there is exchange, there is then the possibility of treating thing as interchangeable and thus reducible. When (perhaps valuable) “exchangeable” becomes (overfit) “interchangeable,” we have a very problematic reductionism (“compression” becomes “flattening” and everything undergoes self-effacement). Capitalism can make everything “exchangeable” through a (metaphysical) notion of “value” which then tends to be “overfit” into making everything “interchangeable,” causing trouble.
‘As use-values, commodities are […] of different qualities, but as exchange values they are merely different quantities,’ which is to say that that a shovel is useful to me because of its particular qualities that help me dig, but as a means of exchange a shovel is valuable to me because of the quantity I can value it (say as $20).¹⁰ Utility reflects some quality, while value reflects some quantity. “Quantity” is numeric, and since numbers don’t exist in nature, it is possible to use numbers in regard to anything in nature, which is to say that because numbers are not concrete, they are unbound, and so appliable as abstractions to anything in nature. This means numbers could be used to make the whole world relatable to one another, despite all the differences — but who cares? I could label and categorize whatever I wanted, but why should anyone change their lives or care about my categorization? Ah, this is where we need to make the numbers authoritative, and this is where we need to create (what “plausibly” seems like) an “objective basis” for them. And so Capitalism introduces numbers through prices and “exchange value” which it then basis on (the abstract notion of) labor, at which point we have now achieved a means of making everything and everyone on earth relatable in a manner that everyone could “plausibly” care about. This is an incredible accomplishment, but it is also unstable and possibly self-effacing.
As elaborated on in V.7B of “The Problem of Scale (Part I)” (II.1), we as humans simply “enjoy” too much the feeling of “understanding” (that numbers can give us). And so we can then “naturally” and gradually “reduce” everything into the numbers and “(exchange) values” which made (universal) relation possible, at which point things and people become these numbers. Once this occurs, the things we hoped to help relate (to one another) become something else entirely. The world is connected, but it is flat. Had we just “compressed” the world and “de-compressed” it later (holding ourselves back like Beatrice before Dante), that would be one thing, but this is remarkably difficult to do, given the habits which tend to form around the enjoyment we derive from “understanding” things (as “compressed”). We use technology and come to absorb “the technical essence” (Heidegger); we use Capitalism and come to be Capital.
To stress, Capitalism doesn’t have to “become Capital,” per se, which is to say “compression” doesn’t have to become “flattening,” but it is “natural” for this to occur (and would require “nonrationality” to stop the “Nash Equilibria”), which is to say that it is likely to occur given that we need to the quantification of “exchange value” to become authoritative (and seemingly “objective”) in order to help people relate meaningfully, and because it is “pleasurable” to understand things, which is what we can use quantification to do (the temptation of “totality” and A/A, as Levinas discusses). The “equal sign” is at the very foundation of Capitalism as both the source of Capitalism’s great power and great possible destruction, for the “equal sign” helps things and people exchange with one another while at the same putting things and people at risk of becoming interchangeable with one another (which is when AI can prevail). Capitalism frees people from facticity to think of things as relating and equal to one another in terms of something which is not locatable in facticity or materiality at all, which is to say we come to treat an abstract “value” as a reality which is just as concrete as material properties. With this relation between things, it becomes possible for “everything to change” through these new possible relations and exchanges, which means individuals are not so easily captured by “givens” they are born into, which means they are less likely to be stuck in conditions they find themselves in with birth, nationality, ethnicity, etc. (as discussed by thinkers like Foucault, and as discussed in Belonging Again (Part I)). Capitalism can liberate, but it does so through an abstraction of “value” that brings with it a risk of reductionism, conformity, totalization, and the like. Is this worth it? If we don’t “spread Childhood,” perhaps not.
The “equal sign” means there is an “exchange value,” but where does the “value” come from that makes this “exchange (value)” possible? Is value found in and from “exchange,” or is it from the “labor” which made this exchange possible? Indeed, that is a big question, one which brings us to great the debate between “Labor Value Theory” and “Value-Form Theory” (a debate I find hard to stop thinking about)…
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Notes
¹Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 13.
²Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 13.
³Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 13.
⁴Please note that “use-value” is not a reflection of the labor put into a thing: if I spend two days making a fork and you spend one hour, the fork could have the exact same utility (even if we might “choose to think” for some reason that the fork which took longer to make is more valuable for some reason).
⁵Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 13.
⁶Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 14.
⁷Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 14.
⁸Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 14.
⁹A role of money can be to “hide” the oddness of exchange and “the equal sign” so that we don’t question it, a questioning which could threaten the social order. Money adds an additional level of abstraction to the process, making “the oddness of exchange” more difficult to recognize. In this way, money is a critical “plausibility structure,” as discussed by Peter Berger.
¹⁰Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Capital. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago (Great Books Series, Vol 50), 1952: 14.
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