An Essay Featured In (Re)constructing “A is A” by O.G. Rose

The VORD (Part 4)

Sections XII-XVI

O.G. Rose


Photo by NASA


Before advancing in the main argument, I would like to highlight some points that should be considered, ones that elaborate, clarify, and possibly deconstruct the model laid out in this paper. Even if deconstructed, I still think and hope the expressed logic might prove useful, but I wanted to be upfront on possible objections.


1. Possibly suggesting the order on “The Vector Tower” is wrong, Bard wrote: ‘There is no specific order to Emergence Vectors, as if one Vector is the child of another Vector.’¹³ However, I took Bard here to possibly be saying that no given Vector necessarily Emerges out of Physics: though Chemistry did, it didn’t have to be. I believe this is what Bard meant, because he also wrote: ‘The most evident example of such a singularity is of course The Big Bang. Other emergences throughout history that deserve the title singularity are when chemistry suddenly arose out of physics, when biology suddenly arose out of chemistry, and when consciousness suddenly arose out of biology.’¹⁴

The magnificent Alexander Elung made a similar point to Bard (IDW, 12.11.21):

‘Matter is never conscious. Conscious is conscious. If matter has a subjective pole, that pole is not matter but mind. Just like if you have a mind, that mind is not your body. A thing can have more than one attribute. But it is certainly possible that consciousness exists before biology (biology is its own vector, after all, and consciousness is not biology either). It doesn’t have to be contingent to biology at all […]’

Considering this, please take “the order” I depict in “The Vector Tower” with a grain of salt, and also remember that any and all “orders” are firstly “radically contingent” — nothing necessarily follows.

2. The LO may not be “contingent enough” for “the radical contingency” which Bard stresses, but I would like to note that the presented model attempted to suggest that nothing necessarily Emerges, happens, etc. Additionally, if LO is a “process” of Physics or Subphysics, we should expect “embodiment” in following Vectors. Though the LO itself was not necessary, once it arose, it would seem to me Vectors which follow must “embody” it, though that doesn’t mean they are limited or determined by it. This is the balance between “contingency” and “influence” I’d like to strike, which attempts to take Bard’s point into consideration that ‘contingency is the only meta-law, [while] relationalism emerge[d] but was not bound beforehand to occur.’¹⁵

Alexander Bard noted (on IDW) that ‘[n]othing is determined because there is no pre-programing involved,’ which is to say everything is “radically contingent.” Personally, I do not think the LO violates this point, because it didn’t have to arise, only seem to once it did (everything is “dressed in determinism,” per se, as discussed in “(Free) Will” by O.G. Rose). Still, it should be noted that Bard stresses that ‘[t]here is no General Emergence Theory,’ which is to say ‘there is no theory on what constitutes Emergence before [one] happens[]. A new Emergence means that the entire world history has to be rewritten as a new Emergence Theory’ (which means there is what I call a “flip moment”). ‘This is precisely why the theory is called Transcendental Emergentism,’ Bard notes, stating also that ‘[t]herefore there are no laws prior to any novel occurrence.’ I also like Bard’s clarification that ‘[a] phase transition is symmetrical[, while an] Emergence is radically asymmetric […] It makes the world a new world […]’

Audio Summary

To this possible objection, I would note that though the LO looks like a “natural law” or “natural habit,” it is not, not only because there is no “determine course” for how the “dots” move, but also because the idea that “pure difference” and “sameness” are both “effacements” is primarily based on formulation. Yes, form and logic ultimately are themselves because they are based on some ontological or ontic reality, but that truth is precisely what I want to stress: LO isn’t a “natural law” of some kind but a “state of affairs” or “conditionality” which is “the case” because of the Emergence of a Vector. As Bard has stressed that all Vectors are reconstituted by new Vectors “as if” all the Vectors were “always” as they are so reconstituted, so the Emergence of the Vector which arose to LO consequently results in all Vectors being “made in the image and likeness” of LO. “Image and likeness” are not laws or habits, but conditions which things “formally follow” in their indeterminacy, in the same way that everything Physical has shape and color but aren’t “determined” by shape and color to do x, y, or z, only to resemble something with shape and color. The question I don’t know the answer to is if LO arose with the Vector of Physics or the Vector of Subphysics, and though I’ve associated it with Physics in this paper, it easily should be placed with Subphysics, a direction that might address a point Bard raised (IDW, November 2021), that:

‘Transcendental Emergence anchors Physics (spatiotemporal existence) in Subphysics (hypertemporal subsistence) and then explains what kind of background Subphysics is to Physics. In the process creating an emergence vector theory where The Universe may be 100% co-dependent but also allows separation and isolation if those are to be found. This is called ‘neutral monism by accident.’’

I’m not sure, but regardless I believe LO is incredibly fundamental to Vectors. Regardless, I hope LO at least provides some useful and accurate descriptive power.

Bard stresses (IDW 1.25.22):

‘[Certain thinkers] want to take relations seriously but ignore the relation of relations. These guys desperately want to find a pattern which the universe was doomed to follow as it developed (the creator-god program) but there is absolutely no such thing. There is radically no such thing. Nothing ever repeats. There are no meta-laws.’

I appreciate Mr. Bard’s point here: what I would like to stress is that LO is more like shapes and colors than some “natural law.” The presence of shapes and colors do repeat and manifest just about everywhere, though never in the exact same way (no triangle is identical). So the same applies to logical principles like “noncontradiction,” even if the universe wasn’t “determined” to arise to shapes, colors, and various logics. Now that it has, these “forms” manifest everywhere, though never in the same way or following determinacy. Bard notes that ‘[w]e can therefore at best only attend to an absolute minimum of principles in metaphysics’ (IDW 1.25.22), a sentiment with which I agree. In my opinion, right or wrong, the LO honors this concern.

Bard also notes (IDW, 1.25.22):

‘[…] being is torn between negation and oscillation, a fundamental dialectic beyond all emergence vectors, which keeps existence not in one flux but in an endless number of different fluxes. Only kept in some kind of decent order at times due to their massive interdependencies towards one another. Everywhere you find forces at war with one another. Negating one another.’

My hope is that the description of “process” as “similarity/difference,” which inherently entails a constant negation and sublimation, captures the spirit of this point. Also, I am of the opinion that even if there are “traces” in many if not all Vectors of LO, LO still makes plenty of room for countless ‘different fluxes,’ just as Bard describes, in the same way that the constant presence of shapes and colors still makes space for vast variation.

‘[A] novel complex means novel laws,’ Bard states elegantly (IDW, 1.12.22), alluding to C.S. Pierce, an idea I completely agree with and hope the LO does not violate. For me, LO is something akin to shapes and colors more than gravity: it manifests across Vectors in an infinite variety of ways.

3. Critically, please note that just because Physics or Subphysics arose to the “process” of LO, it doesn’t follow that it had to arise to that “process” (as it’s not the case that “shapes” or “colors” had to arise). For all we know, a universe where contradiction could exist was possible: it only seems like such a world wasn’t possible now that an alternative Vector Tower arose. This brings to mind the work of Lev Shestov and Benjamin Fondane, both of whom stress “all things are possible” to a degree which I think Quentin Meillassoux would like. And I would like to stress again that each Vector entails its own logic, ontological schema, and “process”: even if they “embody” and/or “participate” in other Vectors, each still entails a radical uniqueness and “irreducibility.”

As Bard refers to the universe as ‘neutral monism by accident’ (IDW, November 2021), a similar description could apply to LO. “All things are possible,” which includes for Shestov and Fondane a universe where “2 + 2 =5” and God can make a rock he cannot lift. But this doesn’t mean “all things are realized,” and once x is realized instead of y, the universe will form “habits” around x that make it seem like x was “determined” and somehow essential to the universe. So it goes with LO, but now that LO is “the case,” it must be described “as if” it was determined and essential — but this is simply an impression resulting from language and our very being in spacetime. Nietzsche was right, I think, that grammar can sustain and support bad ideas.

4. On the topic of logic, Alexander Elung wrote (IDW 12.21.21):

‘ […] There is no perfect or universal logos: Different things require different types of logic. We can’t engage with biology the same way we engage with chemistry. Biology has a very different perspective in relation to how we form theories of gradual adaptation through an idea of a movement, not towards complexity, but rather being adapted to an environment. It’s a completely different narrative, which is based on a different type of historicism than the one we find in chemistry […] If we are looking at the narrative structures they might go something like this” “Subphysics: potential”; “Physics: being”; “Chemistry: reaction”; “Biology: adaptation”; “Mind: sensation”; “Culture: contemplation” — all require a different structure of logos.’

I found this very well put, and since “truth organizes rationality,” I completely agree. Of course, since Vectors “embody” and/or “participate” in one another, these logics cross and even “cross-pollinate,” but at the same time they need to be kept distinct.

Please note that by associating LO with “shapes” and “colors” as something formal, the hope is to avoid creating a “monologic” which all Vectors must follow. Again, even if all Vectors entails shapes and colors (or perhaps mathematical representations), each Vector can still follow a unique and distinct logic. So I believe is the case with LO.

5. On IDW, Alex Ebert raises a fair concern with Vector Theory in general that we should keep in mind:

‘If we can agree that that divergence point (irreducibility) should not be intentionally manufactured (religioneering), nor should a genuine divergence (genuine ignorance despite best efforts) be used to intentionally blunt efforts at improving our ontological understanding to better match the ontic (the effort of science), then we’re halfway home.

‘But even more importantly, even if there was ontic irreducibility, we can never know whether or not our ontological ignorance is producing that irreducibility or not. [Which means] [i]rreducibility cannot be demonstrable of anything ontic beyond the limitations of the tools/mind in question […] This does not mean that irreducibility is inconsequential! But it does mean that it’s irreducibility is [entirely] contingent on the flux developments (gradient) of a given tool/mind […] Irreducibility is thus subject to change.’

‘Reducibility […] does not demonstrate limitations, but capacities within limitations of tools/mind,’ Ebert stresses, and he adds the fascinating point that ‘[r]educibility […] can demonstrate something ontic — precisely because it does not demonstrate limitations, but capacity.’ In other words, as Quentin Meillassoux basically claims that the truth of “radical contingency” itself “may or may not be true,” thus justifying the position of “radical contingency,” so Mr. Ebert points out that the very split between “the ontic and the ontological” means that “there must be something about the ontic which causes this split,” thus justifying the claim that “we can know at least something about the ontic.”

Ebert admonishes that we must be careful to stress “irreducibility” to the point of potentially acting “religious” about it. Things are “irreducible” until they’re not, after all. At the same time, even if we somehow “reduced” Biology to Chemistry, it is possible that Subphysics, Physics, Mind, and Culture would still all be “irreducible”: “The Vector Tower” would have to be adjusted, but it wouldn’t have to be thrown out. The risk of this is that this might sound like a “God of the gaps” argument (a “theory of the gaps,” per se), but the alternative is to surrender our wonderful defense against “reductionism,” as provided by Elung and Bard.

Still, I would like to quote Mr. Ebert at length again, because I think his points and concerns are very valid (IDW, 12.17.21):

‘The major role of ontologies is to provide a system of domain-independent distinctions to structure domain-specific theories with the goal of integrating and retrieving data and fostering interoperability. In other words, ontology is generalizable language to structure domain specific theories (vectors, say) with the goal of interoperability between domains. A host of factors determine the limitations (functional accuracy) of an ontology: linguistic development, technological development, epistemic and empirical development, and creativity, among others.

‘All of these factors are non-static. [Thus,] [w]hile all attempts at ontology are going to come up against limitations (inoperability or faux-operability), it is precisely those limitations which then yield further developments. [Considering this,] [a]ny attempt to establish “radical” limitations preemptively is difficult not to see as an attempt to squash ontological development itself. An attempt to determine that any Emergence […] requires that 100% of any rule/understanding must be thrown out — that there can be nothing — generalizable between vectors — is exactly that kind of preemptive limitation. [Problematically,] [t]he historical association of preemptive ontological limitation and oppressive fundamentalism is super documented. [For example,] [w]hen Ontological developments afforded by technological developments like the telescope are blocked by phenomenological limitations (like “the Earth feels flat”), you end up with a perversion of ontology that willfully misrepresents the ontic (and is no longer ontological, but fundamentalist). [A similar argument can be made regarding Evolution.]

‘If the desire truly is to limit Ontological Understanding, it should not be at the expense of ontological development universally, and should use language to clarify and classify itself, ontologically, as phenomenology. I actually think a phenomenological theory of emergence is kind of cool, and allows for infinite room to play with limitation, ironically, in ways that don’t infringe on ontological development.

‘[Do note, that] if Vector Emergence itself applied Ontological limitations to its philosophers, a number of interesting things would happen. First and foremost, each philosopher would have their own ontological theory of VE that accorded to their own phenomenology. Each philosopher, in a sense, would live within their own vector. And so, by being truly radical in the limitations, an amazing degree of mutual respect and allowance for creativity could occur, which in itself could serve as a remarkable grounding for a liberated and more experimental philosophical discourse.’

As always, Mr. Ebert exhibits brilliance.

6. Alexander Bard tells us that ‘time is another word for change,’ and furthermore Bard believes “objects are not objects,” per se.¹⁶ ‘[O]nly events exist, as Whitehead maintains, [which is to say that] there are, ontically speaking, no objects whatsoever.’¹⁷ Things are their time¸ we could say: we are not “special” like we tend to think. If this is the case, the LO must describe a temporal movement versus a spatial movement, which means it describes how things “are (as becomings)” versus “how (solid) things move.” There aren’t even “things,” per se, only “processes” (or “processings,” though this is not a word). Considering Bohm, Bard tells us:

the process is primary. What form an ontological point of view appears to be permanent structures is from an ontical point of view nothing other than relative, autonomous sub-entities that arise out of the holomovement and that then once again dissolve in this movement through one big and incessant process of change.’¹⁸

For me, this absolutely aligns with the LO, for though I speak of “things” and “dots” (which is hard to avoid, given language), the entire LO can be viewed as a continual process. Even if there were entities, the LO would still apply. No “processing” can become “pure difference” or “sameness” relative to other “processings” without undergoing effacement. “Pure difference” and “sameness” are “poles” which “processing” occurs between.

Mr. Bard’s emphasis on there being “no things only processings” is echoed in his thoughts on culture and mind. Stéphane Gibon brilliantly asked (IDW, 12.11.21), ‘Why are there languages and cultures instead of isolated self-sufficient and self-aware minds?’ — a question I loved — and following Bard the answer would perhaps be because such is impossible. There is no such thing as “self-sufficiency” or “self-awareness,” for there is no such thing as “the individual,” only “the dividual.” As Bard puts it:

‘There is no dividual that conducts relations, there is only a dividual that is the byproduct of the relations that are constantly ongoing and that spur the dividual toward constant change, which makes the dividual a constantly altered event and nothing else.’¹⁹

Beautifully stated, and indeed none of us are born in anything but a world. At the same time, we cannot “see ourselves” or “feel” too much like “a nonstable process,” because that would existentially and psychologically overwhelm us (as argued throughout Belonging Again by O.G. Rose). Regarding the world today, Bard writes that ‘[t]he need of a hierarchy, direction and structure in the social arena has never been greater, quite simply because the fraying energies that pull societies and collectives apart never have been stronger.’²⁰

There are no individuals, only dividuals (constant fluxes and processes), and yet a role of society is to paradoxically make us feel “held together” so that we can handle ourselves (a “good lie,” alluding to Plato, perhaps). Similarly, it would seem we need something like shapes, colors, the LO, etc. in order for reality to be coherent enough that we could operate in it, which is to say we need reality to feel “noncontingent enough” for us to “feel like” things are meaningfully stable. Yes, ultimately, “radical contingency” is the case, but we seem to have a “natural” need to experience reality otherwise. We cannot take too much reality, T.S. Eliot suggested.

‘The need for a cohesive worldview compels the emergence of a subject at the center of this worldview,’ Bard writes, ‘as the dialectical response to the intrusive chaos. The fundamental lack of cohesion is in itself the experience of the subject.’²¹ So it goes with “things” in general, as Bard himself notes with his “eternalist and mobilist distinction.” For Hegel, ‘the subject is instead what he terms the night of the world,’ which suggests that we could think of “things” in generals as “nights of the world.’²² Where there is a “thing,” there is a concealment, a veil that we require to function. Humans are all nocturnal creatures.

Bard writes:

‘The experience of being a subject arises when the mind via the perception process in unable to connect the incoming information into a cohesive worldview. It is the last resort, a cosmetic emergency solution in the form of a secret concealer of experience spread over the mysteries of existence to hide all cracks and simulate coherent uniformity. There and only there does consciousness arise as a kind of waste product of history, and with it follows self-consciousness.’²³

Again, what Bard has written about subjects can be usefully applied to “things”: “the experience of a thing” arises when we cannot comprehend the “processings” we experience and so manifest them into “some-thing” to which we can refer. If thinking and speaking are generally structured according to “signifiers,” that would mean we need “the signified” in order to think and speak meaningfully. Things that are always changing from moment to moment are not “things which can be signified,” and so we must “freeze them into things” in order to think and make sense of the world around us. And this “violence” is also what we do to ourselves. Bard continues:

‘Subjectivity thus arises only at the end of a momentum as the core of the discrepancy between this momentum’s inner eternalist and outer mobilist observation. This is: we produce a subject at the end of the very process that does not make sense to us. This self-objectification tricks us into believing that we have solved the riddle of ambivalence in the momentum that is at hand by placing ourselves in the center of the riddle, as though our subjectivity could bridge the tangible void. The self is nothing other than the void that unites the surrounding discrepancies into a functional whole. The self-image is literally the mirror of the worldview.’²⁴

As it goes with subjects, so we always produce “things” in order to make sense of a universe of “processings.” If everything was just flashes of shapes, colors, and Leibniz Oscillations which didn’t materialize (into solids), the world would not make sense, and survival would prove difficult (thus why evolution did not let our brains develop accordingly). In a sense, everything is “trans-things,” which means everything is always transforming and transcending. Every moment is worthy of religion.

7. Mr. Bard noted (IDW 12.15.21) that ‘relations are similar to fields that are quasi-objects but not objects. Therefore potential [more so] than virtual but not yet actual. / Which is why I have proposed pandialecticism as a better term than panrelationalism […] But it is the relata that determines the Emergence Vector itself whereas relations is what unifies all the known emergence vectors.’

“Similarity/difference” is a dialectic, as is Sameness/“Pure Difference” regarding Vectors. Are all dialectics relations, though not all relations dialectics? That might be a point of debate, for though I myself entail “similarity/difference,” do my “similarities” and “difference” relate in of themselves or only “to others?” My own “similarity/difference” seems more dialectical and a constant negation/sublimation — I’m not sure.

That’s all well and good, but how are we to understand this though in light of what Bard said in Digital Libido with Jan Söderqvist:

‘The fact is that a world without our consciousness and without our perception would not contain any of these dialectic relations, it would be a world with a single furious mortido in a single mobilist chaos. Dialectics in all its variants arises only in our relation to the surrounding world.’²⁵

We have described “similarity/difference” as a dialectic, but “the dots” depicted in our graphics were not limited to Mind — would this not mean that dialectics exist separate of Mind in opposition to what Bard has stated? Well, the key is that “things” in their very being oscillate between the effacements of similarity and pure difference, and that things in their “becoming” are always a “similarity/difference” compared to other things, which is to say things are dialectical in light of others. But are things dialectical in and to themselves versus just when thought about (by oneself or by others)? This might seem like a strange point, but it’s critical: though I might only be able to understand things as “similarity/differences” (dialectically) (which would be ontologically), that would not necessarily mean things are dialectics to themselves (even if that’s the only way we could describe and understand their “processing” through time). This idea brings to mind something Bard wrote about Deleuze:

‘Eternalist criticism of totalist philosophy therefore builds upon the idea that the phenomenon must be seen as an eternalist product of a mobilistic process, which always precedes the manifestation of the phenomenon in eternalist fiction.’²⁶

“Eternalism” for Bard signifies how we must “freeze change” into (ostensible) “solids” in order to understand and operate in the world, whereas “mobilism” refers to the idea that “change is all”: there is time and hardly any space at all. But very problematically what I just wrote about regarding “mobilism” is in solid words on a solid laptop screen: the medium can never be the message. On this idea, Bard wrote:

‘Deleuze is an impassioned immanence philosopher, and wants at all costs to avoid what he perceives as concessions to eternalism. Despite this, he himself is forced to make a considerable concession in the Nietzschean sense when he — like all other philosophers, for that matter — is forced to put his thinking into words in order to structure and, in due course, communicate it.’²⁷ ²⁸

‘No matter how mobilistic Deleuzianism may be within Deleuze’s own brain — even if this cannot be fully thought through either, because verbal reflection has been deeply involved in the formation of thought — it is still transformed into an eternalist phenomenon among others as soon as it is formulated in language. Philosophy as a discipline, unlike art and possibly poetry, can never itself be mobilistic.’²⁹

To discuss things is not to discuss them: to think is to fail. If Bard and Deleuze are correct that “change is everything,” then we never understand everything: understanding is always a tragedy, a “tradeoff.” Similarly, whatever things “are” (ontically) is that which can never be meaningful to us, and all understanding must be dialectical to be possible. No, raw perception doesn’t have to be, but the moment perception means something, we have engaged in a dialectic (between experience and thinking, for one). Considering this, because I am stuck in language and in an effort to create understanding, I can only present what things “are” as an LO, which is an oscillation of a dialectical “similarity/difference.” Another quote from Bard could help articulate our dilemma:

‘Every singularity in itself consists of an infinite internal chaos, but through the singularity’s internalization of this chaos, a kind of encircling stability is created around the chaos which makes the universe’s identity possible […] a stable universe around chaotic matter, a stable life around a chaotic biology, a stable consciousness around a chaotic hodgepodge of thoughts, followed by God as a kind of stable ring around a chaotic future.’³⁰

Now, it’s of course possible that the universe could ontically entail dialectics, “gaps,” “lacks,” splits, and the like, but I’m not sure, and I do not think that matters for the line of thought explored in this paper. Something similar could be said about Vector Theory: even if it could be shown that all Vectors do somehow fold into one another, that “The Vector Tower” is collapsible, per se, it would not follow that Vector Theory wasn’t still an incredibly useful pragmatic tool (as Elung discussed in O.G. Rose Conversation #39). The same point, I hope, applies just as well to the overall LO schema presented in this work, as wrong as it might prove.

To close this point which acknowledges that this entire paper itself may ultimately just be an “ontological description” versus anything ontic, consider the following from Bard:

‘[…] there is a transrational wisdom in this metaphysical madness. To put it plainly, it is actually impossible to think ourselves past the ego experience. A world without subjects is a logical impossibility, since however illusory or artificial the ego is in the equation of life, the ego remains the basis for the entire existential experience. It is simply necessary for Man to be a pathological creature, to so to speak consciously fool himself in order to be able to achieve the existential experience at all.’³¹

8. Hegel’s thinking is incredibly important for understanding LO, and arguably LO is simply a restatement of something Hegel understand long ago (he is always ahead of us). Bard writes:

‘[Hegel’s] dialectical concepts are instead abstraction, negation, and concretion. The Hegelian spirit is manifested through the movement from abstraction to concretion via negation. But it is always the entire Universe, as one single phenomenon, that is: as precisely the Bohmian holomovement, that represents the authentic change that precedes Hegelian dialectics. This universe and thus authentic change, and nothing else, is, in turn, time itself. This is what we call global time or duration.’³²

The topics of “the holomovement” and time must be left for another paper and the upcoming book by Bard and Söderqvist: here, I want to focus on the concepts of abstraction, negation, and concretion. Alluding back to the graphics, both “pure difference” and “sameness” are abstractions, for nothing in reality are actually “purely different” or “fully the same.” And yet things and ideas are “toward” both — if they never negate these “goals,” against their orientations, then there shall be effacement. That said, since both “sameness” and “pure difference” are actually impossible, they are in a sense “innately negated” from entities in their very becoming, which is to say that things are made concrete precisely thanks to the negation of these (effacing) possibilities. Thus, “the dots” (entities) in the above graphics are indeed constituted and made themselves thanks to the triad of abstraction, negation, and concretion (relative to “sameness” and “pure difference”).

9. The brilliant William Rupush asked a great question, January 2022:

‘How do you know whether something is truly emergent, and what can be reduced to what? According to what you’ve said earlier these events are relatively few, like subphysics-physics-chemistry-biology etc. What makes chemical reactions special enough to deserve their own emergence vector, and not, say tornadoes? How can you know that statements of chemistry cannot someday be reduced to statements of physics? That is a plausible prospect, and already partially underway with quantum chemistry. With methods of approximating the Schrödinger equation molecular and macroscopic condensed matter systems can be studied using quantum mechanics.’

How can we be sure that what is deemed a “New Vector” isn’t merely a matter of salience? By what standard is it claimed that a Vector begins and ends? No doubt, the answer has something to do with reducibility: a new Vector has Emerged when “what is” cannot be reduced “to what has been,” which is perhaps made evident by the appearance of unique processes which have never before been seen. For example, once “the combustion” happened, there was “reason to think” a new Vector of Chemistry had emerged from Physics; once “the idea” appeared, there was reason to think the Mind Emerged unique from Biology; and so on. However, even if we accept this answer, the problem of “Vector Interaction’ still lingers large.


Having considered these points, possible objections, etc. (though no doubt I have missed many), I hope readers still believe this paper offers some value and use. Now, we will advance into the topic of “Vector Interaction.”


Both Alexander Bard and Alexander Elung stress the “irreducibility” of Vectors, and I personally loved how Elung worded the difference between Vector Theory and the works of Alfread Whitehead:

‘Whitehead solves ‘the hard problem’ by positing a shared fundamental structure for reality [‘A Theory of Everything,’ as I, Daniel, call it]. [Bard and Elung] solve the hard problem by saying that difference is fundamental — so the gap is not a problem, it’s a necessary feature [‘A Theory of Each Thing’].’³³

A beautiful articulation, which also suggests a solution to “the hard problem of consciousness” (‘ ‘[t]he hard problem’ is only a problem if one assumes that there must be a continuity which can be reduced to an ontology such as monism or dualism. From [Vector Theory], there is no hard problem at all, because all Emergence Vectors are as radical as physics to mind’).³⁴ With Hegel’s A/B in mind, I also appreciate how Elung wrote that ‘[t]he monad-like structure is to be avoided because it attempts to avoid difference and therefore [dooms] identities to never actually emerge.’³⁵

With Elung’s writings in mind, it helps me articulate each Vector as “a hard problem,” though of course “the hard problem of Biology” is now more so solved than Mind, so perhaps it is not really “a hard problem” at all (as Thomas Hamelryck is right to note). However, at one time, it was “a hard problem,” and I think that is important to keep in mind if we are to avoid singling out Mind as uniquely “hard.” Elung wrote:

‘[E]very vector has its own ‘hard problem.’ ‘Why and how is there Physical existence?’ Or ‘Why and how is there biological existence?’ There is nothing special about consciousness in that regard. All emergence is its own ‘hard problem’ and none of it is a problem, unless we seek explanations outside the emergence vector itself. And the reason why that is a problem is because conceptual reduction can never amount to the thing itself.’³⁶

Considering this passage, we could discuss:

The Hard Problem of Subphysics
The Hard Problem of Physics
The Hard Problem of Chemistry
The Hard Problem of Biology
The Hard Problem of Mind
The Hard Problem of Culture

Consciousness and Mind are thus not unique, and yet we don’t claim (reductively) that “the hard problem” doesn’t matter; instead, the argument is that every Vector has a “a hard problem — all Vectors are equal. Again, please note that Biology and Chemistry are not “hard problems” in the same way as is “Mind” or “Culture”: we’ve made tremendous progress in these Vectors, to the point where Chemistry and Biology are arguably “solved.” However, I still think it is helpful to think of Chemistry and Biology as “hard problems,” because that helps us stop seeing “Mind” as something unique, while at the same time maintaining irreducibility. Something hard isn’t necessarily undoable, after all.

Elung articulates the “irreducibility of Vectors” in many beautiful and eloquent ways. To offer another extensive quote:

‘There is however a new type of logic taking place when describing biological systems, than when describing chemical systems. When we are looking at organisms we have to apply entirely new narrative concepts and ideas, which cannot be reduced to math or the type of concepts we use to describe chemical reactions. We are using different narratives to describe biological adaptation which cannot be reduced to chemistry at all. They are not the same logos at all.’³⁷

There are many more quotes I could cite, but hopefully I have captured some main points. As Alexander Bard put it, all this means that irreducibility is a fundamental axiom of Vector Theory versus reducibility. Faced with the widespread insistence on “reducibility,” Vector Theory takes a different route: ‘the radical and underwhelming response to this axiomatic mistake is to just insist on [axiomatic] irreducibility’ (IDW, 12.13.21). Hence, we could write:

Reducibility = axiom of most theories today.
Irreducibility = axiom of Vector Theory

And yet it must be stressed again that Vectors are irreducible and yet indetermined. It is very hard for us to hold these categories together in our minds, but we must to understand Vector Theory. “The Vector Tower” depicted in this work was not determined to Emerge when the universe started, but now it cannot help but seem determined, precisely because it is necessary for us to be around to view it. It is natural for us to conflate “necessary” and “determined’ in our minds, for, relative to us, when it comes to our existence, those categories must overlap. But just because “they must overlap for us” does not mean “they must overlap.” Bard suggests this when he writes:

‘Kauffman points out that there is nothing built into physics from the start that says that it should emerge and give rise to chemistry, in the same manner that there is nothing built into chemistry from the beginning that says that it should emerge and give rise to biology.’³⁸

All this rearticulated and explored, let us now approach “the hard problem” of “Vector Interaction.” In Section III, there was a third question that we shelved because it did not deal with “processing” like Questions 1 and 2, but the inquiry is still vital to address: “How is interaction possible between Vectors?” If each Vector is unique from all the other Vectors (and no processes connect them), then how in the world do they interact? A great question, the answering of which will be assisted by revisiting Leibniz again, whose thoughts make clear the critical uniqueness of Mind (for the universe to gain intelligibility regarding what it cannot physically “bring together”).

We have explored how Emergent Vectors arise due to “Ontological Impasses” and a “vertical oscillation,” but arguably this does not constitute an “interaction.” This is because (and forgive me if the following is wrong according to the thinking of Elung and Bard, but I struggle to find a better way to put it), the “parts of Subphysics” which “became” Physics suddenly and all at once “flipped” into being something that wasn’t Subphysics “as if” it never was Subphysics: all traces of an “interaction” (if there even was one) are forever gone and covered by the new Emergence (a strange idea that is easier to grasp once we expand on “trinitarian time,” as explored elsewhere in O.G. Rose). Hence, I do not think a description of the process of “Vector Emergence” is equivalent to a description of “Vector Interaction.” Something else is needed.

Earlier sections explored the topics of “embodiment” and “participation,” which suggested a language by which to describe “Vector Interaction.” Relevant to this discussion, a thread on IDW between William Rupush and Alexander Bard (February 2022) might prove useful. William Rupush is brilliant, and his contributions to IDW are ones I adore. On 2.20.22, Mr. Rupush wrote:

‘Metaphysics has logical primacy […] And Being — Nothing — Becoming are metaphysical concepts rather than strictly physical. This does not mean, however, that metaphysics as a discipline has epistemological primacy, or that someone styling themselves a metaphysician has anything worthwhile to say about science. I view the individual sciences (where physics in my opinion holds an epistemological primacy, being the epitome of a rigorous study of nature) as studying their own domains of being, and metaphysics as the subject which studies the categories we use to analyze the world in the first place. For a scientific metaphysics to be of any value whatsoever, it ought to be able to either reproduce the categories of contemporary science, or more useful ones. This is why I insist on making contact with physics, and probably why you think I’m a physicalist. If your scientific metaphysics makes no real contact with useful physics, then it goes straight out the window for me. In order to be a real scientific metaphysician you must first have a solid grasp of basically all of the sciences. Otherwise you are doing something else, and nothing logically primary to science at all.

‘[…] if the purpose is a scientific metaphysics to stand as a proper base for the individual disciplines, then since its subject matter are the individual sciences and their concepts, it is constrained by every significant science there is. Not only physics, but even psychology and sociology. If you try to understand the categories used by physicists to grasp the world, and you ignore them and just say “[screw] you physics we are better than you!” then you are doing it wrong.

‘ […] When two atoms come together to form a molecule, then yes, you can say that you ‘get chemistry,’ but the Schrödinger equation still applies. You can still use the tools of physics to analyze it, the results are just more complex than for one atom (see quantum chemistry). If you think that ‘it is no longer physics’ then you are patently wrong.’

For me, the point Mr. Rupush is making suggests why a language of “participation” and “embodiment” can be useful, for though Vector Theory helps us avoid reductionism, we at the same time don’t want to make it sound like each Vector “has nothing to do” with every other Vector (a “Vector Solipsism,” I suppose). Alexander Bard is passionately concerned about reductionism (and for good reason, given its prevalence), and he may easily accuse me of that mistake in discussing Vector “participation” and “embodiment.” However, I think Mr. Rupush makes another good and relevant point here:

‘The laws of physics constrain chemical and biological theorizing in a way that does not hold in the other direction. This is due to the generality of physics, as compared to the particularity of chemistry or biology. If a biological theory violates the laws of thermodynamics then this really is a problem, and one cannot wriggle one’s way out of it by claiming that they are wholly independent domains. That being said, aside from providing some broad constraints, the tools of physics are generally useless in most other domains and entirely different concepts are required. The ontologies of other sciences do not have to justify themselves directly on a physical basis, but if there are blatant contradictions between domains then that is a problem.’³⁹

As hopefully “The Vector Tower” in Section IX makes clear, “lower Vectors” have more influence on more Vectors then “higher Vectors,” and since Physics is toward the bottom of “The Vector Tower,” Physics is indeed uniquely influential. No, Chemistry cannot be “reduced” to Physics, but that is not being argued; rather, what is being discussed is the nature of “Vector Interaction.” Bard warns that ‘[t]he basement is not more interesting than the top floor of a skyscraper,’ but I would note that saying Physics is more “influential” across Vectors than say Biology does not mean that therefore Physics is more important or more interesting.⁴⁰ Bard also stresses the “transcendental” nature of Vectors, and indeed it’s fair to say that Chemistry “transcends” Physics to some degree, but it also doesn’t to the degree that Chemistry “embodies” Physics. To be metaphorical, this brings to mind Jesus, who is “The God Man,” which is to say that Christ “embodies” humanity while “participating in” divinity — a strange and paradoxical double action that seems useful for understanding “Vector Interaction.” This point also alludes to “The Question of Transhumanism,” the choice between Jesus and Lovecraft, which this essay will explore toward the end.

Mr. Rupush stresses the need for doctrines of “embodiment” and “participation” with the following, and I should note how much I appreciate his eloquence and clarity:

‘Of course biological systems are subject to physical laws. You don’t jump off your balcony because you’re subject to the laws of gravity. You don’t want to get hit by a truck because you’re subject to the laws of mechanics. You don’t lick the electrical socket because you’re subject to the laws of electromagnetism. You eat because you are subject to the laws of thermodynamics. And so forth. To deny this would be to go full Looney Tunes.’⁴¹

I should note that Mr. Rupush also questions the existence of the Vector of Subphysics, writing that ‘ ‘Subphysics’ is not a thing in my book. Whenever I’ve heard [someone] try to explain it, it just sounds like either fundamental physics or logic/metaphysics.’⁴² He might be right about this — I don’t know — but I have included it in this paper because it reflects my current understanding of Vector Theory, following Elung and Bard. Mr. Rupush also discussed “containment paradigms” on IDW, which I think can be associated with the language of “embodiment,” and I think he is correct that this “containment” it why ‘there is actually the possibility of understanding what is going on.’⁴³ Furthermore:

‘Once you realize that you can fruitfully view an organism as a kind of energy-information control system, functioning on cybernetic principles, governed by the laws of physics and in a perpetual struggle against the second law of thermodynamics, then you start getting a cognitive grasp of the object and can begin to understand how it works. If you notice that leaves on a plant are essentially solar panels utilizing sophisticated nanotechnology then you can start reverse engineering them and learn something. Or study the genetics of hydras to learn about their regenerative capabilities, in hope of exploiting this knowledge for medical uses. Or the glow of fireflies to be able to build more efficient light bulbs. Or you can find ways to keep vaccines etc clean by studying the blood of horseshoe crabs. As far as I am concerned every living organism is a proof-of-concept of something possible to build with sufficiently advanced technology. And the leaves on a plant are just as much governed by physical law as the solar panels on your roof.’⁴⁴

Considering this, we must be careful that in our efforts to avoid reductionism, we don’t surrender “the containment” which aids in understanding, nor end up with a “Vectorism” like “Dualism” where we have “Vectors in Vectors” like “ghosts in machines.” It is my hope that the language of “embodiment” and “participation” help establishes a middle ground, but I’ll let others be the judge.

We have very good reason to believe Biology “embodies” Physics because zebras cannot escape the laws of gravity, and because the force they produce is relative to their mass and acceleration. We have good reason to think oxygen (Chemistry) can “participate” in Mind, because we can formulate “ideas about oxygen” (and you right now can read about oxygen). The ideas expressed here are based on experience versus theory: we have “observed” Biology following and “embodying” Physics, as we have experienced Physics “participating” in Mind (to us). For this reason, the possibility of “Vector Interaction” is empirical and phenomenological, so we must give an account for it that avoids reductionism (otherwise we’d risk a main purpose of Vector Theory). Successfully or not, this is what we will now attempt.

To start, I would note that all interaction will necessarily seem reductionist, in the same way that all descriptions of causality seem determined. Freedom is “dressed in determinism,” per se, making it easy to mistakenly think that freedom is determined. Likewise, if x can interact with y, it will “make it seem like” x = y, or at least that x has “enough in it like y” to interact with y, thus making x seem to “just be y.” Also, from “a standard of perspective,” every Vector seems to “just be every other Vector” once it emerges at the top of “The Vector Tower” (at the time). To depict this “flip moment” and change of scope:

Each Emergence Vector “(re)defines” the meaning of every Emergent Vector in “terms of itself,” and based on which Vector we examine, the meaning of “history” changes accordingly. A quote from Digital Libido may help elucidate this:

‘There are no eternal laws or objectively valid truths outside the metatruth that says that change is the only thing that is constant, which in practice is the same as saying that nothing is constant since change constantly shows a new face. This in turn means that events will occur along the timeline that forever change the conditions that apply at any given point in time. We call such an event an emergence, a concept related to phase transitions in natural science, for example when ice melts and converts into water, which then is heated further and changes into vapor […]’⁴⁵

Every Emergence Vector changes every other Emergence Vector in profound ways, which suggests that “how” Emergent Vectors interact change as Emergence Vectors arise. How Biology and Chemistry interact, for example, might forever change once Mind appears — I’m not sure. Bard stresses that ‘the arrival of a New Emergence Vector means that all of Emergence Vector Theory has to be rewritten (in the spirit of Hegel and Peirce who both ban any meta-laws),’ and I assume that this means “Vector Interactions” (VI) must similarly be rethought.⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ On the topic of VI, Bard also notes that we must keep in mind that ‘What’s most important is actually not what Transcendental Emergence can say across [V]ectors but how the theory actually defines what is impossible to take across [V]ectors.’⁴⁸ At the same time, Bard does argue in favor of “Vector Interaction”:

All emergence vectors AFFECT all other emergence vectors and are therefore NOT INDEPENDENT but radically DEPENDENT on one another.

Not that they would have to be according to some meta-law but because they just happen to work that way. Neutral monism.

We can still be thrilled about how physics and biology interact and AFFECT one another. Or as thrilled about how mind and biology interact and AFFECT one another. But then it is general problem of emergence vectors and not a hard problem of mind versus matter.

Here is the radical Hegelian take: Subject AFFECTS matter. Subject AFFECTS substance. And substance responds in kind.

It’s all very Aristotelian. Time to reinvent different CAUSALITIES. They may even differ from person to person, you know.⁴⁹

Alexander Elung offers similar thoughts:

‘Let’s take an object, “insect”
-It’s partly material (atoms),
-Partly chemical (reactions)
-Partly biological (organism, cells)
-Possibly partly mind (qualia)

‘In this way, matter is never conscious, but a material object could have a mental component (qualia). Still, that component wouldn’t be material. This is “Emergentism.” All vectors are different. Biology is not matter either. Biology is an organistic process, which is not the same as physical matter. Chemistry and reactions are neither biology, mind, or matter. Matter and mind are different. But so are all the other vectors. It’s not dualism.’⁵⁰

Subphysics does not “become” Physics, even if Subphysics is “dressed in” Physics relative to Physics and its “scope” (point of view). Once I am a Mind, it is impossible for me to experience Physics like Physics is to Physics, like Chemistry is to Chemistry — the classic Kantian problem arises. From Mind, I can only know Physics “to Mind,” as I can only know Culture “to the degree Mind participates in it.” This doesn’t mean my conclusions are wrong or “have nothing to do with the truth,” only that I am stuck in a particular scope (which is “for me,” as we’ll be expanded on in “Absolute Knowing” by O.G. Rose). To quote Bard again:

All existing Emergence Vectors AFFECT a new emergence. However once that emergence has led to a new vector that vector will in return INTERACT with all other vectors. For example there is no MIND prior to TRIBE but rather TRIBE (culture within biology) just as much creates MIND as the opposite.⁵¹

Alright, let us face our question: “How do Vectors interact?” The balance between “Vector Interaction” (VI) without “Vector Reduction” (VR) seems to be a critical problem that needs untangling. The thinking of Graham Harman might be useful here for maintaining the possibility of VI without VR, notably his idea that it’s not merely subjects which never access “things in themselves” but things also. It’s possible for there to be “interaction across Vectors” thanks to embodiment/participation while not reducing Vectors to one another, and grasping this is paradoxically thanks to thinking found in Kant that we often use to deconstruct Metaphysics. With Vector Theory, Kant may suddenly aid in saving it.

Though Vectors can participate/embody one another, they cannot “purely” interact with one another. In other words, as we never interact with “objects themselves,” even though we can interact “with them,” so Vectors never interact “purely” with Vectors they embody and/or participate in. To put this another way, a Vector can interact “with other Vectors,” but a Vector cannot interact “with other Vector-selves,” per se, which is to say “as other Vectors are to themselves” (the difference between “with them” and “with themselves” is how there can be a “with” regarding Vectors without VI becomes VR). We as humans are biological, chemical, and physical, and yet we cannot “purely experience” Biology, Chemistry, or Physics (“the ontic” is not “fully accessible,” per se). If we didn’t “embody” Physics, Chemistry, and Biology, we wouldn’t exist to interact or relate with anything, and yet because we “embody” these Vectors, we cannot “purely interact” with them (as we cannot “purely interact” with Vectors we participate in, like Culture). But that doesn’t mean we cannot interact with these Vectors at all: we simply cannot interact with them as they interact with themselves. Yes, thanks to Mind, we can uniquely “imagine” what Vectors might be to themselves, but we cannot be sure. (Imagination does in fact seem uniquely useful in this context, as it and “memory” are special regarding Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing”).

Mind interacts with Mind, regardless how often it thinks or considers wrong or incomplete ideas. Mind interacts with ideas, regardless if those are “good ideas” or not, and that’s all that matters for us to establish that Mind-to-Mind is possible, that the Vector can know itself. Misidentifying a thing doesn’t mean I can’t identify it at all, and the existence of “identification” itself is evidence of a Vector. Do note that the Vector which draws the line between “embodiment” and “participation” for a thing might be the Vector which that thing can experience most “like itself to itself.” Biology is that Vector for a dolphin, so perhaps dolphins are more able to experience “Biology-to-Biology” then say can humans, who are part of Mind. Likewise, we might be able to experience Mind-to-Mind in ways Culture cannot, which seems plausible: I know what it’s like to think and “be” in the subjective experience of thinking, whereas a “meme” to itself might leave the subjective experience behind and be just a “raw idea.” Hard to say.

I can access and inhabit “subjective experience” even though I cannot access the minds of other people, for I don’t need to be able to access “other minds” to possess a unique position for interacting as “Mind-to-Mind.” Perhaps Kant is right, and I cannot interact with “objects-in-themselves,” but it does seem that I can interact with “subjectivity-in-itself.” This brings Hegel to mind (who would want to think without him?), and please note that even if I never totally or fully interact with my “subjectivity-in-itself,” it does not follow that I cannot access it at all. Similarly, the inability to access other minds is not the same as being unable to access Mind. I can access Mind, my “highest Vector,” as “Mind-to-Mind,” however imperfectly and incompletely, and I can do this despite the fact I cannot access “other minds.” This point that an expression of a given Vector can access itself even though it cannot access “all expressions” of its Vector is paramount — I think it suggests how we can maintain VI while avoiding VR.

Oxygen does not need to be able to interact with helium to interact with the Vector of Chemistry “to itself,” as I don’t need to be able to “enter other minds” to interact with Mind to itself. There is no reason to think Vectors change in nature, processes, habits, etc. between entities of a Vector. The “formal principles” of (my) Mind are like the “formal principles” of John. No, I might not know all the principles or processes of my Vector, and I might get them wrong and forget a lot of things, but “the formal principles” or habits maintain similarity. Oxygen and helium are different, but they are the same in terms of Vector-ness, meaning they are “similar/different” overall (they’re not “just the same,” which would be an effacement). Dolphins and chetahs are different, and dolphins don’t know what it’s like to be chetahs, but both know what it’s like to embody Biology. I don’t know what it’s like and can’t know what it’s like for chetahs to experience Biology (to Biology), but I can experience Biology through Mind, precisely because I “embody” Biology, making relation possible (if I was “Purely Different,” this would not be the case). And here we arrive at a logic that makes possible Vector Interaction without causing Vector Reductionism: Vectors can interact thanks to embodiment/participation, but it is precisely that embodiment/participation which makes “full interaction as” other Vectors impossible. Hence, we have VI without VR.

“I am” the Vector which marks off the difference between “participation” and “embodiment” (or the end of “embodiment,” which would describe “the top of the Vector Tower,” possible before another Emergence Vector), and if I am a hydrogen molecule, that means I can experience Chemistry-to-Chemistry, even if I cannot experience Physics-to-Physics. If “I am” Sarah, I can experience Mind-to-Mind, even if I cannot experience John-to-John or quantums-to-quantums. Chemistry-to-Chemistry can never be “reduced” to Mind-to-Mind or vice-versa (reductionism as elevationalism works both ways, funny enough), even though Mind “embodies” Chemistry — thus there is interaction without reductionism. At the same time, once Mind “Emerges,” it is then the case that Chemistry “participates” in Mind, and it is perhaps the case that, at this point, the unique characteristics, experiences, attributes, etc. (what have you) of Chemistry-to-Chemistry might forever change. This brings to mind Bard’s stresses on how Emergence Vectors change all other Emergence Vectors, and certainly once Culture “Emerges,” what it’s like in Mind-to-Mind might never be like Mind-to-Mind was when Mind was the top of “The Vector Tower.” At the very least, it’s surely the case that Biology which “participates” in Culture is different from Biology which doesn’t so “participate,” as Chemistry involved with the Mind could be different from Chemistry which has nothing to do with Mind (say on the moon or something). Hard to say — the point is that I see room for what Bard and Elung argue and defend.

Forgive the anthropomorphizing, but cats cannot experience thoughts about cats, while we hardly seem to experience anything but thoughts.⁵² Oxygen cannot eat, even though we need oxygen to eat, and chemicals can only experience thoughts “through us,” per se — in interacting with us — but Chemistry never enters Mind-to-Mind like us, as we never experience Culture-to-Culture even though we are “in” Culture (“participating”). VR and VI maintain separation because Mind-to-Mind is never reducible to Chemistry-to-Chemistry (or vice-versa), even though Mind “embodies” Chemistry. Also, “embodied Chemistry” is easily distinct from “unembodied Chemistry,” which would be a further assurance that reductionism is avoided (Chemistry “embodied” in Biology would be different from Chemistry “embodied” in Biology and Mind, both of which would be distinct from Chemistry “unembodied” in anything — and so on).

All “Vector Interaction” is either “embodied” and/or “participatory,” whereas the interactions of a Vector to itself can be more “pure.” In other words, I never interact with Chemistry as Chemistry interacts with itself, but I also can interact with Chemistry as “embodied” and/or “participatory.” “Pure interaction” is impossible, but “embodied/participatory interaction” is possible. There is VI without VR, thanks to the impossibility of “pure interaction” between, its possibility being only within.


To help clarify the last section, with guidance from Aphesis by Treydon Lunot, we will turn to the work of Žižek and Hegel, where “the impossibility of intersubjectivity” and “The Absolute” are explored. Technically, we never interact with other subjects “as” other subjects, according to the subjectivity of another. I am always bound in and to my subjectivity — it is “absolute,” per se — as your subjectivity is “absolute” for you. Each of us is our only awareness, and we necessarily live “as if” that is the only possible awareness. Yes, we know other “modes of awareness” exist, but we are never aware of other “modes of awareness,” per se, which is to say we never experience them as subjects. Furthermore, we interact with other “modes of awareness” without ever reducing them to “our mode of awareness.” They maintain their “Absoluteness” to themselves as themselves, while we maintain our “Absoluteness” to ourselves as ourselves (I am capitalizing “Absolute” to allude to Hegel, who we will soon explore).

On the technical impossibility of intersubjectivity, Mr. Lunot put the point very well:

‘In terms of human interaction, there seems to exist a “communicative space” that can be entered into. But how can this be reconciled with the enclosed nature of the subject, the fact that it is barred from the external world? Is it not true that any experience of the other is within one’s own framework, meaning there is no collective space in which a plurality of individuals equally exists within, but only individual subjective experiences? There is a simple answer: the “communicative space” does not really exist, but is a function of the activities of individuals influencing each other within the second-order field of relation. This is to say, intersubjectivity exists insofar as there are those who believe (or act as though they believe) that it does.’⁵³

We interact with other people, but we don’t enter other subjects. We think we do, and perhaps “practically forgetting” this truth is somehow necessary for us to function, but technically no two subjectivities ever interact as subjects in the ways which they experience themselves as subjects. Nobody “enters” our Absolute, per se: it is “Absolutely” ours and ours alone. However, as we learn from Hegel, since we cannot experience our “limits” as limits, we naturally think we do enter into the Absolutes of others, which is why it’s the case that ‘[t]he subject introduces untruth into the world.’⁵⁴ Mr. Lunot notes that it’s ‘easy to accept as a mere ‘fact’ that [multiple subjectivities exist], but it is impossible to fully comprehend why [their separation and inaccessibility to one another] must exist, as this ‘why’ is its very finitude, the very prison [each] is trapped within.’⁵⁵ Something similar can be said about Vectors: explaining their very inaccessibility and division from one another is their very existence. The answer “is” that Vectors “are,” with each Vector’s very experience of being “the only Vector” (“limitless”) as evidence that each Vector is not alone.

Like subjects, Vectors “interact” with one another without ever “becoming” one another: the impossibility of intersubjectivity is like the impossibility of what I will call “intervectivity.” Vectors cannot experience their limits, so it is then natural for a Vector to believe all other Vectors “are part of it.” As a subjectivity cannot experience its limits and thus must consider itself limitless, so Vectors cannot to themselves experience their own limits: we simply have to know we and Vectors have those limits. A cat cannot experience the ideas it does not have, and so the cat has no reason to think Biology is limited; I never experience the Cultural “hivemind” which only Culture can unique produce, and so I have no reason to think Mind is limited; Physics which “encounters” a chemical combustion undergoes the Chemistry as a physical entity moving and bubbling in spacetime, which is to say Physics lacks any “hermeneutical way” to understand Chemistry as unique; and so on. Every Vector undergoes every other Vector “as if” its own, for every Vector incorporates other Vectors into its “limits” and “horizons” while at the same time avoiding acknowledging itself as having “limits.” To use Mr. Lunot’s description of subjectivity, a Vector ‘has no access to its limits, only its limitless self-experience; its ‘ontological’ finitude constitutes its ‘phenomenological’ infinitude.’⁵⁶ Yes, I can know that Biology and Physics are not the same, as I can know “other minds exist,” but I cannot experience Biology-to-Biology or Physics-to-Physics. Intervectivity is impossible.

But can’t Vectors “higher” on “The Vector Tower” grasp “lower” Vectors as distinct from themselves? Can’t humans look at dolphins and “get” that they are not the same as humans, that there is “something missing” (Mind) between us? Funny enough, we actually can’t. We cannot confirm a dolphin doesn’t have Mind, for perhaps a dolphin simply doesn’t use Mind like we do: even if we observed different brain patterns, this could easily just mean “a different kind of Mind” is in operation, not something different “in kind” (it’s based on us, in Mind, to determine how we interpret those patterns, an act which would put us in the realm of “signs” and thus Mind-to-Mind). We also cannot confirm that the universe isn’t entirely conscious, disproving panpsychism once and for all (again, Mind could operate somehow on the quantum level, always beyond falsification — or so we could always “think” if we wanted, Mind-to-Mind). Wherever we “are,” there are traces of Mind, and we cannot think “through” Mind or without Mind to be sure that there are places where Mind actually isn’t present. We cannot access “the ontic,” and this means we cannot confirm “the ontic” isn’t somehow Mind. Because we are stuck in Mind, we cannot say Mind isn’t everywhere, even if there is very good reason to “think” it isn’t. To think there are other Vectors outside of Mind requires Mind to think.

Forgive the anthropomorphizing (I have little choice in making a point which makes sense to Mind), but the Law of Gravity is everywhere it looks, and everywhere atoms look they will see atoms. Chemicals will find chemicals everywhere, and we could consider pavement or poles as “combinations of chemicals” if we wanted (as Chemistry would perhaps have us to do). Would animals be forced to see everything “as animal?” No, but animals see plants, birds, sunlight — everything is part of “a natural world.” No, dirt doesn’t act like birds, as birds don’t act like sunlight, but it’s all “part of a natural world,” and hence can be interpreted as “all part of Biology,” as a bear or cow might “naturally” think. Through such reductionism, a single Vector would hence be the only Vector. Overall, my point is that “intervectivity is impossible,” that every Vector naturally treats all other Vectors in terms of a single Vector, mainly itself (even reductionism, as we will explore). A chemical that experiences a bear not “combusting” could simply decide that “the bear is a combination of chemicals which doesn’t combust,” as a bear could decide a rock which doesn’t eat “is an example of the Biological world which doesn’t eat,” thus deciding that digesting isn’t an essential process for a thing to be Biological. No, none of this would necessarily follow or be “right” (by some standard of our choosing), but the point is that all Vectors are limitless to themselves. They can absorb all phenomena into their terms and thus “be” the only Vector, which is to say that every Vector can “be being itself to itself,” exactly how we can “practically live” as if we are the only subject ((stuck) in our Absolute). (Do note here that it would seem that the Mind is uniquely needed for grasping Vector Theory and irreducible differences between Vectors — but this is not a point we will belabor.)

The very fact we cannot “prove” other Vectors outside our own Vector is precisely what keeps Vectors “irreducible”: the impossibility of intervectivity is why Vectors “uniquely” exist. As Kant’s “noumenon” is inverted by Hegel to be evidence that consciousness is “for itself,” so the inability of Vectors to experience existence “outside themselves” (beyond their own “noumena,” per se) is evidence that Vectors are “for themselves,” which is to say that “they keep themselves from reducibility.” If Vectors “carelessly” considered the world in terms of multiple Vectors, then we could say that each Vector would not “jealously defend” its own Vector status, that it could easily slip into thinking of itself as “nothing special,” of “being one of many.” The nature of Vectors to experience themselves as the only Vector is simultaneously proof of their irreducibility and multiplicity, as our experience of ourselves as “the only subject” is evidence to think other people are experiencing themselves as (the only) subjects too. Following Hegel, the limitation of the “Absolute Subject” to be unable to experience itself as limited — the reality that we can only experience ourselves “limitlessly” — is evidence that there are subjects beyond us and our limits which we must experience as limitless, for where limits exist there must be “two sides” to those limits. No, this doesn’t prove other minds, but it does make the sophistic position no better or worse than the position against it. And, also, if we could “prove other minds,” we would be “proving the Vector of Culture,” and that would violate “the impossibility of intervectivity.” If Vector Theory is true, we should expect other minds to prove “improvable” precisely “in their honor.”

No Vector can prove Vectors outside of itself, precisely because each Vector is an “Absolute Vector” — at best we can have “reason to think” there are other Vectors (which “always must be” a “possible act of self-deception” — though note a possibility that is never realized is, in this case, “a permanent state of plausibility”). Taking ourselves as an example, wherever we look and experience, there “is” Mind (projected outward, working internally to give meaning to what we sense, etc.): an experience without Mind is impossible, and yet this very impossibility suggests Mind is not the only Vector. Funny enough, as “the impossibility of intervectivity” is evidence that Vectors are “for themselves” (thus defending their irreducibility in themselves), so the very act of “reductionism” is also evidence that each Vector is an “Absolute Vector” (to itself), as each subject is an “Absolute Subject” (to itself). Reductionism honors irreducibility.

Humanity is constantly arguing how humans and animals are “different in degree” but not in kind, that there is no “real difference” between us and other mammals except brain capacity. We have the same brain; humans just use it differently. This suggests that we naturally think in terms of “a single Vector,” as we naturally think in terms of “a single subjectivity,” which is to say that considering “a multiplicity of Vectors” is unnatural. For us, there is “some Vector without limits” that we consider as consuming everything else into: all distinctions are lost (for distinctions would require limits). Also, we think of Chemistry and Physics as “what make us up,” which is to say that we are all part of the same thing. This is key: we experience and understand all Vectors as “parts of the same Vector” (and so arguably not really “Vectors” at all, just “being”). Even if we say that we are “just atoms,” then we are saying that we are all Physics, which suggests that Vectors can identify themselves with “lower Vectors,” but even in this act, there is a move to make a single Vector the only Vector. Reductionism is an act of “treating a single Vector as the only Vector,” which is to treat a Vector as limitless, as we necessarily experience our own Vector. And here’s the critical move: if we say that “everything is Physics,” then we are saying that Physics is our Vector. We are actually not “escaping our Vector” at all, no more than we “escape our subjectivity” when we ascribe to some “universal spirit” and claim “we are all one.” Rather, we are redefining our Vector as another (as so allows Mind).

Reductionism redefines our “(limited) limitlessness,” our Vector, as a different Vector and “not even a Vector” (“practically speaking”), for if there is only one Vector, then it is not clear in what sense our Vector is even a Vector (versus “being itself”). In this way, reductionism both misidentifies and overidentifies, as we do something similar when we act like our subjectivity is the only subjectivity. In this sense, “reductionism” doesn’t reduce at all, but instead overexpands a Vector to being the only Vector and thus not a Vector (perhaps if “reductionism” actually “reduced,” it would be one thing). Strangely, the mechanism of reductionism is a kind of “expansion” and “overfitting,” hence why it is perhaps easy to think we aren’t reductionistic when we are — the act feels “expansive” and “inclusive.”

If a Vector has no limits, then we are that Vector, and the Vector isn’t even really a Vector — a double action occurs in the misidentification that conceals the misidentification. If we believe everything is Physics, then we are Physics and thus our Vector is the Vector (or, like sameness, the Vector). The Vector we “are” becomes god-like, which strangely suggests the act of “reducing” all Vectors to “one” can seem like a deification (“god is one,” I suppose). This suggests that a failure to accept Vector Theory might lead to strange pathologies, where we are both “divine” and “reduced” simultaneously. I’m not sure, but pathologies do certainly develop if we consider ourselves “the only subject in the world” (as we can feel like in our “Absolute Subject”-ness, because we are not alone).

Reductionism is not proof that intervectivity is possible; in fact, it is strong evidence that we can only think in terms of a single (limitless and self-referential) Vector. The very act of reductionism is an act of imagination (Mind) identifying itself as something else and thus proving it is not something else. Similarly, empathy proves the impossibility of intersubjectivity, because if intersubjectivity was possible, we would not need empathy: we’d just “get” other people. Empathy, which seems to show that intersubjectivity is possible, is actually what confirms that it isn’t, as “reductionism” (whether with what we “embody” or with what we “participate”) confirms the impossibility of intervectivity. We cannot “reduce” things into one another, making them collide, meet, and thus prove their independent uniqueness; rather, we can only “make everything the same thing,” which suggests they aren’t the same thing (for there must be difference to make things the same, a point which alludes back to Leibniz). Only the Mind can “reduce” everything into Physics, which means the Mind isn’t identical with Physics.⁵⁷ Sure, perhaps Physics is necessary for Mind, but the fact rocks must exist for me to have ideas of them does not mean ideas of rocks are found in stones.

When it comes to reductionism, we naturally go to “the lowest possible Vector” on “The Vector Tower,” because that is “the most all-consuming” Vector, and thus everything is easily seen as an expression of Physics or Subphysics. We could say everything is Chemistry, but then we’d have to split the difference and say something like how Chemistry “embodies” Physics while “participating” in Biology, and that would introduce Vector Theory — thus why everything is Physics or Subphysics (atoms, quarks, etc.). To avoid Vector Theory, the only possibility seems to be reductionism to the bottom of “The Vector Tower,” but there we establish a “limitless Vector” (or “limitless(ness) Vector”). Where there is “limitlessness,” there is reductionism, and yet we associate “limitlessness” with gods.

For Hegel, the knowledge that we cannot “know things in themselves,” following Kant, is the revelation that our “limitless experience” of our subjectivity is in fact “limited,” which means consciousness only “absolutely” knows itself once it accepts that it is “with-out -limit” (as in “without limit” and “with an out-limit,” which is “a limit outside itself”). In learning that we cannot know things-in-themselves, we learn that consciousness is “for itself,” which is to say that consciousness “is in the business of knowing itself,” a realization that also gives us reason to believe consciousness is reliable “about itself” (and able to “Harmonize” against Ontological Impasses). Similarly, the inability of Vectors to engage in intervectivity is evidence that Vectors “want to fully be themselves” and are in the business of casting everything in their terms, which means there are things not in their terms. As the inability of subjects to “know things in themselves” or “other subjects in themselves” is evidence the subject is “for itself,” so the impossibility of intervectivity shows that each Vector is “for itself,” irreducible, and not alone (the experience of a Vector to itself as being the only Vector means there is reason to think it is not the only Vector). As the “for-ness” of consciousness is experienced “in the knowledge of limitation as we experience limitlessness” (we “know” other people are subjects we “aren’t,” and yet we experience them as not having a subjectivity we are missing out on, for we experience only a body, a Biology), so the “for-ness” of Vectors is experienced in their capacity to understand everything as “part of them” (as some Vector “they are,” which is what happens in reductionism). The “for-ness” and “irreducibility” of Vectors is experienced in the knowledge of limitation as other Vectors are experienced (we “know” oxygen molecules and cats are distinct in terms of Vectors even as we experience them both in Physics, in spacetime, and as the cat breaths oxygen).

The Vector of Mind is where Hegel’s “Phenomenological Journey” occurs, which is the process by which a subject comes to “Absolute Knowing.” For Hegel, “the subject” is “The Absolute,” which if Mind and “the subject” are practically the same thing, then “Absolute Knowing” is “Mind Knowing.” It is a Vector coming to terms with itself as a Vector versus being itself. All Vectors are “being itself to themselves” before Absolute Knowing, and Mind would seem to be the first Vector which has the capacity to even realize it is a Vector. Vector Theory was impossible before Mind, which in one sense is obvious (theories require thinking), but in a deeper sense the Mind is an Emergence Vector which makes possible a totally new understanding of the universe as comprised of similarity/difference and Emergences, a blending of singularity and multiplicity without reductionism. With the realization of “Mind Knowing,” the entire universe, which we’ve always been in, changes.


Following the thinking of Žižek, “Absolute Knowing” is a state where “the Absolute knows itself” — a simple yet endless notion. For Hegel, “the subject” is “The Absolute,” so “Absolute Knowing” is the state where “the subject knows itself (as Absolute).” This changes what constitutes the self, and also designates “a final limit” of what the self can know, precisely because “knowing it” changes the meaning of everything which came before, and so the self must “go back to the start” (experience it anew). This journey and its implications are explored in “Absolute Knowing” by O.G. Rose; here, I want to focus on the idea of “The Absolute” as “the subject,” because what we discuss provides a schema by which we can think of Vectors (for each Vector is a kind of “Absolute” to itself and sets the parameters of an Absolute Knowing relative to that Vector).

“The subject” is “The Absolute,” for the subject is stuck in itself and thus is its own “absolute standard,” per se. This standard though isn’t “absolute” meaning “noncontingent,” “always right,” or something like that, but more so “the start and end of everything” (to itself). We start in our subjectivities and end in them: everything we experience, think, feel, and the like is through and thanks to “our subject.” It is “absolutely present,” per se, in everything we know: it is “The Absolute.” But coming to know this is thus for “The Absolute to know The Absolute,” which changes us and “The Absolute,” which then changes what we know — an endless feedback loop. In my view, this means we must rethink Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Reason, and all the other steps of Hegel’s “Phenomenological Journey” (as Dr. Last brilliantly calls it) in light of each reiteration of this “feedback loop,” never reaching “a final resting place.” This is both a blessing and a curse depending on how we respond.

Similarly, expressions of Chemistry like oxygen and helium start in Chemistry and end in Chemistry, and everything “relates back to” Chemistry: Chemistry is “the start and end of everything.” Bears and deer experience everything as “part of the natural world,” and so everything comes from Biology, is Biology, and returns to Biology, and all of existence is “for” Biology. Everything in the universe participates in Physical laws, so it seems to Physics that the universe is “for” Physics — everything we’ve said regarding “Absolute Knowing” and “The Absolute Subject” can apply just as well to each Vector. Every Vector is radically self-relating and “with-out-limit” (limit(less)).

Again, Hegel associates “the subject” with “The Absolute,” and so we could say that each of us is an “Absolute Subject” to ourselves (which doesn’t mean we are omnipotent or something like that: it means we are all self-referential and consequently experience ourselves as limitless). Similarly, each Vector is an “Absolute Vector,” per se, to itself, which makes it experience itself “as limitless” (“the only Vector”), and in this way each Vector has “baked into it” a tendency toward reductionism. This should not surprise us, for we ourselves have reductionism “baked into our subjectivities,” in the sense that because “intersubjectivity is impossible,” we only experience “our subjectivity,” and hence it is natural for us “to practically live” “as if” we are the only subject. Yes, we all “know” this is not the case, that it is “theoretically incorrect,” but it is remarkably difficult not to “practically live” like our subjectivity is the only subjectivity. Similarly, it is “practically impossible” for Vectors to not treat themselves “as if” they aren’t the only Vector, though if they know better, they can likewise practice better. But as our “Absolute Subjectivity” requires us to remind ourselves daily that “we are not the only subject,” so Vectors likewise require similar daily diligence. (Again, forgive my anthropomorphizing, but I myself am stuck in Mind — I cannot “think” a better way to describe “the impossibility of intervectivity.”)

There is no Vector Theory until there is an acceptance of limits, as there is no Absolute Knowing until we accept our limits (as our limitless experience). Absolute Knowing and Vector Theory, in this way, are related, and both are only possible thanks to “the subject.” Before Mind, alluding back to Leibniz, we could not “bring together” black holes and birds “mentally” to understand that they operate according to different ontological processes that cannot be reduced into one another. Without Mind, it would not be possible to “think reason” that birds and black holes are ontologically unique. Furthermore, it would not be possible “to think together” “limitlessness” and “limits” to understand one of them as possibly a sign of the other (as Hegel taught). With Mind has been gained memory and imagination, without which the universe “could not know itself” as a Vector Tower, only as “(a) being itself.” Mind is what makes possible “the bringing of each Vector together into Vectors” (to allude to Leibniz), of unveiling (the) Sameness (of experience) to be “Sameness/Pure Difference” (Emergence).

Reductionism is so hard to avoid “feeling” or “thinking” precisely because of “the impossibility of intervectivity,” as it is easy to believe that “we are the only mind which exists” because of “the impossibility of intersubjectivity.” We cannot “experience” our limits, but in Absolute Knowing we “know” we have limits because we experience limitlessness, and there are only two ways to be “limitless”: to be God, or to be limited from experiencing our limits.⁵⁸ Similarly, Vectors experience themselves “as limitless,” and Vectors must decide if that is evidence of “being the only/ultimate Vector” or evidence of a given Vector being one amongst Vectors. Subjectivity is never plural to itself, as a Vector is never plural. As the plurality of subjectivities can only be known, not experienced, so it must simply be known that Vectors are Vectors. But before Mind, the mental “bringing together” of multiple entities to identify evidence of “ontological uniqueness,” was impossible (there could be no thought of “with-out-limit”): Mind has made it possible for there to not just “be” Vectors but for Vectors to recognize themselves as “one of many.” And yet because this can only be “known” in memory and imagination, not experienced, the irreducibility of Vectors is maintained. VI and VR are kept apart.

Alexander Bard and Jan Söderqvist describe Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing” eloquently, and grasping their description can help us also grasp “Absolute Vectors”:

‘Hegel’s most brilliant insight lies in that thinking starts and ends with paradox and inconsistency […] Hegel’s stroke of genius is the insight that [when] knowledge reaches its absolute limit [it] is transformed into what Hegel dramatically calls absolute knowledge, just when it understands and acknowledges its own built-in limitations […]’⁵⁹

Every Vector consists of its own unique “Absolute Knowing,” its own “limit(less)”-ness, which is to say there is a “Physics Absolute Knowing,” a “Biology Absolute Knowing” — and yet only Mind can know (“Absolute Knowing”), which means the AK of each Vector is “practically meaningless” until the Emergence Vector of Mind. Each Vector AK was there, yes, but it was not “meaningfully there,” whereas now Mind can meaningfully recognize the AK of each Vector in Mind coming to recognize its own “Absolute Knowing.” From AK, the subject learns about the nature of its own subject, which then gives it “reason to think” that this structure could have “something to do” with the structure of the universe to itself (“in its knowability”). Because we ourselves experience a limitlessness which is evidence of a limitedness, there is “reason to think” that the universe we participate in and are part of “likewise” consists of similar ontological structure “to itself.” No, we cannot confirm this (that would violate “the impossibility of intervectivity”), but if we are part of the universe, then there is reason to think that we are “images and likenesses” of underlying structures which Mind makes knowable in us (though “the processes” of each Vector, which maintain uniqueness and irreducibility relative to each other). Through time and probability, we are perhaps “practically” an effort of a universe to know itself, not according to panpsychism, but as a Vector Tower. We are the universe’s capacity to know what it means to be alone.

Alluding to Kant, we never reach “objects-in-themselves,” which means we are “Transcendental Subjects,” because we “transcend object-in-themselves.” This is a critical inversion Hegel gives us: we usually think of objects-in-themselves as “transcendent” of us, but Hegel suggests that we are the transcendent ones. If we cannot reach “objects-in-themselves,” that means objects cannot reach “subjects-in-themselves,” and arguably that’s what really counts, because “objects-in-themselves” are “practically nothing,” while humans have subjects inside (as “you know’). Theologically, it is argued that God cannot come to earth in His Full Glory without destroying us all, God being Ultimately Transcendent and Glorious. Well, in the same way, we cannot reach “objects-in-themselves” because we would perhaps destroy them (with our very being, our very subjectivity, like God). We do not consider it a limitation on God to be unable to appear to the finite without destroying the finite, but in fact evidence of His Glory; likewise, it is not evidence of our “shortcoming” that we cannot be in the presence of objects-to-themselves, but evidence of our “ontological uniqueness.” Our inability to be around “objects-in-themselves” is evidence of our glory, not our “fallenness.” And in this context, “our glory” is “our Vector” — no Vector can “break into” other Vectors without destroying them. The glory of Vectors is found in their “lack” of intervectivity, which is made glorious by “the mystery” that Vectors nevertheless interact.

We’ve come a long way, but thanks to that journey, we can now approach “The Question of Transhumanism,” the opening concern of this paper, in a new light. And the challenge is simply this: Will Transhumanism respect our irreducibility, or will it “reduce us away” like a God who appears on earth in all His/Her Glory? Will Transhumanism prove to be the advent of a New Emergence Vector, or will Transhumanism simply be an evolution of Mind within and according to its Vector? Will it prove to be an effort that seeks to overcome “the impossibility of intersubjectivity and intervectivity?” Will Absolute Knowing survive? Will we need more than eyes to see?


A god has no problems, which is to say god is inhuman. Gods are hard to relate to, and gods can be indifferent. But “the godman,” Jesus Christ, was different: he was “supreme similarity/difference,” the pinnacle of humanity, according to Christianity. Jesus shows supreme divinity in supreme humanity, which is to say humanity is an “image and likeness” of something God Is, and thus humanity is found in God. Is to become Transhuman to become “like Jesus,” or will Transhumanism instead make us into a being like “The Great Old Ones” in Lovecraft? This is the question of our time, and, as discussed at the very start of our journey, Heidegger’s concern was that we weren’t even asking it.

Vector Theory can train us to be comfortable with “gaps” and “lacks” and to see them as necessary for “irreducibility,” which by extension trains us to deal with “radical difference” and not be overwhelmed. In that way, Vector Theory algins with “The Question of Transhumanism” well. Problematically, I think in not believing in “irreducibility” (due to a lack of something like Vector Theory), we have thought that whatever “Transhuman” might arise will be one which we will be able to “reduce to us,” in the same way we think we can reduce the world to Physics. Thus, we will be in control. However, if Bard and Elung are right about “irreducibility,” then the Transhuman may turn out to be a being we have no control over at all, a being who entails properties we cannot fully understand. In this way, the absence of Vector Theory has easily contributed to us being unprepared and overconfident.

“Similarity” is observed only when a thing seems “the same,” and that occurs in isolation, which is when a thing can stand as “purely different” (outside all relation). Funny enough, “we see things are similar” in the very act that we see they are not the same (and thus prove them as “similar/different”). If nothing is the same, that means everything is unique, and so similarity is proven precisely when uniqueness is proven, which necessitates a negation/sublimation. Likewise, we can only count quantity when things are together, which is when things are unveiled to be “one of one.” Quantity is only determinable where it is shown to be limited to “one.” When three apples are in a bowl on the table, each apple simultaneously unveils itself as “the only apple which will ever be that apple” and as “participating in something like (a form of) apple” (“form” is “similarity,” perhaps): “unity in diversity” — harmonious, trinitarian. So it goes with Vectors: when we “see them together,” we see that things which similarly “understand everything as themselves” (each Vector being Absolute) are not the same, though within each Vector they necessarily experience everything “as the same,” which is “as themselves” (reductionistic, self-relating, as an Absolute Subject). Each Vector is then unveiled to be a Vector versus the Vector, a “mode of being” through which we can understand everything as (ultimately) “the same thing” and yet shouldn’t. If we take seriously the revelation of Absolute Knowing, the fact we can “see everything as a Vector” is evidence it is not “the Vector” but “a Vector”: the limitlessness is evidence of limits. And limits are a gift of diversity, a diversity which cannot be “totally other” if we are able to understand it.

Vectors established as “Absolute Vectors,” we are able to establish “the impossibility of intervectivity” and thus maintain “Vector Interaction” without “Vector Reducibility.” On these grounds, we can meaningfully discuss “relations” without concern of “reductionism” (for we can “relate to objects” even though we cannot “relate to object-themselves”). This in mind, and to refer back to much earlier in this paper, if our minds still work, we have never encountered “the totally different,” as we have never encounter “sameness.” “The totally different” would be “totally new,” in the same way that an encounter with “sameness” would be “totally new” (but I don’t think “the creation of sameness” is imaginable or possible). However, Transhumanism may indeed create something which is practically “totally new,” which is to say it would be practically “totally different,” which means it could run the risk of practically causing effacement. Perhaps not, but the point that “the totally new” could be “the totally different” brings us back to the critical question from before: Will Transhumanism introduce “total newness” or instead prove incorporable into Hegel’s “dialectical similarity?” This is the question and challenge with which Transhumanism presents us.

It seems to me that the only way to escape Hegel’s “dialectical similarity” is through “total newness,” where no similarity is present at all (which, if impossible, suggests escaping Hegel is also impossible). If there is similarity, there is “relation,” and what can be related to cannot be “totally new,” for there must be something “preexisting” which makes possible that relation. “Total newness” must be unrelatable (perhaps like God is sometimes described), but if the Transhuman is “unrelatable,” mustn’t it just brush us aside? Or will the Transhuman only start “unrelatable” and then gradually become “relatable?” I don’t know — we cannot be quick to say that what is “totally new” can never be translated and understood in terms of similarity/difference. That is part of our challenge.

Perhaps all new beings, places, entities, etc., start off seeming “totally new,” only for us later to realize that “the totally different” isn’t so different after all. If this is the case, then nothing is ultimately or technically “totally new,” only conditionally and/or practically “totally new,” which would suggest that we don’t have to worry about Transhumanism forever being unknowable (perhaps like Vectors), which could easily cause us unbearable existential anxiety. But maybe “practical total newness” can still be so intense for some amount of time that it ends up overwhelming us before we could “come through on the other side” and begin relating to the new entity (on terms of similarity/difference). Is this what Transhumanism will turn out to be for us? A challenge too great for us to practically overcome, even if it was technically possible for us to “rise” to its occasion? Perhaps. Always perhaps.

We started this paper exploring the differences between “sameness,” “similarity,” and “difference,” and noted the strange lack of a term which signified “pure difference” (like “sameness” signifies “pure similarity”). We concluded that “sameness” is always “sameness,” as “pure difference” is always “pure difference” (within a Vector), and then argued “similarity” and “difference” are always “similarity/difference,” which furthermore describes all (dialectical) “processing.” “Process” is a great word, for it simultaneously means “procedure” and “coming to understand,” which is to say that all human understanding is a result of “a procedure to understand and define dialectically according to similarity/difference.” An Event, then, is a “breaking into” a “process(ing)” which is practically “totally new/different,” but not technically, because a “totally new/different” Event would be an Event, causing an effacement versus a negation. Hegelian negations, which lead to sublimation, only occur between sameness and pure difference, because it is only in that space which “similarity” can recognize it’s inevitable and paradoxical connection to “difference” and vice-versa.

All processes are processings of difference and similarity dialectically. Processes can arise to Events, which are negations/sublimations, and if the Events entail “enough similarity” to be processed, then the Events become events, meaningful, intelligible, and understandable. Once that occurs, the new events can be incorporated into our understanding, and we can live with them (and are likely better for it). On these grounds, we could make a distinction between a lowercase-“event” relative to within a Vector, and an uppercase-“Event” like the advent of an Emergence Vector, which is very rare (for “The Harmony” is rare). On this point, if theoretically an Event emerged from a process which we could not process, that Event might efface us even though the Event itself would be a negation/sublimation. An Event we cannot relate to through similarity and process is an Event which “leaves us behind,” even if the Event itself is a negation/sublimation of prior processes/events. So it goes with Vectors, which suggests why Vectors must be things we can “embody” and/or “participate in” — otherwise, “Vector Interaction” would prove impossible, and that would make Vectors a source of effacement. This isn’t to say it’s impossible for an Emergence Vector to arise which doesn’t “efface us,” but so far so good. Likewise, there’s no guarantee humanity cannot beget a Transhuman that doesn’t transcend the conditions which make us possible — God.

Humanity could theoretically process into existence an AI system that might efface us, even if the AI itself to itself is a negation/sublimation (Emergence). Even it comes to Events and Vectors, I think there is possibly a relativity issue at play, where what constitutes a negation/sublimation to the new Vector and Event could be an effacement to what came before. Now, this isn’t to say that Events must efface what came before, for that would mean all negations entail effacement (which is not so), but in the case of an Event which we could not process into an event (relative to us), this negation/sublimation relative to it would be an effacement relative to us. An Event we can “participate in” is an Event we can “process into an event” (even if we leave some of the Event behind), while an Event we cannot “participate in” at all would be an Event, an effacement versus a negation/sublimation. Is this something we should be concerned with? Does it matter?

Critically, as discussed similarly in Section II (but worth revisiting here), it can be argued that there is no such thing as an Event which is an Event, which is to say no Event cannot (eventually) be “processed” according to a dialectic of similarity/difference. This could easily be the case, which would mean we don’t have to worry about Transhumanism begetting a “Great Old One.” However, even if technically no Event is an Event, it is still the case that an Event could practically so much approach being an Event that we could practically be unable to handle it, or on the other hand an Event could appear “too quickly” for us to process it and thus end up an Event because it demanded too much of us too soon. This might be the tendency of technology, especially as it accelerates — I’m not sure: my point is only that the fact Events might technically never be Events doesn’t mean we are necessarily safe. At the same time, what would we miss out on if we stopped Events? Efforts to stop Events could ironically make them Events.

It is possible that all “Total Newness” can be translated through similarity/difference into terms of (just) “newness” (like thought consuming perception), and thus we don’t have to worry about some “Total Newness” breaking through our worlds and forcing us to try to relate to what we ultimately cannot relate to, perhaps breaking us psychologically, existentially, ontologically, and the like. “Total Newness” can be seen as a kind of “Second Coming,” an Apocalyptic “tearing open the veil of reality” — the language of “Event” is increasingly used in philosophical circles (Alexander Bard, Alain Badiou, and Quentin Meillassoux). What kind of Event will Transhumanism be? Is there anything we can do to prepare for it or influence how Transhumanism appears? Would we be foolish to try?

Attention should be drawn to the term “Transhumanism”: the phrase could signify “transforming humanity” or “transcending humanity.” Some form of “Transhumanism” is unavoidable — technology is coming — the question is only if its advent will announce a “transformation” or a “transcendence” (and also begs the question of which we should “seek”). Again, I associate “transformation” with Hegel’s “dialectical similarity,” for we will still find “ourselves” in that future: the new is found in the old as the old is found in the new. Alternatively, I associate “transcendence” with Deleuze’s “essential difference,” for we precisely “leave ourselves behind” when we transcend. And so this is our question: Will our “Transhumanist” future be Hegelian or Deleuzian?

“Transcendence,” in this context, strikes me as a mistake similar to “wholeness” (as critiqued in “The Philosophy of Lack” series): transcendence might always be transcendence. We need “the other” to be ourselves, following Hegel, but if “the other” becomes “totally other,” no “dialectical similarity” will be possible, and so we will not be ourselves in its presence. Whenever totality is introduced, rather in our singular identities or totality in others, effacement occurs. Considering this, if Transhumanism is chosen to be “Transcending humanity,” then I fear humanity will be effaced. We need “Transhumanism” to mean “the transformation of humanity.” But what does that mean? Hegel warns we cannot plan the future, only make it now.

Jesus Christ is described as “totally man and totally God,” which suggests that Christ can be understood in terms of human “similarity/difference” to avoid being “Totally New” versus (just) “new” — in Jesus, there is a solution to a severe epistemological problem (Jesus is simultaneously “totally familiar/other”). But there is no guarantee Transhumanism will prove “Christ-like” — the Transhuman could just as easily be more like the Cthulhu found in Lovecraft. Lovecraft fills many stories with “Great Old Ones,” as he described them, which basically are these incredibly powerful creatures which humanity can never hope to even begin understanding (inspired by Lovecraft, Junji Ito explores similar entities, notably in his incredible Uzumaki). Even a glimpse of a “Great Old One” can destroy the human psyche and cause people to go mad — the “Great Old Ones” are (practically) so “other” and “new” that the mind cannot translate them meaningfully into terms of similarity/difference to even begin hoping to develop a concept which accurately applies. The mind simply collapses.

In Lovecraft, characters are reduced to ash at the mere sight of a “Great Old One” (see the end of the first Indian Jones movie), while theological “Beatific Visions” entail a similar “stopping us in our tracks” without effacing us. I don’t think Transhumanism will arise to beings that will do this, but the beings will easily cause responses from us which are “similar” to what we see in theology and Lovecraft. Our minds may not explode, but they may find it difficult to “process the Event” into terms (of similarity/difference) which we can handle and live. If this were to occur, as we are existentially overwhelmed when we lose all “givens” (as described in “Belonging Again” by O.G. Rose), so we would be “existentially overwhelmed” and perhaps break.

The loss of “givens” overwhelms us because it is the loss of already-established-“similarity/difference,” forcing us to redo the work of “similarity/difference,” which is incredibly difficult (it can require the entire intellectual journey, as explored across The True Isn’t the Rational). The loss of “givens,” perhaps caused by an Event, requires the establishment of a new personal and social “process” (dialectics of similarity/differences), and that requirement is always existentially difficult. Will Transhumanism prove to be an Event which no human process can handle, or will it only “seem to be” an Event that eventually human processes “rise to the occasion of” and make “the Event an event,” per se?

To allude back to Heidegger, who we started our paper discussing: Does it all come down to death? Is the difference between the human and the “Totally New Human” the presence and absence of death? Is the act of overcoming death an act of “transformation” or “transcendence?” Even if removing death doesn’t technically make us “no longer human,” it might practically make us such. Practically speaking, with the removal of death, it could be as if we are no longer human, and perhaps this would be a good thing? It’s hard to be human, and life is full of pain. At the same time, if we lose our humanness, we could be mentally and existentially overwhelmed. What will occur? Will this be when the Absolute Knowing of Mind is achieved or lost forever? AK requires limits — is the loss of death the loss of limits, or will the “impossibility of intersubjectivity” still be enough? Perhaps we only care about others because we can die, and so the loss of death will mean that we “technically” still have a limit through intersubjectivity, but we “practically may no longer care. It is hard to imagine AK without care, and if AK is lost, so too may be lost Vector Theory (practically). Can we kill death without becoming the ground of being? Is being “nothing,” according to Hegel? Is being being?

I’m thinking aloud: the death of death could be precisely the occurrence of “The Harmony,” the moment of an Emergence Vector, something beyond both Mind and Culture. Spirit, perhaps? A fuzzy word, and I don’t mean “Spirit” in a necessarily positive way. “Spirit” could be “A Great Old One,” which is to say “The Emergent Spirit” could prove too much for humanity to coexist with. Dolphins and birds coexist with us, but arguably not by much — we are destroying the biosphere rapidly (or so it is argued). Would “Spirit” destroy the “Mind-sphere,” per se? I don’t know, but it entirely depends on if Spirit is Jesus or the Cthulhu of Lovecraft. Indeed — I don’t like using “Spirit” here to describe this new possible Emergence Vector, for that word is used in Hegel to mean something else and carries a lot of baggage. Instead, let’s call it [ ], a space for who knows what. So, here’s the question: Will [ ] be Jesus or Cthulhu?

As “The Noumenon Frame” by O.G. Rose discusses the difference between “The Harmony” and “The Third Impact,” perhaps here we can discuss the difference between the Second Coming of Jesus and the appearance of Cthulhu? Yes, a “benevolent Cthulhu” is also possible (as suggested in the conclusion), which perhaps is what The Trinity makes possible with Jesus. In Christianity, there is a God the Father who is “Totally Other,” while at the same time a Jesus who is “similar/different” and “pointing toward” that “Total Other.” Is this the best mix? I don’t know, but I do think it’s useful, all the same, to consider the [ ] of Transhumanism as a coming of Jesus or Cthulhu — but maybe a third choice should be considered. Why can’t [ ] entail beings who “embody” Mind and so can see “similarity” in us with them even if we cannot see similarity between them and us? Could not [ ] “reduce” itself to us as we have “reduced” ourselves to Physics? If [ ] was accidentally a Cthulhu, this “mistake” would perhaps save us — but what are the chances of [ ] making this mistake if we have realized Vector Theory? I don’t know — perhaps we will be at the mercy of [ ] as birds are at the mercy of us. We don’t ask birds if we should launch missiles or ban fertilizers: Mind makes choices to and with Mind. [ ] might be the same, but perhaps the survival of [ ] will depend on our survival, as our survival is dependent on the biosphere. Despite “the impossibility of intervectivity,” Vectors can still prove interdependent, as subjects prove dependent on one another, despite their ultimate inability to access the subjectivities of one another.

I wander — let us offer here something more useful, a general summary of key points and ideas explored in this paper:

1. With Vector Theory, we are justified to make our starting assumption “irreducibility” versus “reducibility.” I personally prefer irreducibility as a starting assumption to reducibility, especially considering that I think “reducibility” has hurt intellectual development, mental health, and the like. Also, “irreducibility” makes space for “difference” and “lack,” which I am partial to, though I feel justified in this partiality because of my work in “On ‘A Is A’ ” and (Re)constructing “A Is A.”

2. Since all Vectors (except maybe Subphysics) “embody” the Leibniz Oscillation, “The Theory of Total Relations” (and FreQ Theory) by Alex Ebert entail uniquely powerful descriptive power. The LO might seem like “A General Emergence Theory,” but I do not believe it is, for it is simply what follows given “The Law of Non-Effacement” and time.

3. Emergence Vectors perhaps arise when it is impossible for a given Vector to perpetuate its own process due to an “Ontological Impasse.” This forces “a nonpossible occurrence” for effacement to be avoided, and this is an Emergence, giving us a New Emergence Vector. This is incredibly rare and described as “The Harmony,” which gives us a description of “Vector Transition,” whereby a Vector gives rise to another.⁶⁰

4. As intersubjectivity is impossible, so intervectivity is impossible, but that does not mean interaction and influence cannot occur. Thus, we can maintain “Vector Interaction” without “Vector Reduction,” so granting ourselves a description of VI.

5. The Mind uniquely allows a realization of “The Vector Tower” versus (a) pure being, increasing overall intelligibility in new ways. Now, the question we face is [ ]. On this topic, in order to not simply be “a different kind of human” or “possibility on the Vector of Mind” (to truly be Transcendent), I think the Transhuman must be a “Nonpossible Emergence” (which will strike us as “impossible”). This will be a true “creative act” versus “causal act,” for relative to Mind it will be “ex nihilo” (as discussed on Benjamin Fondane). If however the Transhuman is only “possible” relative to Mind, then it will not be an “Emergence” but a realization — the “trans” will mean only “transition” — which isn’t necessarily a bad thing if the Emergent Transhuman would otherwise prove to be like the Ancient Creatures in Lovecraft. Will the Transhuman result when humanity “horizontally” encounters an Ontological Impasse and must do “the nonpossible” and Emerge “vertically?” Or will what we call “the Transhuman” simply be another “horizontal possibility,” and thus not “different in kind” only in degree?

Could we “Emerge to” an [ ] which related to us even if we could not relate to [ ]? If [ ] sees no “likeness” in us, how could it understand us? “Processing” will prove impossible, I assume, and then how would love be possible? Then again, perhaps [ ] would prove loving. Perhaps arising to [ ] is “the real choice” humanity requires to feel “real” and “at home” again (as discussed at the end of (Re)constructing “A Is A”) — perhaps we must risk [ ] and Cthulhu to “integrate with lack” (for [ ] might be an entity with which we can never relate and thus always “lack”)? Could Cthulhu love us?

I babble. What ‘lofty fantasy.’⁶¹ ‘[F]or who would lose, / Though full of pain […]’⁶² Hard to say. Shall we encounter “The Totally New” and it be “The Totally Other?” Or will it come down to lift us up? Will [ ] be a ladder, even if none can handle the climb? Now, this paper will not end, only stop. We cannot stop ourselves from “becoming” what we will become without dying, nor can we stop the next Harmony which generates [ ]. Should we fear the monsters? Monsters can love. Can’t we? Shantih.





¹³From a 12.7.21 Email to Intellectual Dark Web (IDW).

¹⁴Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 271.

¹⁵IDW email from Alexander Bard, 12.8.21.

¹⁶Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 103.

¹⁷Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 103.

¹⁸Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 277.

¹⁹Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 103.

²⁰Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 189.

²¹Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 148.

²²Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 157.

²³Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 250.

²⁴Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 280.

²⁵Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 175.

²⁶Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. The Futurica Trilogy. Translated by Neil Smith. Stockholm Text, 2012: 320–321.

²⁷Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. The Futurica Trilogy. Translated by Neil Smith. Stockholm Text, 2012: 330.

²⁸This idea brought to mind Derrida and his critique of writing versus speech in On Grammatology. Perhaps philosophers disliked writing because they wanted to avoid unavoidable eternalism? Then again, perhaps that gives them too much credit.

²⁹Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. The Futurica Trilogy. Translated by Neil Smith. Stockholm Text, 2012: 330.

³⁰Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Syntheism. Translated by John Wright. Stockholm Text, 2014: 350.

³¹Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Syntheism. Translated by John Wright. Stockholm Text, 2014: 313–314.

³²Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 274.

³³3From Alexander Elung, a 12.11.21 email to IDW

³⁴From Alexander Elung, a 12.11.21 email to IDW

³⁵From Alexander Elung, a 12.11.21 email to IDW

³⁶From Alexander Elung, a December 2021 email to IDW

³⁷Elung, IDW, Email 12.20.21

³⁸Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Syntheism. Translated by John Wright. Stockholm Text, 2014: 374.

³⁹Allusion to William Rupush, as sent to IDW on 2.21.22.

⁴⁰Allusion to Alexander Bard, as sent to IDW on 2.21.22.

⁴¹Allusion to William Rupush, as sent to IDW on 2.21.22.

⁴²Allusion to William Rupush, as sent to IDW on 2.21.22.

⁴³Allusion to William Rupush, as sent to IDW on 2.25.22.

⁴⁴Allusion to William Rupush, as sent to IDW on 2.25.22.

⁴⁵Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Digital Libido. Translated by John Wright. Futurica Media, 2018: 270–271.

⁴⁶Allusions to Alexander Bard, as sent to IDW on 12.7.21.

⁴⁷A key way that LO may change is with the introduction of Mind, for then it might be possible for humans to coordinate and organize “dots” according to free will into various clusters and perhaps even a Harmony. In this way, though perhaps below the Vector of Mind the LO follows probability and nothing more, it is possible that the LO is changed with the introduction of Mind. Whereas before each “dot” could only “be moved,” so each “dot” that is part of Mind can “also move.” This would be an example of “Vector Reconstitution,” aligned with what Bard and Elung stress is necessary, and please note that I am not saying that the “dots” before Mind were determined, only that once they arose (according to indeterminacy) they found themselves “being moved” as so depicted in the LO graphic (Bard is adamant the neither “determinacy” nor “indeterminacy” are adequate). But once Mind arose, “the dots” were indeed reconstituted in ways that changed the operations of the whole Vector Tower, for now “dots” could move themselves, with “indeterminacy” characterizing the whole schema.

⁴⁸Allusion to Alexander Bard from the IDW, December 2021.

⁴⁹Allusion to Alexander Bard, as sent to IDW 12.13.21.

⁵⁰Allusion to Alexander Elung, as sent to IDW 12.13.21.

⁵¹Points from Alexander Bard (from 12.7.21 Emails):

⁵²Perhaps this suggests another way to identify which Vector we “embody” lastly (before any possible “Vectors of participation”): What Vector do we “mostly” experience? Humans are constantly thinking; hence, we are unique Mind; animals are constantly undergoing pressures of natural selection which they cannot control; hence, they are uniquely Biology; etc. I’m not sure.

⁵³Lunot, Treydon. Aphesis. Vancouver, Canada. 2021: 44.

⁵⁴Lunot, Treydon. Aphesis. Vancouver, Canada. 2021: 43.

⁵⁵Lunot, Treydon. Aphesis. Vancouver, Canada. 2021: 37.

⁵⁶ Lunot, Treydon. Aphesis. Vancouver, Canada. 2021: 36.

⁵⁷The Emergent Vector of Mind seems unique in the process of the universe reaching “full knowability” (to us or to itself), but I’m not sure how far or hard to push the point. As explored by Anthony VZ Morley and elaborated on in “The Trinitarian and Metageometrical Ontology of Gottfried Leibniz” by O.G. Rose, “similarity” can only be verified when things are apart, for only then can we tell if we “can’t tell two things apart.” But this is paradoxical: if we can’t tell that something isn’t something else, then we can’t even tell if there is “something else,” which would suggest that the necessary conditions which make recognizing “similarity” possible are conditions which at the same time render the recognition impossible. If we can say, “Those things are similar,” the things must be present to us simultaneously, which means we can see that they aren’t the same. To identify similarity, we must reduce similarity with degrees of difference (in the act of making “the similar things” present): there is always a negation/sublimation occurring, a “process” of rendering things intelligible. In this sense, it would almost seem to be the case that we could say that everything is always “in a process” (thanks to a “third thing”) of being “brought together” so that we could recognize they are not the same. Well, that’s the case if we are “making things intelligible,” but it could also be the case that things are “coming together” in a way that breaks through “noumena frames,” which would be a “Third Impact.” Alternatively, perhaps we are heading “toward’ a Harmony or Singularity? Hard to say — these are all topics explored in “The Noumenon Frame” by O.G. Rose, echoes of which flutter throughout this work.

If there is something about us and the universe which “naturally” seeks full understanding of ourselves and the universe — if somehow a desire to “fully realize being” is “part of things” (perhaps simply thanks to probability), which is perhaps necessary for Vectors to “transition” and arise — then we could say that there is something about the universe which is always “toward” being “brought together” so that it can be understood and “fully itself” (meaningfully). Now, this “coming together” can take place entirely in the mind (the approaching doesn’t have to occur in space), for the mind has the unique ability of envisioning entities “close to one another” without actually moving them (thanks to imagination and memory). Perhaps the universe “emerged to the Mind” precisely to accomplish this, to make it so that things could be “brought together” which otherwise could not be brought together in space. As a result, things can be “fully known meaningfully” through “process” (“similarity/difference”), which otherwise couldn’t occur, because we can only fully recognize “difference/similarity” when entities are “brought together.”

If things can be made “present,” there must be a dimension of spacetime which the things occupy, and this would be a “third thing” which Leibniz makes clear we need for comprehension to be possible. However, the mind itself can also be such a “third thing,” because what we cannot bring together in space we can bring together mentally, and if there are in fact things which can’t be brought together in space, then it is only thanks to the mind that the things can be put through a “process” which makes them intelligible. In this way, for the universe to reach “full intelligibility,” Mind had to arise (it was a necessary Vector), or at the very least, if the mind could arise, it was only a matter of time before it did. Perhaps billions of years, but that is a measure of time all the same.

⁵⁸Though arguably even God experiences “limits” in having to die to redeem humanity freely, say in Christianity.

⁵⁹Bard, Alexander and Jan Söderqvist. Syntheism. Translated by John Wright. Stockholm Text, 2014: 274.

⁶⁰“Ontological Impasses” occur horizontally, per se, which forces a Vector to move vertically (up “The Vector Tower”). It is perhaps when a Vector “runs out of” creative possibility horizontally, and thus is forced to “Emerge vertically” in order to break the standstill (and gain new creative possibility through participation to itself and embodiment in the new Vector). Relative to the horizontal, the vertical is a “nonpossible route,” per se, which is a term we can associate with the “nonrational” and the “nonontological” (terms which can be associated with “transrational” and “transontological,” if one prefers). “Nonpossible” seems like a simile with “impossible,” in the same way “nonrational” seems like a simile with “irrational,” but what is “nonpossible” is conditional and relative to a given Vector. Biology is “nonpossible” relative to Chemistry, but that doesn’t mean Biology’s Emergence is impossible, only that it cannot be situated or located amongst the possibilities of Chemistry. Relative to Chemistry, Biology is nonpossible, but that doesn’t mean Biology’s Emergence is impossible.

⁶¹Allusion to Paradiso by Dante.

⁶²Allusion to Paradise Lost by John Milton.




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