A Short Piece
Inspired by “The Net (38)”
Javier Rivera has reflected on how if someone we love worries about us, we cannot not follow their advice without risking the relationship: if we do what they think we shouldn’t do, then this will impact the quality and nature of our bond. The person can only “just stop worrying” about us, or else there is nothing we can do, for we can never prove to them that they shouldn’t worry. Similarly, as argued in “On Trust” by O.G. Rose, we cannot earn a person’s trust; they either give it to us or withdraw it. If we must earn their trust, we are completely at their mercy, and there are no guarantees.
Worry always threatens relationships, precisely because it is a “self-relating negativity” in the sense that nothing can satisfy it or “convince it” to stop worrying. Worry can always find reason to worry: it either chooses to stop itself or it will not stop. This is elaborated on in “On Worry” and “Concerning Epistemology,” both by O.G. Rose, but the point was raised that a form of worry can infiltrate “philosophical conversations,” because we can worry that if we disagree with someone and their interpretation of a thinker, that person will get upset and our relationship will be ruined. It was noted that this tendency often occurs in academic debates, but if these new “online intellectual spaces” are going to avoid “just being universities online,” they will need to follow different “social dynamics.” For me, one of those new dynamics should be the lack of such personal offense if someone disagrees, which perhaps was incentivized in universities because people were “specialists” in this thinker or that thinker, so if someone disagreed with them it would be a disagreement in something in which we’ve invested decades. Indeed, perhaps the unavoidability of disagreement was understandable, but it can also hinder and destroy intellectual development.
Anyway, worry can compel us into seeking for “trust to be earned,” and this is not possible: trust can only be given or denied. As this can describe our relation to people, so this can describe our relation to reality itself: a search for an “objective ground” for reality is to fail to trust the world, and there is nothing the world can do to make us trust it. And so we never find that ground, and we end up “snakes eating on own tails” (as warned in David Hume). If we don’t believe the world is “there,” it cannot make us trust it, and so we will not, and so we will seem wise not to trust it (after all, it never earns our trust). In this way we must either “give trust” or a relationship will be impossible, so we must either “choose to believe reality is there” or we will be unable to operate in the world. The “lack of a ground” means the world must be trusted or else there is nothing the world can do. This is Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing,” and choosing to “trust” the world is the start of thought, for we must trust the world to believe we can meaningful ask, “Why must reality be trusted?” With this question, we might begin to glimpse the possibility of a beneficial and creative “white hole,” precisely thanks to a “useless groundlessness” — but more on that later.
I
“The Net” then transitioned into a discussion on systems of accreditation today and “the college monopoly on credentials,” which I personally believe is a massive contributor to class immobility and societal stagnation (see “Innovating Credentials” by O.G. Rose). I am of the opinion that “employment testing” needs to be made far less legally risky and seen as more important than resumes — I believe we are beyond the historic period for when “the resume” was acceptable. Now, people can create online “portfolios” of their work to show that they are competent in say philosophy, as they could come downtown and pass an “oral examine” as evidence of their competence. I see no reason why a “resume” should be used when a “portfolio” is possible, and if colleges indeed offer the best education, then graduates will have the best portfolios (there is no need for the resume or monopoly). Similarly, if a 42-year-old single mom can pass an “employment test” at coding better than a 25-year-old from Harvard, I don’t see why the self-educated single mom shouldn’t get the job, contributing to class mobility.
Another advantage of a portfolio is that when people ask about the value of an English major, we’ll have something to show them. Now, vague answers are given, perhaps about how it activates some neurons that help us think in surprising ways — another answer that cannot be falsified and proves convenient. We don’t tend to wonder what photographers create, because we can see their portfolio — the same could start to happen with literature, philosophy, and the like. In the past, we didn’t have YouTube or the internet to make “portfolios” for average people in these areas, but that is now changing. We have ways of showcasing these abilities like we couldn’t in the past, and it is always better to “show” instead of “tell” where that is possible. Resumes “tell,” while portfolios “show.”
II
High Root made the point that we don’t want a world in which there is only space for what is considered “useful” though, and I agreed. On this point, I think we have lost a useful and important “hobby culture”: people today see no reason to do something unless they will be paid for it, and so people do not learn skills or hobbies (if it doesn’t have use, either in making us money, maintaining health, or helping us feel better, we do not do it). As a result, we don’t do what is “useless,” which includes modes by which we enhance our lives and gain interests. We don’t read novels; we don’t study philosophy; we don’t experiment; we don’t take risks. All of these enterprises are necessarily “useless” to start, and if we aren’t allowed socially to do what is “useless,” we will not have a culture of people who can be creative (suggesting why we are suffering “A Great Stagnation,” exactly as Tyler Cowen discusses, which also suggests the dangers of the “Bestow Centrism” against which Nietzsche warned).
In my view, the humanities are unique in that the mode and character of the person teaching them profoundly impacts their effectiveness, how they are taught, and how students absorb them. Though a professor teaching engineering who views it “just as a job” might not make a great class, that teacher probably won’t make “bridges” and “engines” seem like they don’t matter (after all, people use them daily), but an English professor who treats English “just as a job” will easily make literature seem like a waste of time (after all, few people read). Therefore, it is particularly important that teachers of the humanities, philosophy, etc., be people who truly believe in their fields, but how do we better ensure that this proves the case?
There are no guarantees, but a “life test” might help. In my view, it is perhaps by people having to learn philosophy on their own, without social and financial support, which can function as a test to help determine who really means it when they say they believe in the humanities. Furthermore, philosophers would have to be “street smart” and have some degree of “life experience” if they are to navigate learning philosophy on their own while also paying bills. In my view, to have a “hobby test” would actually help us have higher quality philosophers teaching the fields, while also working against the stereotype that professors have “no real world experience.” This could help colleges regain legitimacy, which is currently a severe problem. Now, of course, the risk of this is that qualified people wouldn’t financially survive long enough to practice a hobby into expertise, and that is a real risk, but likewise the current system of accreditation risks “keeping out” qualified individuals because they don’t have “the right credentials.” There are always risks and imperfections, but at least deconstructing “the college monopoly on credentials” could help increase mobility and opportunity.
If someone on their own learns philosophy, which would require them to study it as a hobby, this alone could suggest the person “really believes in philosophy.” This could help ensure that people who become professors were the kinds of people who helped people “believe” in philosophy, and then these people could go and take an “employment test” to receive the position. Having this opportunity always available, this would also help colleges not feel as if they “serve elites” and the “entitled,” for there would always be opportunity for those who put in the work. Mobility and ability could begin to work to correct rigidness and accreditation. (Please note here that I am not trying to claim that “accreditation” is bad or something like that, but rather that “portfolio” and “ability” are better accreditations than resumes and accreditation. There was a time due to information restriction where resume and accreditation were needed, but times have changed. The internet has opened doors.)
A culture of hobbies is a culture that thinks about using “free time” not just to consume, and also it could create a space to teach people that “the useless” can actually be generative. Sure, there is no clear reason why a person should study philosophy — and then one day there is, out of nowhere, surprisingly. What we choose to do in “the useless” can determine if we are ready for “the unexpected.” Where we don’t use free time to better ourselves, we cannot respond well to unexpected opportunities, nor can we use our time in a manner that helps us be interesting and be interested. Culture is shaped and a mirror of what a people do in their “free time,” and where there is no hobby culture, culture will be consumerist and/or “workaholic” in a manner that benefits the system. Hobbies can liberate, but the current “college monopoly on credentials” greatly hinders the development and flourishing of a hobby culture. Because of this, we are impoverished.
If the “useless” isn’t the source of life, then life will be “used,” and for what? All that’s left is death. The “useless” must be the source of society, or else humans will be made in “the image and likeness” of society versus society be made in “the image and likeness” of people. Humans are “useless,” and that is precisely evidence that humans are invaluable. If humans had “use,” this would suggest they were a means to an end. In a world where there is no space for “uselessness,” humans cannot “be” humans — we must be tools.
However, worry must be curtailed and overcome if we are to enjoy and benefit from “uselessness,” because it is natural to worry that we are “wasting time” or that others are doing the same, and once worry enters a situation, it does not go away unless we simply choose to let it go away. Perhaps a reason we have fallen into systems of accreditation we cannot escape is precisely because of worry and the desire for assurance that a person is indeed “doing something of use?” In this way, the fates of “worry” and “uselessness” are tied together, and a society that is founded more on creation and “humanity” will require courage and trust. Despite what we feel inside, we will have to trust the process, even if it seems like all anyone is doing is useless.
III
Chetan noted the difference between “use” and “useless” in Hannah Arendt, and the conversation further explored the role of philosophy in helping us examine “uselessness” (its good and bad forms), and how philosophy could similarly train us as subjects to psychologically and emotionally handle “the groundlessness” which we find ourselves encountering in life. We cannot “use” a mode of seeing the world, only “use” in a mode. If everything must be “useful” to be taken seriously, then we will not take seriously the mode through which we see and understand the world. For this, we will suffer.
A black hole is “useless” because it sucks everything in, but a white hole is also “useless,” and yet a white hole is a source of the universe. We cannot use a white hole because it would destroy us if we tried, and yet both are very different in their “uselessness.” Chaos is useless, but so is the singularity from which life can emerge, and the trick is learning to discern the difference between these kinds of “uselessness.” Without philosophy, we probably will not have the skill needed to tell this difference, and for that we will suffer. To learn philosophy is to identify such distinctions.
A “Dialogos” conversation is an example of a “useless” discussion that makes a “clearing” for the “white hole” out of which the surprising can “emerge.” They are meta-expressions of the principles discussed in “The Net (38),” and an example of how doing the “useless” can generate. Nobody knows what is going to be said ahead of time. Nobody knows what is going to happen. It’s useless. It’s a white hole. Around this point, Chetan noted that though we tend to associate “plurality” and “subject,” which is to say “against objectivity,” the more people who interpret x, the more reason there is to believe that x is actually and “objectively” present. Plurality does not mean there is less objectivity, but actually suggests there is more reason to believe “objectivity” is possible, even if it somehow becomes more difficult. Plurality can help us believe more in there being a world we share, while isolationism might make it feel more like there is less of a world to share. In this, we can see hope for coming together precisely down a road we have associated with a plurality which causes fragmentation. In this way, we can see the growing State and Spirit in Hegel as a growing revelation that “plurality” increases belief in “objectivity,” which means our faith in the possibility of “harmony” can also increase.
Anyway, if multiplicity increases objectivity (in a certain sense), and we experience “white holes” in a “Dialogos,” then there is reason to associate that emergence as something more objective precisely because it occurs with other people around. And so “emergence’ is arguably more real, which would suggest that “intersuppositional events” are more real, and so for Hegel to consider “the intersuppositional” as a ground for philosophy and reasoning is for Hegel to orbit around what is possibly “more real” than not. If we can associate “the intersuppositional” with “a white hole,” then perhaps deepest reality is generative (and experienceable thanks to the right “conditioning” of subjects), which would mean what we experience as “groundless” and “nothing” is infinitely creative. Is this to experience “wine” instead of “lumber,” to allude to my take on Heidegger? Hard to say.
IV
It seems like there is something like three stages: the useless, the useful, and then the holistic-useless. The holistic-useless seems to be “emergent,” and it cannot be used because this would separate the whole into parts which can be used and thus end the generative-ness of the emergence. In this, we can see the need for “uselessness” to undergo a “Philosophical Journey” found in Hume and “Phenomenological Journey” found in Hegel, as likewise required so that “impulsiveness” might transition and be refined into “intrinsic motivation.”
To escape “the monopoly on credentials,” we will need to overcome worry and extend trust to what seems “useless,” for there is no other possibility of “a white hole,” nor the possibility of an experience which would give us more reason to believe and trust in “something objective” by which we could avoid nihilism and fragmentation. Since though we cannot realize “groundlessness,” this “objectivity” isn’t a “ground,” but something more like a “relation,” which is “intersuppositional.” What kind of world would we live in if we treated relations as “most real” versus foundations? How would this change our thinking and socioeconomic enterprises? Would we become more Whiteheadian? More communal? Hard to say, but even entering this question and considering it requires “useless” philosophy.
The very idea that “the useless is a white hole” is itself an idea we must trust or else it cannot prove true. It can seem silly to suggest “the useless is generative,” and yet this is what we must trust if it were to prove possible. Similarly, we must trust in people who lack accreditation and instead only have themselves to offer (in oral exams, in portfolios), but there is no other way to really access the true “white hole” which people can prove to be. There is a risk there, and it can seem more rational to force people to prove their “use” through accreditation, and again, before the internet and the ability of people to create “portfolios” and readily educate themselves, it’s understandable why we used the accreditation system that we did. But times have changed, and now we have the internet and YouTube — there is no need for “the college monopoly on credentials.” And now if we don’t change, we will know there is something wrong (or college will price itself out of business), and this will agonize us. We must act. We must negate/sublate. If we don’t, Artificial Intelligence might force the question.
.
.
.
For more, please visit O.G. Rose.com. Also, please subscribe to our YouTube channel and follow us on Instagram, Anchor, and Facebook.
